THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 
MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


HOBART'S  ANALYSIS  OF 

BISHOP  BUTLER'S 

ANALOGY  OF  EELIGION, 

Natural  antr  3&ebealeK, 

TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 
WITH  NOTES. 

ALSO,  CRAUFURD'S  QUESTIONS  FOR  EXAMINATION 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF 


HOBART'S  ANALYSIS  OF 

BISHOP  BUTLER'S 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

Natural  antr  Hebealett, 

TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 
WITH  NOTES. 

ALSO,  CRAUFURD'S  QUESTIONS  FOR  EXAMINATION. 
REVISED 


ADAPTED  TO  THE  USE  OF  SCHOOLS. 


BY  CHARLES   E.  WEST, 

PRINCIPAL   OF  RUTGERS    INSTITUTE   IN  THE   CITY   OF  NEW  YORK. 


NEW    YORK: 
HARPER  &  BROTHERS,   PUBLISHERS, 

82  CLIFF    STREET. 
1848. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  forty-eight,  by 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District 
of  New  York. 


877/W 


ADVERTISEMENT, 


AN  abridgment  of  Hobart's  Analysis  of 
Butler's  Analogy,  with  questions  for  examina- 
tion by  Craufurd,  was  edited  by  me  some  three 
or  four  years  since.  From  the  favorable  man- 
ner in  which  the  work  was  received,  I  have 
been  led  to  prepare  another  edition  for  the 
press,  differing  from  the  former  in  the  follow- 
ing respects  :  1st.  The  Analysis  is  given  with- 
out abridgment.  2d.  The  Questions  have  not 
been  introduced  into  the  body  of  the  text,  but 
are  appended  at  the  end  of  the  several  chap- 
ters. This  course  has  been  adopted  to  meet 
the  wishes  of  friends,  some  of  whom  have  ex- 
pressed the  desire  that  there  should  be  no  inter- 
ruption in  the  text  by  the  introduction  of  ques- 
tions ;  while  others  have  been  pleased  with  the 
questions,  and  have  preferred  that  they  should 
be  retained.  By  the  arrangement  adopted,  it 


iv  ADVERTISEMENT. 

will  be  seen  that  the  views  of  both  have  been 
met.  The  use  of  the  questions  is  left  at  the 
option  of  the  teacher.  They  can  be  dispensed 
with,  if  rigid  attention  is  given  to  the  synopsis, 
as  presented  at  the  beginning  of  each  chapter. 
The  combined  study  of  both,  however,  will  not 
be  found  unprofitable  :  the  first,  as  giving  a  suc- 
cinct outline  of  the  argument ;  the  second,  as 
leading  to  such  explanations  as  are  adapted  to 
fix  it  in  the  mind  of  the  learner.  If  the  scholar 
will  take  the  pains  of  studying  the  two  in  con- 
nection, he  can  not  fail  of  mastering  his  task. 
This  is  the  end  which  has  been  kept  in  view 
by  the  publication  of  this  little  work,  and  it  is 
hoped  that  its  introduction  into  Academies  and 
Schools  where  Butler  is  studied  will  prove  this 
effort  at  his  elucidation  not  to  have  been  un- 
successful. 

CHARLES  E.  WEST. 


Rutgers  Institute,  New  York, 
Feb.  26th,  1848. 


PREFACE, 


NOTWITHSTANDING  the  approbation  with 
which  this  celebrated  treatise  of  Bishop  Butler 
has  been  received,  his  style  has  been  frequently 
censured  as  intricate  and  obscure.  A  great 
portion  of  this  obscurity  should  justly  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and,  perhaps, 
a  greater  degree  of  it  to  the  comprehensive 
mind  of  the  author,  and  the  conciseness  of  ex- 
pression characteristic  of  such  minds.  It  can 
not  be  expected  that  difficulties  of  the  former 
kind  can  be  lessened  by  an  analysis,  or,  in- 
deed, by  any  thing  else,  without  that  serious 
attention  in  the  reader  which  subjects  of  such 
importance  demand — the  removal  of  those  of 


vi  PREFACE. 

the  latter  class  has  here  been  attempted.  For 
example,  the  scope  and  connection  of  the  sev- 
eral parts  not  being  sufficiently  marked  out ; 
the  length  of  elaborate  sentences,  where  clauses 
are  minutely  opposed,  or  exceptions  briefly  ad- 
verted to ;  repetitions  that  separate,  at  great 
intervals,  the  parts  of  the  reasoning ;  the  in- 
troduction of  digressionary  remarks — all  con- 
tribute to  render  it  the  more  abstruse  for  ordi- 
nary perusal. 

The  summary  at  the  head  of  each  chapter, 
in  this  Analysis  shows,  at  once,  its  design  and 
the  connection  of  the  steps  of  reasoning  em- 
ployed in  it.  For  the  most  part,  the  precise 
language  of  the  original  has  been  adhered  to, 
so  far  as  it  did  not  come  within  the  preceding 
exceptions.  Some  notes  have  been  occasion- 
ally introduced  from  the  text  containing  re- 
marks unconnected  with  the  chapter  in  which 
they  stand,  while  others  have  been  added  of  an 
explanatory  nature. 

It  is  distinctly  to  be  kept  in  view,  that  the 
evidence  of  analogy  is  applied,  not  to  the  proof 
of  religion  natural  or  revealed,  but  to  the  con- 
firmation of  that  proof  supposed  to  be  known. 


PREFACE.  vii 

"  I  know  no  author,"  says  Dr.  Reid,  "  who 
has  made  a  more  just  and  a  more  happy  use  of 
analogical  reasoning  than  Bishop  Butler,  in  his 
Analogy  of  Religion.  In  that  excellent  work, 
the  author  does  not  ground  any  of  the  truths  of 
religion  upon  analogy  as  their  proper  evidence  : 
he  only  makes  use  of  analogy  to  answer  objec- 
tions against  them.  When  objections  are  made 
against  truths  of  religion,  which  may  be  made 
with  equal  strength  against  what  we  know  to 
be  true  in  the  course  of  nature,  such  objections 
can  have  no  weight."  To  the  same  purpose,  it 
is  observed  by  Dr.  Campbell,  that,  "  analogical 
evidence  is  generally  more  successful  in  silen- 
cing objections  than  in  evincing  truth.  Though 
it  rarely  refutes,  it  frequently  repels  refutation  ; 
like  those  weapons  which,  though  they  can  not 
kill  the  enemy,  will  ward  his  blows." 

It  consequently  follows,  that  if  any  point  of 
the  analogy  appears  weak,  it  is  not  to  be  con- 
cluded that  the  proper  proofs  of  it  are  so. 
Some  parts  are  more  convincing  than  others  ; 
but  the  force  of  this  treatise  can  only  be  esti- 
mated by  viewing  all  its  parts  in  connection. 
The  books  of  Nature  and  of  Revelation  are 


viii  PREFACE. 

compared  together.  An  Author  of  Nature  is 
the  only  point  assumed  ;  and,  by  a  reference  to 
the  natural  course  of  things — to  indisputable 
facts — to  man  himself,  according  to  his  original 
constitution — to  his  daily  habit  of  acting  on 
evidence  far  inferior  to  that  which  ac  ompanies 
revelation — all  objections  are  answered,  as  ap- 
plying with  equal  force  against  the  constitution 
of  nature,  where  they  are  found  false  in  fact. 
The  objector  is  answered  according  to  princi- 
ples which  he  can  not  deny.  The  part  of  his 
conduct  which  is  natural  convicts  him  of  ob- 
jecting to  what  is  equally  suited  to  his  nature. 

It  is  evident  that  the  proper  motives  and 
principles  of  the  Christian  are  not  to  be  looked 
for  in  a  work  that  descends  so  low  ;  for  exam- 
ple, the  nature  of  human  life  is  such  as  to  en- 
courage any  kind  of  exertion  OD  the  lowest 
chance  of  obtaining  the  end  in  view ;  yet,  al- 
though this  may  show  the  unreasonableness  of 
neglect  with  regard  to  a  future  state,  where  the 
chance  of  its  existence  is  acknowledged,  this 
chance  is  not  intended  to  be  a  substitute  for 
that  faith,  which  is  "  the  substance  of  things 
hoped  for,  and  the  evidence  of  things  not  seen." 


PREFACE.  ix 

Yet  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  the  believer  can 
not  be  confirmed  by  arguments  from  analogy. 
He  also  may  have  doubts  which  they  can  im- 
mediately dispel ;  and  to  all,  even  the  most 
steadfast  disciples  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  they  must 
afford  some  degree,  if  not  of  profit,  at  least  of 
pleasure.  It  might  be  added,  if  the  work  were 
written  on  any  other  subject,  that  it  would 
serve  as  a  useful  exercise  to  our  intellectual 
faculties  in  and  for  itself;  but,  in  this  case,  the 
end  so  far  exceeds  the  means,  that  we  must  al- 
together lose  sight  of  them  in  the  all-important 
object  to  which  they  are  directed.* 

But  the  chief  design  of  this  treatise  undoubt- 
edly is,  to  wrarn  the  unbeliever  and  careless  pro- 
fessor of  the  danger  to  which  they  are  exposed, 
and  to  extort  from  their  own  breasts  a  confes- 
sion of  their  self-condemnation ;  to  show  them 

*  I  can  not  forbear  adding  a  late  encomium  upon  the 
works  of  the  author  of  the  Analogy  : — "  I  am  ready  and  anx- 
ious to  acknowledge,"  observes  Dr.  O'Brien,  "  that  I  trace  so 
distinctly  to  his  ( Bishop  Butler's)  writings  the  origin  of  the 
soundest  and  clearest  views  that  I  possess  upon  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind,  that  I  could  not  write  on  this  or  any  kin- 
dred subject,  without  a  consciousness  that  I  was,  directly  or 
indirectly,  borrowing  largely  from  him." — Vide  Two  Ser~ 
mons  on  the  Human  Nature  of  Christ. 


x  PRFEACE. 

that  there  is  more  even  in  natural  religion,  and 
much  more  in  revealed  religion,  than  they  sup- 
pose ;  and  to  lead  them  to  search  the  Scrip- 
tures of  truth.  It  is  humbly  hoped  that  the 
present  Analysis  may  prove  useful  with  re- 
spect to  such  persons  where  the  abstruseness 
of  the  original  work  might  render  it  less  ef- 
ficient, or  even,  in  some  degree,  prevent  its 
perusal. 


CONTENTS. 


I-A.GB 

INTRODUCTION .13 

PART  I. 

OF    NATURAL    RELIGION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  a  Future  Life 25 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punishment, 
and  particularly  of  the  latter        .         .         .         .         .39 

CHAPTER  III. 
]    Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God  .         .         .         .         .48 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties, 
and  Danger 62 

CHAPTER  V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline 
and  Improvement .68 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing 
Practice 88 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or 
Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended     .        .        .101 


xii  CONTENTS. 

PART  II. 

OF    REVEALED    RELIGION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity.         .         .         .         .113 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Supposed  Presumption  against  Revelation,  con- 
sidered as  Miraculous  .  .  .  .  .  .127 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging  what  were  to  be  expected 
in  a  Revelation;  and  the  Credibility  from  Analogy 
that  it  must  contain  things  appearing  liable  to  ob- 
jections   135 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution, 
imperfectly  comprehended 148 

CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity ;  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World 
by  Him 153 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation ;  and  of  the 
supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it  .  .  .  172 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity   .         .         .189 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  arguing 
from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion  .  .  .216 


INTRODUCTION, 


I.  The  Nature  of  Probable  Evidence. 

II.  The  Foundation  of  Probable  Evidence. 

III.  The  Imperfections  of  Probable  Evidence. 

IV.  Yet  Probability  the  Guide  of  Life. 

V.  General  way  of  arguing  from  Analogy  conclusive. 

VI.  Application  of  Analogy  to  Religion. 

VII.  The  degree  of  weight  to  be  attached  to  it. 

VIII.  Its  superiority  above  arguments  not  drawn  from  facts. 

I.  PROBABLE  evidence  is  essentially  distinguish- 
ed from  demonstrative  by  this — that  it  admits  of 
degrees — from  the  highest  moral  certainty  to  the 
very  lowest  presumption.  But  the  very  lowest  pre- 
sumption does  riot  prove  a  thing  to  be  probably  true; 
especially  if  (as  there  may  be  probabilities  on  both 
sides)  there  are  any  probabilities  against  it ;  yet  it 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  probability,  for  by  fre- 
quent repetition,  it  will  amount  to  moral  certainty. 
Thus,  the  observation  of  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the 
tide  to-day  begets  a  very  low  presumption  that  it 
may  happen  to-morrow  ;  but  this  observation  often 
repeated  gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 
B 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

II.  From  observing  a  likeness  in  this  event  to  an- 
other which  has  come  to  pass,  we  determine  on  the 
probability  of  its  occurrence,  and  so  of  every  thing 
else.*     Therefore,  the  foundation  of  probability  is 
expressed  in  the  word  "  likely"  (verisimile),  like 
some  truth,  or  true  event,  in  itself,  or  in  its  evi- 
dence, or  in  some  of  its  circumstances;  and  thus  it 
daily  happens  that  we  have  a  presumption,  an  opin- 
ion, orfall  conviction  of  the  truth  of  an  event,  past 
or  future,  according  to  the  frequency  of  the  obser- 
\ation  of  a  similar  one  under  similar  circumstan- 
ces.    For  example,  we  conclude  that  a  child,  if  it 
lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  stature  and 
strength  of  a  man — that  food  will  contribute  to  the 
preservation  of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it,  for  such 
a  number  of  days,  will  be  its  certain  destruction. 
Whether  we  judge,  expect,  hope,  or  fear,  we  are 
guided  by  the  same  principle  of  observed  similarity. 

III.  But  the  extent  of  our   observation  being 

*  Though  the  common  experience  of  the  ordinary  course 
of  things  have  justly  a  mighty  influence  on  the  minds  of  men, 
to  make  them  give  or  refuse  credit  to  any  thing  proposed  to 
their  belief,  yet  there  is  one  case  wherein  the  strangeness  of 
the  fact  lessens  not  the  assent  to  a  fair  testimony  given  of  it. 
For  where  such  supernatural  events  are  suitable  to  ends 
aimed  at  by  Him  who  has  the  power  to  change  the  course  of 
nature,  there,  under  such  circumstances,  they  may  be  Jitter  to 
procure  belief,  by  how  much  the  more  they  are  beyond  or  con- 
trary to  ordinary  observation.  This  is  the  proper  case  with 
miracles,  which,  well  attested,  do  not  only  find  credit  them- 
selves, but  give  it  also  to  other  truths  which  need  such  con- 
firmation.— Locke. 


xNTRODUCTION.  15 

limited,  it  may  warrant  a  fair  conclusion  in  the 
way  of  analogy,  though  a  false  one.  Thus  the 
prince  who  lived  in  a  warm  climate,*  who  had 
never  seen  water  but  in  a  fluid  state,  naturally  in- 
ferred that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  water  be- 
coming hard.t  The  field  of  our  observation  being 
more  extended,  we  do  not  consider  this  any  pre- 
sumption against  the  possibility  of  water  being 
frozen.  We  know  that  it  is  supposable  that  there 
may  be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in  January 
next,  and  probable  on  some  day  in  that  month,  and 
morally  certain  some  time  or  other  in  the  winter. 
Therefore,  probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature, 
affords  but  an  imperfect  kind  of  information. 

IV.  It  relates  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities. 

*  A  Dutch  embassador,  entertaining  the  King  of  Siam  with 
the  particularities  of  Holland,  which  he  was  inquisitive  after, 
among  other  things,  told  him  that  the  water  in  his  country 
would  sometimes,  in  cold  weather,  be  so  hard  that  men 
walked  upon  it,  and  that  it  would  bear  an  elephant  if  it 
were  there.  To  which  the  king  replied,  "  Hitherto  I  have 
believed  the  strange  things  you  have  told  me,  because  I  look 
upon  you  as  a  sober,  fair  man,  but  now  I  am  sure  you  lie." — 
Locke. 

t  But  it  has  been  well  observed,  by  Dr.  Leland,  that  ex- 
perience may  assure  us  that  facts  or  events  are  possible,  but 
not  that  the  contrary  is  impossible.  The  greatest  uniformity 
and  frequency  of  experience  can  not  prove  the  certainty  of 
an  event,  nor  even  afford  the  least  probability  that  it  would 
never  happen  otherwise.  For  aught  we  know,  there  may  be 
occasions  on  which  it  would  fail,  and  secret  causes  in  the 
frame  of  things  which  sometimes  may  counteract  these  by 
which  it  is  produced. 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

Every  thing  is  certain  to  an  Infinite  Intelligence, 
for  every  thing  must  be  observed  by  Him  abso- 
lutely as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly  true  or  certainly 
false ;  but  with  us  most  things  are  only  probable. 
In  questions  of  real  or  imaginary  difficulty,  the  low- 
est presumption  on  one  side  more  than  on  the  other 
determines  the  question  ;  and,  in  the  common  pur- 
suits of  life,  even  in  questions  of  great  consequence, 
we  find  men  considering  themselves  bound  to  act 
not  only  where  there  are  merely  slight  probabili- 
ties in  favor  of  success,  but  when  these  are  equalled, 
or  even  exceeded,  by  probabilities  against  their  suc- 
ceeding. 

V.  But  whence  is  it  that  likeness  produces  a 
presumption,  opinion,  or  full  conviction  ]  And 
how  can  we  be  certain  that  the  conclusion  drawn 
by  analogy  is  correct?  This  belongs  to  the  sub- 
ject of  logic,  and  is  a  part  of  that  subject  which 
has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  considered ;  but  it  is 
evident  (and  enough  for  the  present  purpose)  that 
this  general  way  of  arguing  is  natural,  just,  and 
conclusive ;  for  there  is  no  man  can  make  a  ques- 
tion but  that  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,*  and  be 

*  "  A.  man  brought  into  being  at  maturity  and  placed  in  a 
desert  island  would  abandon  himself  to  despair  when  he  first 
saw  the  sun  set  and  the  night  come  on :  for  he  could  have  no 
expectation  that  ever  the  day  would  be  renewed.  But  he  is 
transported  with  joy  when  he  again  beholds  the  glorious  orb 
appearing  in  the  east,  and  the  heavens  and  the  earth  illumi- 
nated as  before.  He  again  views  the  declining  sun  with  ap- 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  cir- 
cle, and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 

VI.  For  introducing  this  sort  of  reasoning  into 
the  subject  of  revealed  religion,  we  have  the  au- 
thority of  Origen,  who  has  observed,  that  "  he  who 
believes  the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  Him 
who  is  the  Author  of  nature,  may  well  expect  to 
find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  in  it  as  are  found 
in  the  constitution  of  nature."  And  it  may  be 
added,  that  he  who  denies  the  Divine  origin  of  the 
one,  on  account  of  these  difficulties,  may,  with  as 
much  reason,  deny  that  of  the  other.  We  argue 
from  the  likeness  that  exists  between  the  revealed 
and  the  natural  dispensation  of  Providence,  that 
they  have  both  the  same  Author;  at  least,  that 
the  objections  against  it  are  of  no  force,  from  diffi- 
culties in  the  one  analogical  or  similar  to  what  are 
found  in  the  other,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be 
from  God,jfor  an  Author  of  nature  is  here  SUPPOSED 
(and  to  this  assumption  there  can  be  no  objection, 

prehension,  yet  not  without  hope  :  the  second  night  is  less  dis- 
mal than  the  first,  but  is  still  very  uncomfortable  on  account  of 
the  weakness  of  the  probability  produced  by  one  favorable  in- 
stance. As  the  instances  grow  more  numerous,  the  probabil- 
ity becomes  stronger  and  stronger:  yet  it  may  be  questioned, 
whether  a  man  in  these  circumstances  would  ever  arrive  at 
so  high  a  degree  of  moral  certainty  in  this  matter  as  we 
experience,  who  know  not  only  that  the  sun  has  risen  every 
day  since  we  began  to  exist,  but  also  that  the  same  phenom- 
enon has  happened  regularly  for  more  than  five  thousand 
years,  without  failing  in  a  single  instance. — Beattie  on  Truth. 
B* 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

since  it  is  not  denied  by  the  generality  of  those 
who  profess  themselves  dissatisfied  with  the  evi- 
dences of  religion ;  and  if  it  were,  as  there  is  no 
presumption  against  it  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  so 
it  has  been  often  proved,  with  accumulated  evi- 
dence, from  final  causes,  abstract  reasonings,  tra- 
dition, the  general  consent  of  mankind,  &c.,  &c.). 

VII.  As  to  the  degree  of  weight  to  be  attached 
to  this  argument  from  analogy,  in  some  cases  it 
will  amount  to  a  practical  proof — in  others  merely 
a  confirmation  of  what  can  be  otherwise  proved ; 
yet  its  chief  force  will  be  to  answer  the  objections 
against  the  system  both  of  natural  and  revealed  re- 
ligion, and  it  will  possess  considerable  force  in  an- 
swering objections  against  the  evidence  of  it — the 
argument  being  conclusive  in  proportion  to  the  de- 
gree of  the  whole  analogy  or  likeness.     It  is  to  be 
distinctly  observed  that,  in  this  analogy,  we  argue 
from  known  existing  facts  to  others  that  are  like 
them. 

VIII.  This  has  been  shown  to  be  a  method  of 
proof,  practical,  usual,  and  conclusive  in  various 
degrees.     It   does  not   argue  from  hypothesis,  or 
from  the  possibility  to  the  propriety  of  a  better 
form  of  Divine  government.     Those  who    argue 
from  hypothesis,  reason  either  from  assumed  prin- 
ciples, or  from  certain  principles  assumed  to  be  ap- 
plicable to  cases  to  which  they  have  no  ground  to 
apply  them.     The  former  resemble   Des  Cartes 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

building  a  world  upon  hypothesis;  the  others  act 
like  those  who  explain  the  structure  of  the  human 
body  from  mere  mathematics,  without  sufficient 
data.  As  to  those  who  run  into  the  wild  extrava- 
gance of  planning  an  improved  state  of  things,  the 
plan  fixed  on  by  the  wisest  speculator  probably 
would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according  to  his 
own  notion  of  "  best."  For  what  would  he  pro- 
pose ?  That  which,  both  by  occasions  and  mo- 
tives, was  productive  of  the  greatest  virtue,  or 
greatest  happiness,  or  both  combined ;  i.  e.,  when 
fully  expressed,  that  all  creatures  should,  at  first, 
be  made  as  perfect  and  as  happy  as  they  were  ca- 
pable of  being ;  that  nothing — at  least  nothing  of 
hazard  or  danger — should  be  put  upon  them  to 
do ;  or  that  they  should,  in  fact,  always  do  what 
was  right  and  most  conducive  to  happiness.  And 
how  would  he  effect  this  ?  He  would  do  away 
with  the  method  of  government  by  punishment,  as 
absurd  and  contrary  to  happiness ;  and  he  would 
either  not  give  them  any  principles  which  would 
endanger  their  doing  wrong,  or  he  would  lay  the 
right  motive  of  action  before  them  in  so  strong 
a  manner  as  would  never  fail  of  inducing  them  to 
act  conformably  to  it.  We  may  at  once  give 
this  General  Answer :  Following  the  first  princi- 
ples of  our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge  some 
ends  to  be  preferable  to  others ;  and  our  whole  na- 
ture leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

God,  and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  Him ;  this  is  a 
practical  proof  of  His  moral  character,  for  it  is  the 
voice  of  God  speaking  in  us ;  from  hence  we  con- 
clude that  virtue  and  happiness  are  essentially 
united,  and  that  under  His  government  right  must 
prevail.  But  the  necessary  means  of  accomplish- 
ing this  end,  we  have  not  faculties  to  determine. 
Even  in  the  little  affairs  of  this  present  life,  we  are 
not  competent  judges,  and  we  are  likely  to  be 
much  less  so  in  a  system  of  such  extent  as  this 
world  may  be,  taking  in  all  that  is  past  and  to 
come,  though  we  should  suppose  it  detached  from 
the  whole  creation. 

We  shall  first  apply  the  argument  from  analogy 
to  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears — a  fu- 
ture life. 


QUESTIONS— INTRODUCTION. 

1.  How  is  probable   evidence   distinguished   from 
demonstrative ;  and  to  what  may  the  former  at  length 
amount  ?     Illustrate  this  by  a  fact  in  nature. 

2.  What  exception  does  Locke  justly  produce  to  the 
following  general  rule,  namely  :  that  from  observing  a 
likeness  in  an  event  to  another  which  has  come  to  pass, 
we  determine  on  the  probability  of  its  occurrence  and 
so  of  every  thing  else  ? 

3.  What  imperfection    naturally  attaches  itself  to 
our  reasoning  by  analogy,  from  the  extent  of  our  ob- 
servation being  limited  ?     Quote  Dr.  Leland's  observa- 
tion as  to  the  exact  value  of  experience,  in  reasoning 
upon  a  reported  fact. 

4.  How  do  men  act  in  all  worldly  affairs,  with  re- 
spect to  probable  evidence  ? 

5.  Quote  the  argument  from  Beattie  by  which  he 
endeavors  to  prove  that  likeness  would  produce  pre- 
sumption, then  opinion,  lastly  conviction. 

6.  What  does  Origen  say  upon  the  application  of 
analogy  to  religion  ?     How  does  Butler  support  and 
confirm  his  argument  ? 

7.  What  degree  of  weight  is  to  be  attached  to  the 
argument  from  analogy ;  and  in  what  consists  its  prin- 
cipal excellence  ? 

8.  What  general  answer  may  we  give  to  those  who 
would  argue  from  the  possibility  to  the  propriety  of  a 
better  than  the  existing  form  of  Divine  government? 


SCHEME  OF  PART  I. 


ON    NATURAL    RELIGION. 

CHAP.  I.  Analogy  folly  confirms  the  Scripture  account  of 
the  existence  of  a  Future  State — 

CHAP.  II.  And  that  it  will  be  one  of  Rewards  and  Punish- 
ments— 

CHAP.  III.  And  that  these  Rewards  and  Punishments  will  be 
dispensed  according  to  the  merit  and  demerit 
of  our  actions. 

CHAP.  IV.  Therefore  it  becomes  incumbent  on  us  to  resist 
all  Temptations  in  this  State  of  Trial. 

CHAP.  V.  And  to  make  use  of  all  the  Means  of  Improvement 
for  another  Life,  which  this  Probation  State 
affords  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline. 

CHAP.  VI.  For  these  Obligations  are  not  in  the  least  degree 
affected  by  the  opinion  of  Universal  Necessity. 

CHAP.  VII.  Or  by  any  objections  which  may  be  urged  against 
God's  Moral  Government. 


PART  I. 
OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ON    A    FUTURE    STATE. 

I.  A  Future  State  probable  from  the  Changes  which  we  have 
undergone. 

II.  And  from  the  probability  of  our  continuing  endued  with 
the  same  Capacities,  unless  there  be  some  ground  for  sup- 
posing that  Death  will  destroy  us — we  have  no  grouud 
from  Analogy  or  Reason,  and  we  can  not  have  it  from  any 
thing  else. 

HI.  Yet  there  are  Imaginary  Presumptions  founded  on  the 
notion  of  Living  Beings  being  Compounded,  and  therefore 
divisible.  A  proof  of  the  Contrary  confirmed  by  a  general 
Observation  from  Experience,  leading  to  four  particular 
Observations.  An  Objection  to  some  of  these,  "  that  they 
tend  to  prove  the  immortality  of  Brutes,"  answered. 

IV.  A  contrary  Analogy  proved  to  be  only  apparent. 

V.  Our  entrance  on  another  State  shown  to  be  natural. 

c 


26  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  [PART  I. 

I.  PASSING  by  the  difficulties  raised  by  some  con- 
cerning personal  identity,*  the  probability  of  a  fu- 
ture state  appears  from  the  changes  we  have  under- 
gone— from  the  imperfect  state  of  infancy  to  mature 
age.  Nor  is  this  a  law  of  our  being  only,  that  we 
should  exist  at  one  period  of  our  life  with  capaci- 
ties of  action,  of  enjoyment,  and  suffering  greatly 
different  from  those  at  another  period  of  it;  we 
find  it  in  other  creatures  also;  for  example,  the 
change  of  worms  into  flies — birds  and  insects  burst- 
ing the  shell,  and,  by  this  means,  entering  into  a 
new  world.  But,  as  far  as  we  are  concerned,  that 
there  should  be  a  future  state  of  existence,  as  dif- 

*  To  the  Analogy  are  usually  subjoined  two  dissertations, 
both  originally  inserted  in  the  body  of  the  work.  One  on 
Personal  Identity,  in  which  are  contained  some  strictures 
on  Mr.  Locke,  who  asserts  that  consciousness  makes  or  con- 
stitutes Personal  Identity ;  whereas,  as  our  author  observes, 
consciousness  makes  only  Personality,  or  is  necessary  to  the 
idea  of  a  person,  i.  e.,  a  thinking,  intelligent  being ;  but  pre- 
supposes, and  therefore  can  not  constitute,  personal  identity ; 
just  as  knowledge,  in  any  other  case,  presupposes  truth,  but 
does  not  constitute  it.  Consciousness  of  past  actions  does 
indeed  show  us  the  identity  of  ourselves,  or  gives  us  a  cer- 
tain assurance  that  we  are  the  same  persons  or  living  agents 
now  which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our  remembrance 
can  look  back :  but  still  we  should  be  the  same  persons  as 
we  were,  though  this  consciousness  of  what  is  past  were 
wanting,  though  all  that  had  been  done  by  us  formerly  were 
forgotten — unless  it  be  true  that  no  person  has  existed  a 
single  moment  beyond  what  he  can  remember.  The  other 
dissertation  is  on  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  which  does  not  be- 
long to  the  religious,  but  to  the  moral,  system  of  our  author. 
— Bishop  Halifax. 


CHAP.  I.]  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  27 

ferent  from  the  present  as  the  present  is  from  our 
state  in  the  womb  and  in  infancy,  is  only  what  is 
warranted  by  the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  Secondly,  from  the  probability  of  our  con- 
tinuing endued  with  the  same  capacities  of  action, 
happiness,  and  misery  which  we  feel  that  we  now 
possess.  This  is  probable,  unless  there  be  some 
ground  for  supposing  that  death  will  destroy  them ; 
for,  in  any  thing,  existence  leads  to  a  probability 
of  continuance,  except  where  we  have  some  reason 
to  think  it  will  be  altered.  This  seems  to  be  our 
only  reason  for  believing  that  any  one  substance 
now  existing  will  continue  to  exist  a  moment 
longer  (the  self-existent  substance  only  excepted). 
There  is  the  same  kind  of  probability,  though  not 
the  same  degree  of  it,  that  our  living  powers  will 
continue  after  death  as  there  is  that  our  substances 
will;  and  there  would  be  no  probability  against 
the  former,  if  men  were  assured  that  the  unknown 
event,  death,  was  not  the  destruction  of  our  facul- 
ties of  perception  and  action;  i.  e.,  there  would  be 
no  probability  against  it  arising  from  any  thing 
else,  unconnected  with  death,  being  able  to  destroy 
them.  Now,  if  death  be  justly  presumed  to  destroy 
them,  and  if  this  be  not  merely  a  confused  suspicion, 
we  must  have  some  ground  for  the  presumption 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  or  from  the  analogy 
of  nature.  First,  we  have  it  not  from  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  for  we  know  not  what  death  is  in  it- 


28  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  [PART  1 

self,  but  only  some  of  its  effects,  such  as  the  disso- 
lution of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones ;  we  know  not  upon 
what  the  exercise  (much  less  the  existence)  of  our 
living  powers  depends  ;  for  they  may  exist  without 
being  exercised,  and  when  there  is  no  present  ca- 
pacity of  exercising  them,  as  in  a  sleep  or  swoon. 
They  may  depend  on  something  out  of  the  reach 
of  the  King  of  Terrors ;  so  that  there  is  nothing 
more  certain  than  that  the  reason  of  the  thing 
shows  us  no  connection  between  death  and  the 
destruction  of  living  agents.*  Secondly,  we  have 
it  not  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  for,  throughout 
the  whole  of  it,  there  is  not  the  slightest  presump- 
tion that  animals  ever  lose  their  living  powers — 
much  less,  if  possible,  by  death.  This  event  de- 
stroys the  sensible  proof  which  we  had  before  their 
death,  of  their  being  possessed  of  living  powers, 
but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to 

*  Destruction  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression 
unavoidably  ambiguous,  and  may  signify  either  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  living  being,  so  as  that  the  same  living  being  shall 
be  incapable  of  ever  perceiving  or  acting  again  at  all,  or  the 
destruction  of  those  means  and  instruments  by  which  it  is  ca- 
pable of  its  present  life,  of  its  present  state  of  perception,  and 
of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the  former  sense.  When  it  is 
used  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  present  is  added.  The  loss  of 
a  man's  eye  is  a  destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  latter 
sense;  but  we  have  no  reason  to  think  the  destruction  of 
living  powers,  in  the  former  sense,  to  be  possible.  We  have 
no  more  reason  to  think  a  being  endued  with  living  powers, 
ever  loses  them  during  his  whole  existence  than  to  believe 
that  a  stone  ever  acquires  them. — Butler. 


CHAP.  L]  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  29 

believe  that  they  are  then,  or  by  that  event,  de- 
prived of  them.  As  far  as  our  faculties  can  trace, 
they  retain  them,  and  this  is  in  itself  a  probability 
of  their  retaining  them  beyond  that  period,  espe- 
cially when  viewed  in  connection  with  our  first 
proof. 

III.  Objected  against  the  assertion  that  "  there  is 
no  proof  from  the  reason  of  the  thing"*  "  Living 
beings  are  compounded,  and  so  divisible." 

ANSWER.  There  is  no  proof  of  this ;  it  arises  not 
from  reason,  but  from  that  delusive  faculty — useful, 
indeed,  to  apprehension,  but  the  author  of  all  error 
— Imagination.  Since  consciousness  is  indivisible, 
it  should  rather  seem  that  the  perceptive  power, 
and  consequently  the  subject  in  which  it  resides, 
must  be  so  too.t  As  a  particle  of  matter  (as  well 
as  its  power  of  motion)  is  one  and  indivisible,  if  its 
motion  be  absolutely  one  and  indivisible — for  if  the 

*  There  is  no  subject  on  which  doubts  and  difficulties 
may  not  be  started  by  ingenious  and  disputatious  man ;  and 
therefore  from  the  number  of  their  objections,  and  the  length 
of  the  controversy  to  which  they  give  occasion,  we  can  not, 
in  any  case,  conclude  that  the  original  evidence  is  weak,  or 
even  that  it  is  not  obvious  and  striking.  Were  we  to  pre- 
sume that  every  principle  is  dubious  against  which  specious 
objections  may  be  contrived,  we  should  be  quickly  led  into 
universal  skepticism.  The  two  ways  in  which  the  ingenuity 
of  speculative  men  has  been  most  commonly  employed  are 
dogmatical  assertions  of  doubtful  opinions,  and  subtle  cavils 
against  certain  truths. — Gerard's  Dissertation,  II.,  4. 

t  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Dodwell,  and  the  defenses 
of  it. 


30  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  [PART  I. 

particle  were  divisible,  one  part  might  be  moved 
and  the  other  at  rest,  and  thus  its  motion  could  not 
be  as  is  supposed — in  the  same  way,  if  the  subject 
of  consciousness  be  divisible,  the  consciousness  of 
our  own  existence  would  be  divisible ;  so  that  one 
part  would  be  here  and  another  there,  contrary  to 
what  is  supposed  and  experienced.*  Hence  the 
absolute  oneness  of  the  living  agent  renders  the 
body  unessential  to  its  being,  and  our  organized 
bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part  of  ourselves, 
than  any  other  matter  around  us ;  and  yet  it  is  as 
easy  to  conceive  how  such  matter  may  be  appro- 
priated to  our  use  in  the  manner  that  our  present 
bodies  are,  as  how  we  receive  impressions  from, 
and  have  power  over  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy  to 
conceive  that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies  as  in 
them  ;  that  we  might  have  animated  bodies,  of  any 
other  organs  and  senses,  wholly  different  from  those 
now  given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate 

*  That  it  is  highly  unreasonable  and  absurd  to  suppose 
the  soul  made  up  of  innumerable  consciousnesses,  as  matter 
is  necessarily  made  up  of  innumerable  parts ;  and,  on  the 
contrary,  that  it  is  highly  reasonable  to  believe  the  seat  of 
thought  to  be  a  simple  substance  such  as  can  not  naturally  be 
divided  and  crumbled  into  pieces,  as  all  matter  is  manifestly 
subject  to  be,  must,  of  necessity,  be  confessed.  Consequently 
the  soul  will  not  be  liable  to  be  dissolved  at  the  dissolution 
of  the  body,  and,  therefore,  it  will  naturally  be  immortal.  All 
this  seems  to  follow,  at  least,  with  the  highest  degree  of 
probability,  from  the  single  consideration  of  the  soul's  being 
endued  with  sense,  thought,  or  consciousness. — Clarke's  Evi- 
dence of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion. 


CHAP.  I.]  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  31 

these  same  or  new  bodies,  variously  modified  and 
organized,  as  to  conceive  how  we  can  animate  such 
bodies  as  our  present.  Their  destruction,  then, 
might  be  like  that  of  any  other  matter,  without  any 
tendency  to  destroy  our  living  powers.  Even  with- 
out determining  whether  our  living  substances  be 
material  or  immaterial,  all  this  is  confirmed  (though 
from  the  nature  of  the  case  not  properly  proved) 
by  observations  from  experience.  We  remain  the 
same  living  agents  after  the  loss  of  our  limbs,  or- 
gans of  sense,  or  even  the  greatest  part  of  our 
bodies ;  we  can  remember  ourselves  the  same  when 
our  bodies  were  extremely  small,  and  we  lose  now, 
and  might  have  lost  then,  a  great  part  of  our  bodies, 
and  yet  remain  the  same.  And  it  is  certain,  that 
the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in  a  constant  change 
from  that  never-ceasing  attrition  which  there  is  in 
every  part  of  them.  All  this  leads  us  to  distinguish 
the  large  quantity  of  matter  in  which  we  are  near- 
ly interested  from  the  living  agent  who  remains  one 
and  the  same  permanent  being. 

OBJECTION.  What  is  alienated  or  lost  is  no  part 
of  our  original  solid  body,  but  only  adventitious 
matter. 

ANSWER.  Surely  entire  limbs  which  we  may  lose 
must  contain  many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of  the 
original  body;  or,  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have 
no  proof  that  any  of  these  solid  parts  are  dissolved 
or  alienated  by  death. 


32  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  [PART  I. 

From  this  it  follows  : — 1st.  Even  though  the  liv- 
ing being  be  not  absolutely  indivisible,  yet  it  can 
not  be  assumed  that  death  will  be  the  dissolution  of 
it  until  its  proper  bulk  be  determined,  and  till  it  be 
determined  to  be  larger  than  the  solid  elementary 
particles  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to 
think  any  natural  power  can  dissolve.  2dly.  Our 
interest  in  systems  of  matter  does  not  imply  the  de- 
struction of  ourselves  the  living  agents,  for  we  have, 
though  not  to  the  same  degree,  the  like  interest  in 
all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us  ideas,  and  over 
which  we  have  any  power ;  nor  have  we  any  ground 
to  conclude  that  any  other  systems  of  matter,  sup- 
pose internal  systems,  are  the  living  agents  them- 
selves ;  for  we  can  have  no  reason  to  conclude  this, 
except  from  the  same  principle — our  interest  in  such 
systems.  3d.  If  we  consider  the  component  parts 
of  our  body,  this  will  more  clearly  appear.  Our 
organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  only  instruments 
which  the  living  persons  ourselves  make  use  of  to 
perceive  and  move  with ;  and  therefore  we  have  no 
other  kind  of  relation  to  them  than  we  have  to  any 
other  foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  per- 
ception and  motion — suppose  into  a  microscope 
and  a  staff.  But  are  not  our  organs  themselves 
percipient  ?  No ;  the  common  optical  experiments 
show  that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same  sense 
that  we  see  with  glasses ;  and  the  like  may  justly 
be  concluded  from  analogy  of  all  our  other  senses. 


CHAP.  I.]  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  33 

Some  of  these  organs  may  be  lost,  while  the  living 
beings,  the  former  occupiers,  remain  unimpaired. 
In  dreams  we  have  a  latent  power,  and,  what  would 
otherwise  be  an  unknown  power,  of  perceiving  sen- 
sible objects  in  as  strong  and  lively  a  manner  with- 
out our  external  organs  of  sense  as  with  them.  But 
are  not  our  limbs  endued  with  the  power  of  moving 
and  directing  themselves  1  No ;  a  man  can  move 
an  artificial  leg,  for  example,  as  he  used  to  move 
his  natural  one,  only  that  the  natural  instrument  of 
motion  was  more  exactly  formed,  so  as  to  move 
and  produce  motion  in  its  several  parts ;  his  active 
power  remains  unlessened.  And  thus  the  finding 
that  the  dissolution  of  matter  in  which  living  beings 
were  most  nearly  interested  is  not  their  dissolution, 
and  that  the  destruction  of  several  of  the  organs 
and  instruments  of  perception  and  of  motion  is  not 
their  destruction,  shows,  demonstratively,  that  there 
is  no  ground  to  think  that  the  dissolution  of  any 
other  matter,  or  destruction  of  any  other  organs 
and  instruments,  will  be  the  dissolution  or  destruc- 
tion of  living  agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  relation. 
And  we  have  no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any 
other  kind  of  relation  to  any  thing  which  we  find 
dissolved  by  death. 

OBJECTION.  Brutes,  in  the  same  way,  might  be 
proved  to  be  immortal,  and,  by  consequence,  capa- 
ble of  everlasting  happiness. 

ANSWER.  (1st.)  In  amoral  point  of  view,  no  such 


34  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  [PART  I. 

consequence  necessarily  follows  as  that  they  should 
be  capable  of  everlasting  happiness ;  and,  even  ad- 
mitting it,  there  is  no  difficulty ;  for  we  know  not 
what  latent  capacities  they  may  be  endued  with: 
and  it  is  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  beings  should 
possess  capacities  of  virtue  for  some  time  without 
exercising  them,  as  in  infancy  and  childhood,  and 
often  without  exercising  them  at  all  in  this  world. 
(2dly.)  As  to  a  natural  immortality,  the  economy 
of  the  universe  may  require  living  creatures  with- 
out any  capacities  of  this  kind.  Therefore  we 
must  know  the  whole  system  before  such  can  be 
an  objection  to  this  part  of  the  proof  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  human  soul :  it  is  less  applicable 
to  the  next  part,  which  is  more  peculiar  to  man. 
(3dly.)  Our  present  powers  of  reflection  not  be- 
ing dependent  on  our  gross  bodies  in  the  manner 
in  which  our  organs  of  sense  are,  we  may  conclude 
that  they  are  not  destroyed  by  death.  We  can 
live  in  a  state  of  reflection,  after  ideas  are  gained, 
when  none  of  our  senses  are  affected  or  appetites 
gratified,  and  in  this  state  enjoy  the  greatest  pleas- 
ure, or  feel  the  greatest  pain,  without  any  assist- 
ance from  our  senses,  and  without  any  at  all,  which 
we  know  of,  from  that  body  which  will  be  destroy- 
ed by  death.  Further,  there  are  some  mortal  dis- 
eases which  do  not  affect,  and,  therefore,  it  may 
be  presumed,  will  not  destroy  our  present  intel- 
lectual powers.  Indeed,  the  body  and  intellectual 


CHAP.  I.]      ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  35 

powers  mutually  affecting  each  other  would  no  more 
prove  the  necessity  of  their  joint  dissolution  than 
the  connection  of  the  body  and  the  living  agent  re- 
quired their  joint  destruction,  as  already  shown; 
but  instances  of  their  not  affecting  each  other  afford 
a  presumption  of  the  contrary.  Several  things,  in- 
deed, greatly  affect  all  our  living  powers,  and  at 
length  suspend  the  exercise  of  them — as,  for  in- 
stance, drowsiness  increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound 
sleep ;  and  from  hence  we  might  have  imagined  it 
would  destroy  them,  till  we  found,  by  experience, 
the  weakness  of  this  way  of  judging.  But  by  these 
diseases  there  is  not  even  a  shadow  of  probability 
that  our  present  reflecting  powers  will  be  destroy- 
ed. And  if  death,  by  diseases  of  this  kind,  is  not 
their  destruction,  it  will  scarcely  be  thought  that 
death  by  any  other  means  is;  and  as  it  does  not 
destroy,  it  is  probable  it  does  not  interrupt  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  since  they 
can  be  exercised  without  the  aid  of  the  body,  and  in 
a  most  lively  manner,  during  the  whole  progress  of 
a  mortal  disease ;  nay,  it  may  even  remove  the  kin- 
derance  to  our  existing  in  a  higher  state  of  reflec- 
tion,* namely,  those  external  organs  which  render  us 
capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state  of  sensa- 
tion, so  that  it  may  in  some  respects  answer  to  our 

*  There  are  three  distinct  questions  relating  to  a  future 
life  here  considered :  Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of 
living  agents  ?  if  not,  whether  it  be  the  destruction  of  their 


36  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.       [PART  I. 

birth,*  not  a  suspension,  but  a  continuation  of  our 
former  faculties,  with  great  alterations. 

IV.  Objected  against  the  assertion  that  "  there  is 
no  proof  from  analogy."     There  is  an  analogy  for 
death  being  the  destruction  of  living  creatures — 
namely,  the  decay  of  vegetables. 

ANSWER.  This  comparison  may  be  just  enough 
for  poetic  similes,  but  not  for  an  analogy  ;  for  one 
of  the  two  subjects  compared  is  wholly  void  of  that 
which  is  the  chief  thing  in  the  other,  and  which  is 
the  only  thing  about  the  continuance  of  which  we 
are  inquiring — the  power  of  perception  and  of  ac- 
tion.t 

V.  Thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
pass  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and 
action,  just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  pres- 
ent ;   for  it  would  be  a  contradiction  to  say,  that 

present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destruction 
of  their  present  powers  of  sensation  ?  and  if  not,  whether  it 
be  the  suspension  or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of  these 
present  reflecting  powers?  Now,  if  there  be  no  reason  to 
believe  the  last,  there  will  be,  if  that  were  possible,  less  for 
the  next,  and  less  still  for  the  first. — Butler. 

*  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brack- 
mans. 

t  St.  Paul  answers  objections  against  the  resurrection,  by 
analogy  from  the  works  of  nature.  Vide  ICor.,  xv.,  36.  "The 
seed  dies — it  is  only  the  germ  or  bud  that  springs  ;  the  body 
of  the  seed  first  feeds  this  bud,  and  then  turns  to  corrup- 
tion." It  is  particularly  to  be  noted,  that  St.  Paul  is  not 
speaking  of  the  identity  of  the  raised  bodies. —  Vide  Whitby 
on  the  passage. 


CHAP.  I.]  ON  A  FUTURE  STATE.  37 

no  state  is  natural  but  the  present,  and  yet  that  the 
probability  of  a  future  one  appears  from  reason. 
The  meaning  of  the  word  natural  is,  stated,  fixed, 
or  settled ;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires 
and  presupposes  an  Intelligent  Agent  to  render  it 
so,  i.  e.,  to  effect  it  continually,  or  at  stated  times,  as 
what  is  supernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it 
for  once.  And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  our 
notion  of  what  is  natural  will  be  enlarged  in  pro- 
portion to  our  greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of 
God,  and  the  dispensations  of  His  Providence. 
And  this  state  may  naturally  be  a  social  one,  and 
the  advantages  of  it — advantages  of  every  kind  may 
naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed  gen- 
eral laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  proportion 
to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue. 

NOTE.  The  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here 
insisted  upon,  seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion. 
Even  a  demonstrative  proof  of  it  would  not  be  a  proof  of  re- 
ligion ;  for  it  is  just  as  reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of  Athe- 
ism as  the  fact  that  we  are  now  alive ;  but  as  religion  implies 
;t  future  state,  presumptions  against  the  latter  would  be 
urged  against  the  former,  and,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  to 
r amove  them. 

D 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  I. 

1.  Describe  at  full  length  the  scheme  of  the  first  part 
of  the  Analogy  which  treats  on  natural  religion. 

2.  How  does  Butler  correct  Locke  in  his  definition 
of  personal  identity  ? 

3.  How  does  the  analogy  of  Nature  warrant  us  to 
assert  that  a  future  and  different  state  of  existence  is 
probable  ? 

4.  Why  is  it  probable  that  we  may  continue  endued 
with  the  same  capacities,  unless  they  may  be  destroy- 
ed by  death  ? 

5.  Show  that  there  is  no  ground,  from  reason  or 
from  analogy,  to  presume  that  death  does  destroy  any 
faculty  of  perception  or  action. 

6.  What  answer  can  be  given  in  refutation  of  the 
objection  that  "Living  beings  are  compounded,  and  so 
divisible, "and  consequently  liable  to  complete- destruc- 
tion ? 

7.  By  what  argument  do  we  arrive  at  the  following 
conclusion  :    viz.,  "  That  the  dissolution  of  matter  iu 
which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested,  is  not 
their  dissolution?"     And  to  the  proof  of  what  truth  is 
this  conclusion  applied  ? 

8.  Show  that  there  is  no  probability  that  death  will 
cause  the  destruction  of  our  present  powers  of  reflec- 
tion. 

9.  Explain  what   is  meant   by  the   assertion   that, 
44  Our  entrance  on  another  state  will  be  natural." 

10.  Show  that  the  credibility  of  a  future  life,  insist- 
ed on  by  Butler  in  this  chapter,  answers  all  the  pur- 
poses of  religion  that  a  demonstrative  proof  would. 


CHAPTER  II. 

)N    THE  f^OVT  RN'IENT  OF  GOD  BY   REWARDS  AND  PUN- 
ISHMFNTS,    AND    PARTICULRALY    ON    THE    LATTER. 

I.  If  a  Future  State  were  only  as  credible  as  the  last  Chap- 
ter proves  it  to  be,  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  urge  us  seriously  to 
inquire,  whether  it  is  to  be  a  State  of  Rewards  and  Pun- 
ishments, depending  upon  our  Conduct  here  ?     The  prob- 
ability of  this  appears  from  our  happiness,  and,  in  a  great 
measure,  our  misery,  in  this  life,  being  left  dependent  on 
our  own  actions;  and  objections  to  it  are  answered. 

II.  That  there  is  to  be  a  Future  State  of  Punishments,  ap- 
pears from  several  particular  analogies. 

I.  THE  importance  of  the  question  concerning 
a  future  life  arises  from  our  capacity  of  happiness 
and  misery.  But  the  consideration  of  this  question 
would  appear  of  so  little  importance  as  only  to  be 
brought  into  our  thoughts  by  curiosity  concerning 
the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospect  of  our 
own,  if  there  were  not  a  supposition  of  our  happi- 
ness and  misery  hereafter  depending  upon  our  ac- 
tions here. 

That  there  is  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments, appears  from  the  following  General  An- 
alogy— We  are  at  present  under  such  a  govern- 


40  ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.     [PART  I. 

merit;  all  that  we  enjoy,  and  a  great  part  of  what 
we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own  power ;  for  pleasure 
and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  actions,  and 
we  are  endued,  by  the  Author  of  our  nature,  with 
capacities  of  foreseeing  the  consequences.  Our 
preservation,  and  every  kind  and  degree  of  our  en- 
joyment, is  effected  by  the  means  of  our  own  actions. 
Generally  (though  not  always)  our  sufferings  are 
produced  by  our  own  actions,  though  instruction, 
example,  and  experience  forewarned  us  that  the 
effect  of  such  conduct  would  be  injurious  to  our 
reputation,  our  property,  or  our  life.  But  why  is 
the  happiness  and  misery  of  creatures  left  depend- 
ent on  themselves  ]  Perhaps  any  other  course 
would,  from  the  nature  of  things,  be  impossible,  or 
would  confer  a  less  degree  of  happiness,  or  not  an- 
swer the  end  of  an  infinitely  Perfect  Mind,  which 
may  be  pleased  with  the  moral  piety  of  moral 
agents  in  and  for  itself,  as  well  as  on  account  of  its 
being  a  means  of  conferring  happiness,  or,  perhaps, 
it  would  not  answer  the  whole  end  of  the  Deity, 
which  our  faculties  can  not  discern.  But  is  not  the 
dispensation  of  happiness  and  misery  in  this  world 
to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  nature  ] 
True,  this  is  the  very  point  asserted ;  it  is  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  general  course,  and,  therefore,  to  the 
Author  of  nature  ;  for  we  must  not  deny  that  He 
does  things  at  all,  because  He  does  them  constant- 
ly— because  the  effects  of  His  acting  are  permanent, 


CHAP.  II.]     ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  41 

whether  His  acting  be  so  or  not,  though  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  it  is  not.  The  natural  course  of 
things  is  the  appointment  of  God ;  our  natural 
faculties,  which  guide  us  in  our  actions,  by  ena- 
bling us  to  foresee  their  effects,  are  given  by  Him 
also ;  the  consequences  of  our  actions  are,  there- 
fore, His  appointment,  and  the  foresight  of  these 
consequences  a  warning  given  us  by  Him  how  we 
are  to  act ;  so  that  we  are  at  present  actually  un- 
der His  government  in  the  strictest  sense — in  such 
a  sense  as  that  He  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our 
actions — in  the  same  sense  as  that  we  are  under 
the  government  of  civil  magistrates.  Because  the 
annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions  and  pain  to 
others  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving 
notice  of  this  appointment  beforehand  to  those 
whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper  formal  notion  of 
government.  It  matters  not,  in  this  case,  whether 
the  Deity  interpose  or  not.  If  civil  magistrates 
^ould  make  offenders  execute  their  laws  upon 
themselves,  or  could  execute  them  some  other  way, 
without  interposing  at  all,  we  should  be  under 
their  government  in  the  same  sense  then  as  we  are 
now,  but  in  a  much  higher  degree  and  more  per- 
fect manner.  1st.  Objected  :  Is  the  pleasure,  then, 
naturally  accompanying  every  particular  gratifica- 
tion of  passion,  intended  as  an  inducement  and  a 
reward  for  the  gratification  of  it  in  every  such  par- 
ticular instance  ?  No,  certainly ;  no  more  than  our 

D* 


42  ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.     [PART  I 

eyes,  which  were  unquestionably  given  us  to  see 
with,  were  intended  to  give  us  the  sight  of  each 
particular  object  to  which  they  do  or  can  extend, 
however  destructive  of  them,  or  however  improper. 
2d.  Objected  :  Is  every  trifling  pain  an  instance  of 
Divine  punishment  ?  The  general  thing  here  as- 
serted can  not  be  evaded,  without  denying  all  final 
causes ;  for  if  pleasure  and  pain  be  annexed  to  ac- 
tions, as  apparent  inducements  for  our  conduct, 
they  must  be  admitted  as  instances  of  final  causes, 
and  as  rewards  and  punishments.  If,  for  example, 
the  pain  felt  on  approaching  too  near  the  fire  be  in- 
tended to  prevent  our  doing  what  tends  to  our 
destruction,  this  is  as  much  an  instance  of  God's 
punishing  our  actions,  as  if  He  did  after  having 
warned  us  by  a  voice  from  heaven. 

II.  A  future  state  of  punishment,  being  what  men 
chiefly  object  against  (either  from  man's  nature 
being  so  frail  and  exposed  to  temptation  as  almost 
to  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vice,  or  from  the 
nature  of  God,  irresistible  in  His  will,  or  incapable 
of  offense  and  provocation),  will  appear  farther 
credible  from  the  following  particular  analogies 
between  the  punishments  in  this  life  and  what  re- 
ligion teaches  us  of  those  in  the  next : — 

"  1st.  Natural  punishments  often  follow  actions 
that  are  accompanied  with  present  gratification  ; 
for  example,  sensual  pleasure  followed  by  sickness 
and  untimely  death. 


CHAP.  II.]     ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  43 

2d.  The  punishments  are  often  much  greater 
than  the  present  pleasures  or  advantages. 

3d.  The  punishments  are  often  delayed  a  great 
while,  sometimes  tilllong  after  the  actions  occasion- 
ing them  are  forgotten,  contrary  to  what  we  might 
imagine,  that  they  would  immediately  follow  crimes 
or  not  at  all. 

4th.  After  such  delay,  these  punishments  often 
come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with  violence 
and  at  once. 

5th.  Though  these  punishments,  in  very  many 
cases,  inevitably  follow  at  the  appointed  time,  yet 
persons  have  seldom  a  distinct  full  expectation, 
and,  in  many  cases,  see,  or  may  see,  only  the  cred- 
ibility of  their  following :  e.  g.,  that  intemperance 
will  bring  after  it  diseases. 

6th.  The  thoughtlessness  and  imprudence  of 
youth  does  not  prevent  the  punishments  of  excess 
following,  and  continuing  the  whole  course  of  their 
existence  in  this  life.  These  consequences  are 
generally  not  considered,  and  can  seldom  be  prop- 
erly said  to  be  believed  beforehand. 

7th.  There  are  frequent  punishments  for  want 
of  acquirements,  which  being  neglected  at  the 
natural  season  of  acquiring,  could  not  be  acquired 
afterward  :  this  is  very  observable  in  the  natural 
course  of  things.  The  indocility  of  youth  makes 
the  consequent  defects  of  old  age  irretrievable;  the 
neglect  of  the  seed  time  brings  with  it  the  irrecov- 


44  ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.     [PART  I. 

erablc  loss  of  the  whole  year.  There  is  a  time 
when  real  reformation  may  prevent  the  conse- 
quences of  extravagance ;  ascend  to  a  higher  de- 
gree, and  there  is  no  place  for  repentance. 

8th.  The  punishments  of  neglect  from  inconsid- 
erateness  are  often  as  dreadful  as  those  of  any 
active  misbehavior  from  the  most  extravagant 
passion. 

9th.  Civil  government  being  natural,  its  punish- 
ments are  so  too,  and  some  of  these  capital;  as  the 
effects  of  a  dissolute  course  of  pleasure  are  often 
mortal.  So  that  many  natural  punishments  are 
final,*  and  seem  inflicted  naturally  to  diminish  the 
aggregate  of  mischief,  either  by  the  removal  of  the 
offender  from  such  a  course,  or  by  his  example. 

These  things  are  so  analogous  to  what  religion 
teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punishment  of  the 
wicked,  that  both  would  naturally  be  expressed  in 
the  same  words.  So  much  so,  that  it  is  doubtful 
to  which  of  the  two,  principally,  the  following  pas- 
sage from  the  book  of  Proverbs,  i.,  22—32  refers : 
— Wisdom  is  introduced  as  frequenting  the  most 
public  places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when  she 

*  It  can  not  he  said  that  it  is  Scripture  only,  and  not  natu- 
ral religion,  which  informs  us  of  a  future  state  of  punishment, 
and  the  duration  and  degree  of  it.  For  this  was  known  to 
the  heathen  poets  and  moralists ;  and  reason  might  well  con- 
clude that  it  would  be  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  ill  with 
the  wicked.  But  what  is  peculiar  to  revelation  is,  it  fixes 
the  time  when  this  distributive  justice  shall  take  place; 
namely,  at  the  end  of  this  world. — Butler. 


CHAP.  II.]     ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  45 

offers  herself  as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  hu- 
man life — "  How  long,  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love 
simplicity  ?  and  the  scorners  delight  in  their  scorn- 
ing, and  fools  hate  knowledge  ]  Turn  ye  at  my 
reproof;  behold,  I  will  pour  out  my  Spirit  unto 
you,  I  will  make  known  my  words  unto  you.  Be- 
cause I  have  called,  and  ye  refused;  I  have  stretched 
out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded  ;  but  ye  have 
set  at  nought  all  my  counsel,  and  would  none  of 
my  reproof:  I  also  will  laugh  at  your  calamity  ;  I 
will  mock  when  your  fear  cometh  ;  when  your  fear 
cometh  as  desolation,  and  your  destruction  cometh 
as  a  whirlwind  ;  when  distress  and  anguish  cometh 
upon  you  :  then  shall  they  call  upon  me,  but  I  will 
not  answer ;  they  shall  seek  me  early,  but  they 
shall  not  find  me :  for  that  they  hated  knowledge, 
and  did  not  choose  the  fear  of  the  Lord  :  they 
would  none  of  my  counsel :  they  despised  all  my 
reproof:  therefore  shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit  of  their 
own  way,  and  be  filled  with  their  own  devices. 
For  the  turning  away  of  the  simple  shall  slay  them, 
and  the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them." 

The  instances  of  punishments  now  mentioned"* 
(for  men  are  not  always  punished  here  in  propor- 
tion to  their  sins)  are  sufficient  to  show  what  the 

*  Hence  may  be  deduced  experimental  answers  to  many 
popular  objections  and  excuses ;  as,  that  God  is  too  merciful 
to  inflict  everlasting  punishment ;  that  we  were  sincere  in  our 
intentions  ;  that  we  did  not  know  it  was  a  sin  we  were  com- 
mitting, &c.  Our  misery,  like  our  neglect,  is  self-induced. 


46  ON  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.     [PART  I. 

laws  of  the  universe  may  admit,  and  to  answer  the 
usual  objections  against  a  future  state  of  punish- 
ment. Indeed,  nothing  but  a  universally  acknowl- 
edged demonstration  on  the  side  of  Atheism  can 
justify  unconcern  about  such  a  state.  The  folly 
of  such  security  without  proof  appears  from  the 
following  analogy.  May  it  not  be  said  of  any  per- 
son upon  his  being  born  into  the  world,  that  he 
may  act  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  of  no  service  to 
it  but  by  being  made  an  example  of  the  woful  ef- 
fects of  vice  and  folly ;  he  may  bring  death  upon 
himself  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice,  or  from  the 
effects  of  his  excesses ;  or  infamy  and  diseases  worse 
than  death.  So  that  even  with  regard  to  the  present 
world,  it  had  been  better  for  him  that  he  had  never 
been  born.  And  shall  we  suppose  that  there  is  no 
danger  of  something  similar  in  a  future  state,  under 
the  providence  and  government  of  the  same  God, 
though  we  rest  as  secure  and  act  as  licentiously  as 
we  please  1 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  II. 

1.  What  supposition  makes  the  consideration  of  the 
question,  concerning  a  future  life,  evidently  important 
to  each  individual  ? 

2.  Describe  the  general  analogy^  which  makes  a 
future  state   of  rewards  and  punishments   perfectly 
probable. 

3.  Why  is  the  present  happiness  or  misery  of  crea 
tures  left  so  much  dependent  upon  themselves  ? 

4.  Suppose  it  to  be  granted   that  "  The  dispensa- 
tion of  happiness  and  misery,  in  this  world,  is  to  be  as- 
cribed to  the  general  course  of  nature"  what  follows 
from  that  admission  ? 

5.  What  is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  government, 
whether  human  or  divine  ?     And  what  would  be  the 
most  perfect  manner  of  it  ? 

6.  State   the  two  objections  urged  against  the  as- 
sertion that  **  pleasure  or  pain  is  annexed  by  God  to 
certain  actions  as  an  apparent  inducement  for  our  con- 
duct," and  refute  them. 

7.  Describe  at  full  length   the  particular  instances 
of  analogy  between  natural  punishments  in  this  life, 
and  what  religion  teaches  us  of  those  in  the  next. 

8.  For  what  purposes  are  the  above-mentioned  in- 
stances of  analogy  amply  sufficient  ? 

9.  By  what  analogy  may  the  folly  of  a  person,  who 
is  unconcerned  about  a  future  state,  be  demonstrated  ? 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF    THE    MORAL    GOVERNMENT    OF    GOD. 

Having  shown  in  the  last  Chapter  that,  as  the  appearances  of 
Final  Causes  prove  an  Intelligent  Maker  of  the  World,  so  the 
particular  instances  of  Final  Causes,  there  mentioned,  prove 
an  Intelligent  Governor  of  it.  In  this  Chapter,  it  is  shown 
that  He  is  a  MORAL  Governor.  Omitting  to  consider  that 
the  natural  notion  we  have  of  God  is  as  a  Moral  Governor, 
and  that,  from  the  Nature  He  has  given  us,  we  may  conclude 
that  Vice  will  finally  be  punished,  and  Virtue  rewarded — 
and  not  dwelling  on  the  proof  that,  even  in  this  Life,  Virtue 
has  its  own  reward,  and  Vice  its  punishment,  it  is  shown  that 
the  Government  by  Rewards  and  Punishments  is  to  be  moral. 

I.  Because  no  other  seems  so  suited  to  our  minds. 

II.  Our  Prudence  is  here  rewarded,  and  Imprudence  punished 

III.  Vicious  Actions,  as  injurious  to  Society,  are,  in  a  great 
degree,  punished. 

IV.  Virtue,  as  such,  is  actually  rewarded,  and  Vice  punished  : 
1st,  by  their  effect  on  the  Mind ;  2d,  by  the  opinion  of  the 
World  in  general. 

Y.  The  natural  tendency  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  if  not  so  much 
obstructed,  is  to  produce  good  and  bad  effects  in  a  greater 
degree  than  they  do  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  these  Obstruc- 
tions will  be  removed  in  a  Future  State. 

I.  HAVING  seen  that  we  are  under  a  government 
of  rewards  and  punishments  an  this  life,  we  shall 
next  inquire  whether  this  government  be  moral,  and, 
if  so,  to  what  extent  ?  For  moral  government  con- 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  49 

sists,  not  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men  for 
their  actions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person  may 
do,  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  punishing 
the  wicked — in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their 
actions,  considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the  per- 
fection of  moral  government  consists  in  doing  this, 
with  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exact 
proportion  to  their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 
Let  us,  then,  examine  whether  there  be  in  the  con- 
stitution and  conduct  of  the  world  any  intimations 
of  a  moral  government — clear  to  those  who  will 
carefully  examine  it* — and  consequently  of  a  Moral 
Governor.  That  simple  absolute  benevolence  is 
the  only  character  and  principle  of  action  of  the 
Author  of  nature — which  makes  him  disregard  the 
actions  of  his  creatures  farther  than  they  might  pro- 
duce higher  degrees  of  happiness — requires  to  be 
proved  before  it  is  asserted.  But  the  possibility  of 
its  being  proved  or  disproved  is  foreign  to  our  pur- 
pose, which  is  to  inquire  whether  in  our  world  a 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it 
not  being  universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been, 
may  be  urged  against  natural  religion  as  well  as  against  re- 
vealed. And,  therefore,  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to 
the  first  part  of  this  treatise  as  well  as  the  second;  but,  as 
these  objections  are  chiefly  urged  against  revealed  religion,  I 
chose  to  consider  them  in  the  second  part.  And  the  answer 
to  them  there  (Chap  VI.),  as  urged  against  Christianity,  being 
almost  equally  applicable  to  them  as  urged  against  the  religion 
of  nature :  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that 
chapter. — Butler. 

E 


50    OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  [PART  L 

righteous  government  be  not  discernible,  which 
implies  necessarily  a  righteous  Governor.  It  may 
at  once  be  granted,  that,  if  there  be  a  moral  gov- 
vernment  here,  it  is  not  perfect;  the  question  is, 
therefore,  reduced  to  this,  can  there  be  discerned 
any  principles  of  a  moral  government,  further  than 
the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given  us,  and  oar 
natural  notion  of  Him  as  a  Moral  Governor  ] 

It  might  be  urged  that,  in  general,  less  uneasiness 
and  more  satisfaction  are  the  natural  consequences 
of  a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  course  of  life ;  but  it 
is  difficult  so  to  weigh  pleasures  and  uneasinesses  as 
exactly  to  estimate  the  overplus  of  happiness  on  the 
side  of  virtue  ;  this  is  more  difficult  in  the  case  of 
those  who  have  led  a  vicious  life  for  some  time. 
They  have,  upon  their  reformation,  their  former 
passions  craving  for  their  accustomed  gratification  ; 
their  former  vices  will  be  more  frequently  thrown 
in  their  way,  by  the  conversation  of  men,  or  other- 
wise, after  their  amendment,  when,  from  having  ac- 
quired a  deeper  sense  of  shame,  the  infamy  will  be 
more  felt ;  for,  though  this  properly  belongs  to  their 
former  vices,  yet  it  will,  in  part,  be  attributed  to 
their  change  of  life.  We,  therefore,  rather  dwell 
on  the  following  considerations  : 

Since  it  has  appeared  that  we  are  under  the 
government  of  God,  by  the  methods  of  rewards 
and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled  rule  of 
distribution,  what  rule  for  finally  rewarding  and 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  51 

punishing  appears  more  natural  to  us  than  that  of 
distributing  justice  ? 

II.  In  this  world  our  prudence  is  rewarded,  and 
our  imprudence  punished;  the  one  by  satisfaction 
and  external  advantages,  the  other  by  inconven- 
iences and  sufferings.     These  afford  instances  of  a 
right  constitution  of  nature. 

III.  Vicious  actions  are,  to  a  great  degree,  pun- 
ished, as  mischievous  to  society,  by  the  actual  in- 
fliction of  the  punishment,  or  by  the   fear  of  it. 
And   this  is  necessary  for  the  very  being  of  so- 
ciety ;  therefore  these  punishments  are  as  natural 
as  society  itself. 

OBJECTION.  Actions  beneficial  to  society  are  of- 
ten punished,  as  in  the  case  of  persecutions,  &c., 
and  actions  injurious  to  it  rewarded. 

ANSWER.  This  is  not,  in  the  same  sense,  neces- 
sary, and,  therefore,  not  natural,  neither  are  they 
punished  as  being  beneficial,  nor  rewarded  as  being 
mischievous. 

IV.  Virtue,  as  such,  is  actually  rewarded,  and 
vice,  as  such,  punished.     In  order  to  see  this  more 
clearly,  we  must  distinguish  between  actions  in  the 
abstract,  and  with  morality  attached  to  them.     An 
action  by  which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified,  or 
fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantages 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  morality 
of  such  action.     Consequently  the  pleasure  or  ad- 
vantage in  this  case  is  gained  by  the  action  itself — 


52    OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  [PART  I 

not  by  the  morality,  the  virtuousness,  or  the  vi 
ciousness  of  it ;  though  it  be,  perhaps,  virtuous  01 
vicious.  1st.  Then  it  appears,  from  the  effects  of 
virtue  and  vice  on  the  mind  and  temper,  that  un 
easiness  arises  from  vice — pleasure  from  virtue 
This  is  evident  from  daily  experience.  A  man 
says,  Jie  is  vexed  with  himself,  when  the  uneasiness 
does  not  arise  from  a  sense  of  mere  loss  or  harm, 
but  from  a  sense  of  some  action  being  vicious  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree.  This  feeling,  in  more  se- 
rious language,  we  call  remorse.  Again,  a  man  la- 
ments an  accident  or  event,  and,  besides  that,  feels 
additional  grief,  when  he  has  to  admit  that  it  was 
his  own  doing  ;  or  else  some  redeeming  satisfaction, 
if  he  can  not  blame  himself.  Thus  also  vice,  even 
where  there  is  no  reason  to  fear  resentment  or 
shame,  causes  disturbance  from  a  sense  of  being 
blameworthy.  And  it  may  be  added — where  there 
are  some  fears,  not  to  be  got  rid  of,  of  the  possibil- 
ity of  retribution  in  after  life.  On  the  contrary, 
satisfaction  and  complaisancy  are  found  in  the  real 
exercise  of  virtue,  together  with  the  peaceful  hopes 
of  a  better  life.  2d.  From  the  opinion  of  the 
world  in  general — from  the  encouragement  given 
by  good  and  honest  men,  and  even  by  most  men,  to 
a  person  considered  to  be  virtuous.  Public  hon- 
ors are  the  consequences  of  actions  considered  as 
virtuous — for  example,  patriotism,  eminent  justice  ; 
while  actions  considered  as  vicious  have  been  pun- 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  53 

ished;  e.  g.,  tyranny,  from  a  sense  of  its  own  na- 
ture, independent  of  the  miseries  it  brings  with  it. 
For  men  resent  injuries  under  the  notion,  not 
merely  of  having  received  harm,  but  for  having 
received  wrong,  and  they  feel  this  resentment  in 
behalf  of  others  as  well  as  of  themselves.  In  re- 
turning kind  actions,  we  are  influenced,  not  only 
by  the  actions  themselves,  but  by  the  kind  inten- 
tion and  good  desert  they  imply  in  the  doer.  In 
domestic  government,  children  are  punished  for 
falsehood,  injustice,  &c.,  as  such,  and  rewarded  for 
the  contrary.  The  authors  of  crimes,  punished  by 
civil  government,  merely  as  being  prejudicial  to 
society,  are  brought  to  justice  very  much  from  the 
sense  which  men  have  for  their  actions  as  immoral. 
Absence  or  aggravation  of  guilt  in  the  moral  senses 
often  effects  the  remission  or  retention  of  penalties 
annexed  to  civil  crimes.  These  instances  may 
seem  trivial,  but  they  borrow  importance  from  the 
subject  to  which  they  are  applied.  But  whence  is 
it  that  virtue,  as  suck,  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice, 
as  suck,  punished,  and  this  rule  never  inverted  ?  It 
proceeds,  in  part,  from  the  moral  nature  which 
God  has  given  us*  (and  is  an  additional  proof  to 

*  That  we  have  an  approving  and  disapproving  faculty  of 
this  kind  is  evident  from  our  own  experience — from  the 
words  right  and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  base  and  wor- 
thy, with  many  others  of  like  signification  in  all  languages 
applied  to  actions  and  characters — from  the  many  written 
systems  of  morals  which  suppose  it — from  our  natural  sense 
E* 


54     OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  [PART  I. 

that  furnished  by  the  possession  of  such  a  nature ; 
for  this  last  is  a  proof  that  lie  will  finally  favor  and 
support  virtue  effectually ;  while  the  former  is  an 
example  of  his  favoring  and  supporting  it  at  pres- 
ent, at  least  in  some  degree),  and  it  proceeds,  in 
part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together  with  this 
nature,  so  great  a  power  over  each  other's  happi- 
ness and  misery.  For,  from  the  first,  we  are  so 
made,  that  well-doing,  as  such,  gives  us  satisfac- 
tion, at  least,  in  some  instances — ill-doing,  as  such, 
in  none.  And,  from  both  conjoined,  vice  must  be, 
in  some  degree,  infamous,  and  men  disposed  to 
punish  it,  as  detestable.  There  is  nothing  on  the 
side  of  vice  to  answer  this,  because  there  is  nothing 
in  the  human  mind  contradictory,  as  the  logicians 
say,  to  virtue.  Any  instances  of  such  a  thing,  if 
they  be  not  imaginary,  are,  at  least,  unnatural  per- 
versions. There  are,  it  is  admitted,  cases  where 
persons  are  prosperous,  though  wicked — afflicted, 
though  righteous — and  even  rewarded  for  wicked 
actions,  and  punished  for  virtuous  ones.  But  this 
arises  not  from  the  reversion  of  the  natural  tend- 
encies of  virtue  and  vice,  which  is  impossible,  but 
it  may  arise  from  there  being  other  wise  rules  for 
the  distribution  of  happiness,  besides  that  of  per- 
sonal merit  or  demerit,  as,  for  example,  the  way  of 

of  gratitude,  which  implies  a  distinction  between  merely  be- 
ing the  instrument  of  good  and  intending  it,  &c.,  &c. —  Vide 
Bishop  Butler  on  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  55 

mere  discipline.  We  see  enough  to  know  on  which 
Bide  the  Author  of  nature  is  ;  and,  in  the  degree 
that  we  co-operate  with  Him,  we  naturally  feel  a 
secret  satisfaction  and  sense  of  security,  and  an  im- 
plicit hope  bf  somewhat  farther  ;  and  this  hope  is 
confirmed  by — 

V.  The  natural  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to 
produce  the  good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned, 
in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do,  in  fact,  produce 
them.  For  instance,  good  and  bad  men  would  be 
much  more  rewarded  and  punished,  as  such,  were 
it  not  that  justice  is  often  artificially  eluded.  With 
regard  to  individuals,  these  tendencies  are  obvious. 
But  it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be  consid- 
ered, that  power  in  a  society,  by  being  under  the  di- 
rection of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and  has  a  nat- 
ural tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power  not 
under  the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  power, 
by  being  under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and 
has  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  The 
superiority  which  reason  gives  to  power  is  consid- 
ered to  be,  not  the  accidental,  but  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  reason ;  and  yet  it  could  not  prevail  over 
altogether  disproportionate  force.  It  is  possible 
that  brute  force,  either  by  excess  of  numbers,  by 
union,  by  want  of  sufficient  length  of  time,  or  of 
some  other  opportunities  in  the  rational  creatures, 
should  gain  the  superiority  over  them.  No  one 
would,  notwithstanding,  hesitate  to  consider  this  as 


56     OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  [PART.  I. 

an  inverted  order  of  things ;  i.  e.,  that  the  natural 
tendency  of  reason  is — to  be  superior.  Now,  virtue 
in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency  to  procure  superi- 
ority and  additional  power,  considered  either  as  the 
means  of  security  from  opposite  power,  or  of  obtain- 
ing other  advantages.  It  has  this  tendency,  among 
other  ways,  by  rendering  public  good  an  object  and 
end  to  every  member  of  society,  and  by  uniting 
society  by  the  chief  bonds  of  union — veracity  and 
justice.  But  yet  there  must  be  some  proportion 
between  the  natural  power  or  force  which  is  under 
the  direction  of  virtue,  and  that  which  is  not :  there 
must  be  sufficient  length  of  time ;  for  the  complete 
success  of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  can  not,  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  thing,  be  otherwise  than  gradual.  There 
must  be  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  ex- 
tensive, proper  opportunities  for  the  virtuous  to 
join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against  lawless 
force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labors. 
Since  much  less  power,  under  the  direction  of  vir- 
tue, would  prevail  against  power  not  under  the  di- 
rection of  it,  good  men,  if  united,  would  prevail 
even  here,  to  a  considerable  degree,  over  the  bad. 
But  there  are  various  obstacles  to  their  being  uni- 
ted ;  for  example,  they  can  not  be  sufficiently  as- 
sured of  each  other's  characters.  These  obstacles 
may  be  removed  in  a  future  state  (which  implies  a 
more  perfect  one,  like  the  state  of  mature  ago 
compared  with  that  of  childhood),  where  men  may 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  57 

unite  among  themselves  and  with  other  orders  of 
virtuous  creatures.  Virtue  is  here  militant.  Among 
other  things,  the  shortness  of  life  denies  to  it  its  full 
scope  in  several  other  respects.  In  a  future  state 
it  may  prevail,  and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards. 
There  may  be  scenes  there  lasting  enough,  and,  in 
every  other  way  adapted  to  afford  it  a  sufficient 
sphere  of  action ;  and  it  may  be  added,  if  this  ten- 
dency were  carried  into  effect,  it  would  serve  as  an 
example  to  those  orders  of  creatures  capable  of 
being  recovered  to  a  just  sense  of  virtue.  These 
are  merely  suppositions,  which  are  not  to  be  consid- 
ered true,  because  not  incredible ;  but  they  are 
mentioned  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  objections 
against  the  natural  tendency  of  virtue,  from  the 
obstacles  that  prevent  it  in  this  world,  as  we  can 
easily  conceive  how  these  obstacles  can  be  remov- 
ed ;  and  the  presumption  that  they  will  be  removed, 
as  they  are  only  accidental,  is  proportionate  in 
degree  to  the  length  of  time  through  which  the 
natural  tendency  will  continue.  The  happy  ten- 
dency of  virtue  might  be  seen  by  imagining  an 
instance  even  in  this  world,  by  supposing  a  king- 
dom, or  society  of  men,  perfectly  virtuous  for  a 
succession  of  many  years — every  individual  con- 
tributing to  its  preservation  by  contentedly  employ- 
ing his  capacity  in  its  proper  sphere;  injustice, 
whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown 
among  themselves,  and  their  wisdom,  inviolable 


58     OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.    [PART  J. 

union,  &c.,  would  fully  secure  them  against  their 
neighbors,  devoid  of  such  virtuous  qualities,  allow- 
ing both  a  sufficient  time  to  try  their  force.  The 
head  of  this  society,  by  the  tendency  and  example 
of  virtue,  would,  in  time,  become  a  universal  mon- 
arch in  another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been, 
and  all  people,  nations,  and  languages  would  serve 
Mm.  And  thus  the  wonderful  power  and  prosperi- 
ty promised,  in  Scripture,  to  the  Jews,  would  be,  in 
a  great  measure,  the  consequence  of  what  is  also  pre- 
dicted of  them — "  that  the^eo^Ze  should  be  all  right- 
eous and  inherit  the  land  forever  ;"  i.  e.,  taking  the 
term  "forever"  to  mean  length  of  time  sufficient  to 
acquire  this  power.  Suppose  the  obstacles  against 
the  fulfillment  of  this  prediction  to  be  removed,  and 
the  dominion  and  pre-eminence  promised  must  nat- 
urally follow  to  a  very  considerable  degree.  All 
this  might  appear  of  little  importance,  if  we  did  not 
consider  what  would  be  the  consequence  if  vice  had 
naturally  these  advantageous  tendencies,  or  virtue 
the  direct  contrary  ones. 

OBJECTION.  But  prove  that  the  obstacles  will  be 
removed  in  a  future  state. 

ANSWER.  Even  if  they  were  not  removed  in  a 
future  state,  if  there  was  to  be  a  continuation  of  the 
apparent  confusion  of  rewards  and  punishments 
that  exists  in  this,  it  could  not  be  said  that  vice, 
upon  the  whole,  would  have  the  advantage  rather 
than  virtue.  But  that  the  future  state  is  to  be  one 


CHAP.  III.]  OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.  59 

perfectly  moral,  can  be  proved  by  the  usual  argu- 
ments, of  which  the  things  here  alleged  afford  a 
strong  confirmation  ;  for,  1st,  they  show  that  the 
Author  of  nature  is  not  indifferent  to  virtue  and 
vice,  so  that  even  the  course  of  nature,  as  here  ex- 
plained, furnishes  us  with  a  real  practical  proof  of 
the  obligations  of  religion.  2d.  The  distributive 
justice,  which  Scripture  declares  is  to  take  place 
in  a  future  state,  will  not  be  different  in  kind,  but 
only  in  degree,  from  what  we  experience  here  :  it 
will  be  that  in  effect  to  which  we  now  see  a  tendency. 
3d.  Our  experience  that  virtue  and  vice  are  actu- 
ally rewarded  and  punished  at  present  in  a  certain 
degree,  gives  us  just  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear 
that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  high- 
er hereafter  ;  and  4thly,  there  is  sufficient  ground 
to  think  that  they  will,  from  the  natural  tendencies 
of  virtue  and  vice — obstructed,  indeed,  in  this  life  by 
obstacles,  which  being,  in  numberless  cases,  only  ac- 
cidental, are  more  likely  to  be  removed  in  a  future 
state  than  the  natural  and  necessary  tendencies. 

From  these  things  joined  with  the  moral  nature 
which  God  has  given  us,  considered  as  given  us  by 
Him,  arises  a  practical  proof  (vide  chap.  6.,  ad  fin.) 
that  it  will  be  completed — a  proof  from  fact,  and, 
therefore,  a  distinct  one  from  that  which  is  deduced 
from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations,  the  fit- 
ness and  unfitness  of  actions.* 

*  Vide  the  Note,  Part  II.,  Chap,  VIIL,  2. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  III. 

1.  Explain  the  meaning  of  the  term  "Moral  Gov- 
ernment," and  show  in  what  it  consists. 

2.  In   commencing   the    inquiry  "  whether   in   oui 
world   a  righteous   government   be    not   discernible," 
what  considerations,  that  might  fairly  be  adduced  in 
proof  of  it,  does  Butler  omit  to  press  as   arguments  ? 
What  reasons  does  he  give  for  these  omissions  ? 

3.  State  the  four  general  heads,  under  which  the 
arguments,  showing  that  God's   government  is  to  be 
moral,  are  comprehended  in  this  chapter. 

4.  How  does  it  appear  from   their  effects  on   the 
mind  and  temper,  that  the  uneasiness  arises  from  vice, 
and  pleasure  from  virtue  ? 

5.  Show  that  from   the   world   in  general,   virtue, 
considered  as  such,  is  actually   rewarded  ;   and  vice, 
considered  as  such,  punished. 

6.  Whence  is  it  that  the  above-mentioned  rule  of 
judging  and  acting  is  never  inverted  by  mankind  in 
general  ? 

7.  To  the  proof  of  what  assertions  does  Butler  ap- 
ply these  two  facts;  viz.,  that  mankind  possess  a  moral 
nature,  and  that  they  (taken  as  a  whole)  judge  and  acl 
according  to  it  ? 

8.  How  may  we  answer  the  objection  "  that  some 
persons  are  even  rewarded  for  wicked  actions,  others 
punished  for  virtuous  ones  ?" 

F 


CHAP.  III.]     QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  III.  61 

9.  Give  a  summary  of  the  comparison  which  But- 
ler institutes  between  reason  and  virtue ;  as  to  their 
natural  tendency  in  causing  power  under  their  direc- 
tion to  increase  in  a  society. 

10.  Name  some  of  the  obstacles  which  counteract 
the  natural  tendency  of  virtue  to  prevail.     How  and 
when  does  Butler  suppose  they  may  be  removed  ? 

11.  For  what  purpose  are  the  above-mentioned  sup- 
positions brought  forward  ? 

12.  By  what  supposed  case  (the  possibility  of  which, 
however,  is  intimated  in  Scripture)  may  the  natural 
happy  tendency  of  virtue  in  a  society  be  seen  ? 

13.  All  the  reasonings  here  alleged,  affording  con- 
firmation of  the  usual  arguments  that  the  future  state 
is  to  be  perfectly  moral,  are  summed  up  under  four 
heads.     Name  them  distinctly. 

F 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF     A     STATE     OF     PROBATION,      AS     IMPLYING     TRIAL, 
DIFFICULTIES,    AND    DANGER. 

I .  Having  shown  the  confirmation  which  Analogy  affords  to 
the  Scriptural  Doctrine  of  a  righteous  distribution  of  Re- 
wards and  Punishments  in  a  Future  State,  it  is  next  shown 
that  this  World  is  our  state  of  Probation  previous   to  it. 
1st.   As  implying  Trials  and  Difficulties.     3d.  As  intended 
for  Moral  Discipline  and  Improvement.     3d.  As  a  Theatre 
of  Action  for  the  manifestation  of  Persons'  Characters  to 
the  Creation  of  God.     That  this  World  is  a  state  of  Proba- 
tion in  the  first  sense  of  the  word,  is  proved  in  the  present 
Chapter,  from  the  Analogy  that,  in  our  Temporal  Capacity, 
we  are  in  a  state  of  trial  and  danger  for  our   Temporal 
Interest. 

II.  This  Analogy  is  more  perfect,  since  the  same  constitutes 
both  trials ;  men  behave  the  same  way  under  them,  and 
the  dangers  in  both  are  increased  from  the  same  causes. 

III.  Objections  answered. 

I.  A  STATE  of  probation  (in  the  most  common 
meaning  of  the  word)  is,  in  a  great  measure,  the 
same  with  the  moral  government  which  we  have 
already  proved  to  exist — affording  us  scopes  and 
opportunities  for  that  good  and  bad  behavior,  which 
God  will  hereafter  reward  and  punish  ;  for,  in  or- 


CHAP.  IV.]     OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  63 

der  that  there  may  be  some  ground  for  future 
judgment,  there  must  be  some  sort  of  temptation  to 
what  is  wrong  ;  but  the  word  "  probation"  express- 
es more  clearly  and  particularly  this  allurement  to 
wrong,  together  with  the  dangers  and  -difficulties 
to  be  encountered  in  adhering  uniformly  to  what 
is  right.  That  the  present  is  such  a  state  appears 
from  the  following  analogy  : — Natural  government 
fyy  rewards  and  punishments,  which  leaves  our 
happiness  and  misery  dependent  on  ourselves 
(chap.  2),  as  much  implies  natural  trial,  as  moral 
government  does  moral  trial.  Accordingly,  in  our 
temporal  interests,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  state  of 
trial ;  all  temptations  to  vices  contrary  to  that  inter- 
est prove  it;  also  all  difficulties  and  dangers  of 
miscarrying  in  any  thing  relating  to  our  worldly 
happiness. 

II.  This  will  more  distinctly  appear,  if  we  con- 
sider, 1st,  that  the  same  constitutes  both  trials  ; 
namely,  something  either  in  our  external  circum- 
stances or  in  our  nature.  In  the  one  case,  a  temp- 
tation may  be  so  singular  or  sudden  as  to  overpow- 
er ;  in  the  other,  a  person  may  be  so  habituated  to 
vice  as  to  seek  opportunities,  and  go  out  of  his  way 
to  gratify  sinful* passions  ;  and  these  passions  are 
as  much  temptations  to  act  contrary  to  prudence, 
or  that  reasonable  self-love,  the  end  of  which  is  our 
worldly  interest,  as  they  are  to  act  contrary  to  the 
principle  of  virtue  and  religion.  However,  these 


64  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.        [PART.  I. 

two  sources  of  temptation  coincide  and  mutually 
imply  each  other,  for  there  must  be  somewhat 
within  men  themselves  to  render  outward  circum- 
stances temptations,  and  there  must  be  external 
occasions  and  exciting  objects  to  render  their  in- 
ward passions  so.  Thus  mankind,  having  a  tem- 
poral interest  depending  upon  themselves,  and  a 
prudent  course  of  behavior  being  necessary  to  se- 
cure it,  passions  inordinately  excited  are  dangerous 
temptations  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our 
temporal  interest,  for  the  sake  of  present  gratifica- 
tion. Such  is  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  ca- 
pacity ;  and  it  will  answer  that  in  our  religious  ca- 
pacity, by  merely  substituting  the  word  future  for 
temporal,  and  virtue  for  prudence*  so  analogous 
are  they  to  each  other.  2d.  That  mankind  behave 
in  the  same  way  under  both  trials.  Many  do  not 
look  beyond  their  present  gratification,  not  even  to 
the  consequences  in  this  life,  whether  they  are 
blinded  by  inordinate  passions,  or  forcibly  carried 
away  by  them  against  their  better  judgment,  or 
willingly  yield  in  defiance  of  all  consequences  tem- 
poral and  eternal.  3d.  That  the  difficulties  of 
right  behavior  are  increased  in  a  like  way  in  both 

*  Parables  are  founded  on  analogical  reasoning.  Vide,  in 
this  case,  the  Scripture  parable  of  the  Ten  Virgins,  but  more 
especially  that  of  the  Unjust  Steward.  "The  Lord  com- 
mended the  unjust  steward,  because  he  had  done  wisely,  for 
the  children  of  this  world  are,  in  their  generation,  wiser  than 
the  children  of  light." — Luke,  xvi.,  8. 


CHAP.  IV.]     OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  65 

capacities — in  our  religious  capacity  by  the  ill  be- 
havior of  others,  by  an  education  wrong  in  a  moral 
sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious,  by  general  bad 
example,  by  dishonest  artifices  in  business,  and  by 
religions  being  corrupted  into  superstitions  which 
indulge  men  in  their  vices.  In  our  temporal  capa- 
city our  difficulties  are,  in  like  manner,  increased 
by  a  foolish  education — by  the  extravagant  and 
careless  example  of  others — by  mistaken  notions, 
taken  from  common  opinion,  concerning  temporal 
happiness  ;  and  these  difficulties  are  increased  to 
men,  in  both  capacities,  by  their  own  wrong  be- 
havior in  any  stage  of  their  existence  ;  for  example, 
in  youth,  it  renders  their  stage  of  trial  more  dan- 
gerous in  mature  age. 

III.  1st  OBJECTION.  Why  is  not  this  state  of 
trial  less  uncertain  ?  Would  it  not  be  more  cred- 
ible if  it  were  not  so  uncertain  ] 

ANSWER.  There  are  natural  appearances  of  our 
being  in  a  state  of  degradation,  and,  though  our 
condition  may  not  appear  the  most  advantageous, 
this  furnishes  no  cause  for  complaint ;  for,  as  men, 
by  prudent  management,  can  secure,  to  a  tolerable 
degree,  their  temporal  interest,  so  religion  requires 
no  more  of  us  than  what  we  are  well  able  to  do,  if 
we  do  not  neglect  the  appointed  means.  But  the 
chief  answer  to  the  objection  against  such  a  state 
as  religion  declares  this  to  be,  is  the  foregoing  an- 
alogy, for,  from  it,  this  appears  to  be  throughout 


66  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.        [PART.  I. 

uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the  general  conduct 
of  Providence  toward  us  in  all  other  respects  with- 
in the  compass  of  our  knowledge.  If  our  present 
interest  were  not  uncertain,  but  secure,  it  might 
furnish  some  presumption  against  the  truth  of  re- 
ligion, which  represents  our  future  interest,  not  as 
secure,  but  depending  on  our  behavior;  but  from 
the  contrary  being  the  fact,  the  objection  is  of  no 
force. 

2d  OBJECTION.  It  is  improbable  that  any  kind  of 
hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an 
Infinite  Being,  when  every  thing  which  is  hazard 
and  danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  arid  which 
will  end  in  error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  now  al- 
ready certain  in  His  foreknowledge. 

ANSWER.  It  might  seem  improbable,  did  not 
analogy  prove  it  false  in  fact.  The  difficulty  of 
accounting  for  it  in  speculation  can  not  be  removed 
till  we  know  the  whole,  or,  at  least,  much  more  of 
the  case. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  IV. 

1.  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  term,  "  a  state  of 
probation,"  as  used  in  this  work  ? 

2.  From  what  analogy  does  the  present  life  appear 
to  be  such  a  state  ? 

3.  Explain  the  analogy  which  appears  to  exist  be- 
tween our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal,  and  that  in 
our  religious  capacity. 

4.  How  do  mankind  commonly  behave  under  both 
trials  ? 

5.  By  what  causes,  common  to  both,  are  the  diffi- 
culties of  doing  well  increased? 

6.  Answer  the  following  two  objections :  1st.  Why 
is  not  this  state  of  trial  less  uncertain  ? 

7.  2d  Objection.     Is  it  not  improbable  that  hazard 
should  be  put  upon  us  by  a  Being  whose  foreknowl- 
edge is  certain  1 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  A  STATE    OF    PROBATION,  AS    INTENDED  FOR    MORAL 
DISCIPLINE  AND    IMPROVEMENT. 

I.  That  we  are  in  a  state  of  Probation,  in  the  second  sense,  as 
intended  for  Moral  Discipline  and  Improvement  for  another 
state,  appears  from  Analogy — from  the  beginning  of  Life 
considered  as  a  preparation  for  mature  age. 

II.  The  extent  of  this  Analogy  may  be  determined  from  the 
1    following  considerations,     I.  In  both  respects,  new  Char- 
acters must  be  acquired.     2.  We  are  capable  of  acquiring 
these  new  Characters  by  our  capacities  of  Knowledge  and 
power  of  Habit  (Habits  are  either  active  or  passive ;  Habits 
either  bodily  or  mental ;  all  virtuous  Habits  formed  by  ac- 
tive exertion).     3.  The  possession  of  these  Capacities  im- 
plies what  experience  also  proves  to  us — the  necessity  oi: 
using  them.     And,  4th,  we  can  show  how  virtuous  Habits 
can  be  useful  in  the  preparation  for  another  Life  ;  and  Dis- 
cipline necessary  even  for  Creatures  finitely  perfect. 

III.  Objections  to  such  a  State  answered. 

IV.  This  World  is  a  state  of  Probation  in  the  third  and  last 
sense. 

I.  FROM  considering  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
probation,  the  question  naturally  arises,  how  came 
we  to  be  placed  in  it  1  But  this  is  a  question  in- 
volved in  insuperable  difficulties.  We  may  lessen 


CHAP.  V.]         OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  69 

these  difficulties  by  observing  that  all  wickedness 
is  voluntary,  and  that  many  of  the  miseries  of  life 
have  apparent  good  effects ;  but  it  is  plain  folly 
and  presumption  to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of 
the  whole  reason  of  the  matter.  Perhaps  the  dis- 
covery or  comprehension  of  it  is  beyond  the  reach 
of  our  faculties,  or,  perhaps,  the  knowledge  of  it 
would  be  prejudicial  to  us.  Religion  affords  a  par- 
tial answer  to  it,  but  a  satisfactory  one  to  a  ques- 
tion of  real  importance  to  us,  namely,  What  is  our 
business  here  ?  And  this  answer  is,  we  are  placed 
in  a  state  of  so  much  affliction  and  hazard  for  our 
improvement  in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  hap- 
piness. 

GENERAL  ANALOGY  :  The  beginning  of  life  con- 
sidered as  an  education  for  mature  age,  in  the  pres- 
ent world,  appears  plainly  to  be  analogous  to  this 
our  trial  for  a  future  one  :  the  former  being  in  our 
temporal  capacity  what  the  latter  is  in  our  religious 
capacity.  This  will  more  clearly  appear  from  the 
following : — 

II.  PARTICULAR  ANALOGIES  :  1st.  Every  species 
of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed  for  a  particular 
way  of  life,  to  which  the  nature,  the  capacities, 
temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  species  are  as 
necessary  as  their  external  circumstances.  One 
thing  is  set  over  against  another,  as  an  ancient 
writer  expresses  it  (Eccles.,  xlii.,  24).  Our  nature 


70  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.          [PART  I. 

corresponds  to  our  external  condition.*  So  that 
there  must  be  some  determinate  capacities — some 
necessary  character  and  qualifications,  without 
which  persons  can  not  but  be  utterly  incapable  of 
a  future  state  of  life  ;  in  like  manner  as  there  must 
be  some  without  which  men  would  be  incapable 
of  their  present  state  of  life.  2d.  The  constitution 
of  human  creatures,  and,  indeed,  of  all  creatures 
within  our  observation,  is  such  as  that  they  are  ca- 
pable of  naturally  becoming  qualified  for  states  of 
life  for  which  they  were  once  wholly  unqualified. 
We  may  imagine  creatures,  but  we  do  not  know 
of  any,  whose  faculties  are  not  made  for  enlarge- 
ment by  experience  and  habit.  We  find  ourselves 
in  particular,  endued  with  capacities  of  acquiring 
knowledge,  namely,  apprehension,  reason,  and  mem- 
ory. And  by  the  power  of  habits,  we  can  acquire 
.a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  settled  al- 
terations in  our  temper  and  character.  But  neither 
the  perception  of  ideas  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort 
are  habits,  though  they  are  absolutely  necessaiy  to 
the  forming  of  them ;  but  the  improvements  of  our 

*  Bishop  Butler  has  clearly  shown,  in  his  sermons,  the  pe- 
culiar correspondence  between  the  inward  frame  of  man 
and  the  external  conditions  and  circumstances  of  his  life;  that 
the  several  passions  and  affections  of  the  heart,  compared 
with  those  circumstances,  are  certain  instances  of  final  causes ; 
for  example,  anger  leads  us  to  the  immediate  resistance  of 
injury,  and  compassion  prompts  us  to  relieve  the  distressed, 
&c.,  &c. 


CHAP.  V.]  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  71 

capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge,  especially  in  the 
case  of  memory,  may,  perhaps,  be  so  called.  That 
perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of 
course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before, 
seems  a  thing  of  the  same  kind  as  readiness  in  any 
particular  kind  of  action  proceeding  from  being 
accustomed  to  it ;  and  aptness  to  recollect  practical 
observations  of  service  in  our  conduct,  is  plainly 
habit  in  many  cases.  There  are  habits  of  percep- 
tion, as,  for  example,  our  constant  and  even  invol- 
untary readiness  in  correcting  the  impressions  of 
our  sight  concerning  magnitudes  and  distances,  so 
as  to  substitute,  imperceptibly  to  ourselves,  judg- 
ment in  the  room  of  sensation.  And  it  seems  as  if 
all  other  associations  of  ideas,  not  naturally  con- 
nected, might  be  called  passive  habits,  as  properly 
as  our  readiness  in  understanding  languages  upon 
sight  or  hearing  of  words.  There  are  also  active 
habits,  as,  for  example,  our  readiness  in  speaking 
and  writing  languages.  For  distinctness,  we  may 
consider  habits  as  belonging  to  the  mind  or  to  the 
body.  As  habits  of  the  body,  i.  e.,  all  bodily  activi-1 
ties  and  motions,  are  produced  by  exercise;  so  are 
habits  of  the  mind — including,  under  this  denomi- 
nation, general  habits  of  life  and  conduct,  such  as 
those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  authority,  or; 
to  any  particular  person ;  those  of  veracity,  justice, 
and  charity ;  and  those  of  attention,  industry,  self-- 
government, revenge.  But  there  is  this  difference 


72  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.         [PART  I. 

between  them,  that  bodily  habits  are  produced  by 
repeated  external  acts — mental  habits  by  the  exer- 
tion of  inward  practical  principles  carried  into  ac- 
tion, or  acted  upon.  No  external  course  of  action 
can  form  these  habits  otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds 
from  the  inward  principles,  e.  g.,  of  obedience  and 
veracity ;  because  it  is  only  these  inward  principles 
exerted  which  are  strictly  acts  of  obedience,  ve- 
racity, &c.  It  will  contribute  toward  forming  vir- 
tuous habits  to  resolve  to  do  well,  and  to  endea- 
vor to  impress  on  our  minds  a  practical  sense  of 
virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that  practical  sense  of 
it  which  a  man  really  feels  himself  (for  resolutions 
and  endeavors  are  properly  acts).  Practical  hab- 
its are  formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated  acts; 
not  so  with  passive  impressions — they  grow  weaker 
by  being  repeated  ;  so  that  going  over  the  theory 
of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  draw- 
ing  fine  pictures,  in  place  of  forming  a  habit  of  vir- 
tue, may  form  a  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral 
considerations.  Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through 
the  mind,  are  felt  less  sensibly.  Thus — 

(1st.)  Being  accustomed  to  danger  begets  intre- 
pidity, i.  e.t  lessens  fear. 

(2d.)  Being  accustomed  to  distress  lessens  the 
passion  of  pity. 

(3d.)  Being  accustomed  to  instances  of  others' 
mortality  lessens  the  sensible  apprehension  of  our 
own. 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  73 

And  these  effects  of  active  and  passive  habits 
may  occur  at  the  same  time ;  active  habits  may  be 
strengthening  while  the  motives  that  excite  them 
are  less  and  less  sensibly  felt ;  and  experience  con- 
firms this,  for  active  principles,  at  the  very  time 
that  they  are  less  lively  in.  perception  than  they 
were,  are  found  to  be  somehow  wrought  more 
thoroughly  into  the  temper  and  character,  and  be- 
come more  effectual  in  influencing  our  practice. 
Thus,  in  the  three  examples  of  passive  habits,  just 
mentioned,  active  habits  may  be  operating  at  the 
same  time. 

(1st.)  Active  caution  may  be  increasing,  while 
passive  fear  is  growing  less. 

(2d.)  The  practical  principle  of  benevolence  may 
be  strengthening,  wrhile  the  passive  impression  of 
pity,  in  consequence  of  frequently  witnessing  dis- 
tress, will  be  less  and  less  sensibly  felt. 

(3d.)  It  greatly  contributes  to  strengthen  a  prac- 
tical regard  to  death  ;  i.  e.,  to  form  a  habit  of  acting 
with  a  constant  view  to  it ;  to  behold  daily  instan- 
ces of  men  dying  around  us,  though  these  instan- 
ces give  us  a  less  sensible  feeling  or  apprehension 
of  our  owTn  mortality. 

Thus  it  appears  that  passive  impressions  made 
upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  and 
example  tend  to  form  active  habits,  not  from  our 
being  so  affected,  but  from  our  being  induced  to 
such  a  course  of ; action;  i.  e.t  it  is  the  acting,  and. 
G 


74  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.        [PART  I 

not  the  affection,  that  forms  them ;  only  it  must  be 
always  remembered  that  real  endeavors  to  enforce 
,good  impressions  upon  ourselves  are  a  species  of 
virtuous  actions.  And  practical  principles  grow 
•stronger  absolutely  in  themselves  by  exercise,  a8 
well  as  relatively  with  regard  to  contrary  princi- 
ples, which,  by  being  accustomed  to  submit,  do  so 
habitually  and  of  caurse.  Thus  a  new  character, 
in  several  respects,  may  be  formed. 

3d.  We  should  be  totally  unqualified  for  the 
employments  and  satisfactions  of  a  mature  state  of 
life,  unless  we  exerted  the  capacities  that  are  given. 
us,  and  therefore,  we  may  conclude,  intended  to  be 
made  use  of.  Even  maturity  of  understanding  and 
bodily  strength  require  the  continued  exejxnse  of 
our  powers  of  mind  and  body  from  our  infancy. 
But  if  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into  the  world 
with  both  these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  con- 
ceivable, he  would  plainly,  at  first,  be  as  unquali- 
fied for  the  human  life  of  mature  age  as  an  idiot. 
Want  of  acquired  habits  would  be  like  want  of 
language — it  would  destroy  society.  Children, 
from  their  very  birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted 
with  the  scene  in  winch  they  are  to  have  a  future 
part,  and  learning  something  necessary  to  the  per- 
formance of  it ;  he,  from  his  ignorance  would  be 
distracted  with  astonishment;  apprehension,  and 
suspense.  The  subordination  to  which  they  are  ac* 
.  customed  teaches  them  subjection  and  obedience ; 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  75 

he  would  be  so  strangely  headstrong  and  self-willed 
as  to  render  society  insupportable.  And  there  are 
numberless  little  rules  of  action,  learned  so  insen- 
sibly as  to  be  mistaken  for  instinct,  which  he  would 
be  ignorant  of,  without  which  we  could  not  live. 
Thus,  by  example,  instruction  and  self-government, 
we  are  suited  to  different  stations  in  life,  and  our 
conduct  in  each  (which  depends  upon  habits  from 
our  youth)  determines  our  character  and  rank  in 
society.  All  this  is  an  analogy  applicable  to  the 
present  life,  considered  as  a  preparation  for  a  fu- 
ture. Our  condition  in  both  respects  is  uniform, 
and  comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  gene- 
ral law  of  nature. 

4th.  But  do  we  know  how  this  world  is  calcula- 
ted for  such  a  preparation  ?  If  we  did  not,  this 
would  be  no  objection  against  it  being  so.  We 
might,  with  as  much  reason,  object  to  the  known 
fact  that  food  and  sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of 
the  body,  because  we  do  not  know  how  they  can 
do  it,  and,  prior  to  experience,  we  could  not  have 
thought  that  they  would.  Children  are  as  ignorant 
that  sports  and  exercise  are  useful  for  their  health ; 
and  they  might  as  well  object  to  restraints  in  them, 
and  in  other  matters  necessary  for  their  discipline, 
because  they  do  not  see  the  reason  of  them.  But 
taking  in  the  consideration  of  God's  moral  govern- 
ment, and,  consequently,  that  the  character  of  vir- 
tue and  piety  is  a  necessary  qualification  for  a  fu- 


76  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.       [PART.  1 

ture  state,  we  may  distinctly  see  how  and  in  what 
respects  the  present  life  may  be  a  preparation  for 
it,  since  we  want,  and  are  capable  of,  improvement 
in  that  character  by  moral  and  religious  habits,  and 
the  present  life  is  Jit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for 
such  improvement.  Now,  first,  as  regards  the  state 
for  which  we  are  to  prepare,  analogy  leads  us  to 
conclude  that  it  will  be  a  society  as  Scripture  de- 
scribes it ;  and  it  is  not  at  all  unreasonable  to  sup- 
pose, though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  it  will 
be,  according  to  the  representation  of  Scripture, 
under  the  more  immediate  or  sensible  government 
of  God.  That  we  are  capable  of  improvement,  has 
been  already  shown ;  and  that  we  want  it,  every 
one  will  admit  who  is  acquainted  with  the  great 
wickedness  of  mankind,  or  even  with  those  imper- 
fections which  the  best  are  conscious  of.  But  the 
necessity  for  discipline  in  human  creatures  is  to  be 
traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions  by 
indulgence  and  habits  of  vice.  From  the  very  con- 
stitution of  their  nature  they  are  deficient,  and  in 
danger  of  deviating  from  what  is  right,  and,  there- 
fore, they  stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits  for  a  se- 
curity against  this  danger ;  for,  besides  the  general 
principle  of  moral  understanding,  they  have,  in  their 
inward  frame,  various  affections  toward  external 
objects,  which  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither 
excite  nor  prevent  being  excited ;  and  when  the 
object  of  any  affection  can  not  be  obtained  with  the 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  77 

consent  of  the  moral  principle,  yet  may  be  obtained 
without  it,  such  affection,  though  its  being  excited, 
and  its  continuing  some  time  in  the  mind,  be  as  in- 
nocent as  it  is  natural  and  necessary,  tends  to  in- 
cline them  to  venture  upon  an  unlawful  means  of 
indulgence.  Now,  what  is  the  general  security 
against  their  actually  deviating  from  what  is  right? 
As  the  danger  is  from  within,  so,  also,  must  the  se- 
curity be — from  the  inward  practical  principle  of 
virtue  ;*  and  the  strengthening  this  principle  will 
lessen  the  danger  or  increase  the  security  against 
it.  All  this  is  under  the  supposition  that  particular 
affections  remain  in  a  future  state.  If  this  suppo- 

*  It  may  be  thought  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  ef- 
fectually restrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if,  by  a 
sense  of  interest,  is  meant  a  speculative  conviction,  or  belief, 
that  such  and  such  indulgence  would  occasion  them  greater 
uneasiness,  upon  the  whole,  than  satisfaction,  it  is  contrary 
to  present  experience  to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  suf- 
ficient to  restrain  them  from  thus  indulging  themselves.  And 
if,  by  a  sense  of  interest,  is  meant  a  practical  regard  to  what 
is,  upon  the  whole,  our  happiness,  this  is  not  only  coincident 
with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part 
of  the  idea  itself.  And  it  is  evident  this  reasonable  self-love 
wants  to  be  improved  as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature ; 
for  we  daily  see  it  overmatched  not  only  by  the  more  boister- 
ous passions,  but  by  curiosity,  shame,  love  of  imitation — by 
any  thing,  even  indolence ;  especially  if  the  interest — the  tem- 
poral interest  suppose — which  is  the  end  of  such  self-love,  bo 
at  a  distance ;  so  greatly  are  profligate  men  mistaken  when 
they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interestedness  and 
self-love ;  and  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim 
this  principle. — Butler, 

G* 


78  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.         [PART  I. 

sition  be  true,  acquired  habits  will  probably  be 
necessary  to  regulate  them;  if  it  be  not,  it  amounts 
to  the  same  thing ;  for  habits  of  virtue,  thus  ac- 
quired by  discipline,  are  improvements  in  virtue  ; 
and  improvements  in  virtue  must  be  advancement 
in  happiness,  if  the  government  of  the  universe  be 
moral.  The  necessity  of  moral  improvement  by 
discipline  wrll  further  appear  by  considering,  1st, 
how  creatures,  made  upright,  may  fall;  and,  2d, 
how,  by  preserving  their  integrity,  they  may  raise 
themselves  to  a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  The 
nature  of  liberty  can  no  more  account  for  the  for- 
mer than  the  possibility  of  an  event  can  account 
for  its  occurrence.  But  it  seems  distinctly  con- 
ceivable, from  the  very  nature  of  particular  affec- 
tions or  propensions ;  for,  suppose  creatures  intend- 
ed for  a  state  of  life  for  which  these  propensions 
are  necessary,  endued  with  them,  together  with  a 
moral  understanding,  having  all  these  principles 
exactly  proportioned  to  their  intended  state  of  life, 
such  creatures  would  be  made  upright  or  finitely 
perfect.  Now,  these  propensions  must  be  felt,  the 
objects  being  present ;  they  can  be  gratified  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  moral  principle,  and,  there- 
fore, possess  some  tendency  to  induce  persons  to 
such  forbidden  gratification  ;  which  tendency,  in 
such  particular  cases,  may  be  increased  by  a  great- 
er frequency  of  occasions  to  excite  them,  by  the 
least  voluntary  indulgence,  even  in  thought,  till,  by 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  79 

peculiar  conjunctures  conspiring,  the  danger  of  de- 
viating from  right  ends  in  actual  deviation — a  dan- 
ger necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  pro- 
pension,  which,  on  this  account,  could  not  have 
been  prevented,  though  it  might  have  been  inno- 
cently passed  through.*  It  is  impossible  to  say 
how  far  the  first  act]  of  irregularity  might  disorder 
the  inward  constitution,  but  repetition  of  irregular- 
ity would  produce  habits;  and,  in  proportion  to 
this  repetition,  creatures,  made  upright,  would  be- 
come depraved.  But,  2d,  by  steadily  following 
the  moral  principle,  creatures  might  have  preserved 
their  uprightness,  and,  consequently,  might  have 
been  raised  to  a  higher  and  more  secure  state  of 
virtue,  since  the  moral  principle  would  gain  strength 
by  exercise,  and  the  propensions  from  habit  would 
more  easily  submit.  Thus,  then,  vicious  indulgence 
is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also  depraves  the 
inward  constitution  and  character.  And  virtuous 
self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also 
improves  the  inward  constitution,  and  may  improve 
it  to  such  a  degree  as  that  the  danger  of  actually 

*  This  proves  that  it  was  not  necessary  for  our  Lord  to 
take  upon  him  our  sinful  nature  in  order  to  be  capable  of 
temptation.  Vide  two  Sermons,  by  Dr.  O'Brien,  to  prove 
that  he  might  be  "  tempted  like  as  we  are,  and  yet  without 
sin." 

t  This  may  serve  as  an  answer  to  the  common  objection, 
that  the  consequences  of  a  single  crime  in  our  first  parents 
are  represented  in  Scripture  as  incredibly  excessive. 


80  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATIOiN.        [PART  I. 

deviating  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  less- 
ened. Thus  it  appears,  that  creatures  without 
blemish,  even  possessed  of  a  moral  principle,  may 
be  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  so  stand  in  need 
of  the  higher  perfection  and  security  of  virtuous 
habits  formed  in  a  state  of  discipline.  Much  more 
are  they  in  danger,  and  much  do  they  require  such 
habits,  whose  natures  are  corrupted,  and  whose 
passions  have  become  excessive  from  habits  of  in- 
dulgence. They  require  to  be  renewed,  not  merely 
improved  ;  for  them,  discipline  of  the  severer  sort 
must  be  necessary.  This  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to 
be  a  state  of  discipline  for  this  purpose.  Such  ex- 
perience as  it  affords  of  the  frailty  of  our  nature — 
of  the  danger  and  actual  event  of  creatures  losing 
their  innocence  and  happiness — hath  a  tendency  to 
give  us  a  practical  sense  of  things  very  different 
from  a  speculative  knowledge  of  what  we  are  liable 
to.  But  what  renders  it  peculiarly  fit,  are  the  snares 
and  temptations  to  vice,  because  they  render  cau- 
tion, recollection,  and  self-denial  necessary  to  such 
as  will  preserve  their  integrity.  And  strong  temp- 
tations particularly  call  these  into  action ;  and,  re- 
quiring a  stronger  effort  of  virtue,  or  a  continued 
exercising  of  it,  they  confirm  a  habit  of  it  much 
more  than  weak  or  instantaneous  temptations  could 
possibly  do.  It  is,  indeed,  ridiculous  to  assert  that 
self-denial  is  essential  to  virtue  and  piety ;  but  it  is 
nearer  the  truth,  though  not  strictly  the  truth  itself, 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  81 

to  say,  that  it  is  essential  to  discipline  and  improve- 
ment ;  for,  though  actions  materially  virtuous  may 
not  be  an  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  i.  e., 
not  virtuous  actions  at  all,  but  merely  done  from 
being  agreeable  to  our  own  particular  inclinations, 
yet  they  may  be  an  exercise  of  that  principle,  and, 
when  they  are,  they  tend  to  form  and  fix  the  habit 
of  virtue ;  and  this  in  proportion  to  the  frequency 
or  intensity  of  the  exercise  of  the  virtuous  princi- 
ple ;  but,  as  neither  our  intellectual  power  nor  bod- 
ily strength  can  be  improved  beyond  a  certain  de- 
gree, and  both  may  be  overwrought,  possibly  there 
may  be  some  trifling  analogy  to  this  in  the  moral 
character.  Thus  it  appears,  in  general  (for  there 
may  be  some  other  minute  exceptions),  that  this 
world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  trial,  in  the 
same  sense  that  some  sciences  are  fit  to  form  to 
habits  of  attention  the  minds  of  such  as  will  attend 
to  them.  These  several  observations,  concerning 
the  active  principle  of  virtue,  are  applicable  to  pas- 
sive submission,  or  resignation  to  the  Divine  will, 
which  is  another  essential  part  of  a  right  charac- 
ter, connected  with  the  former,  and  very  much  in 
our  power  to  form  ourselves  to.  •> 

III.  1st  OBJECTION.  "  The  present  state  is  so 
far  from  proving,  in  event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to 
the  generality  of  men,  that,  on  the  contrary,  they 
seem  to  make  it  a  discipline  of  vice." 

ANSWER.  The  viciousness  of  the  world  is,  in  dif- 


32  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.        [.PART  L 

ferent  ways,  the  great  temptation,  which  renders 
it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in  the  degree  it  is, 
to  good  men.  The  whole  end  of  man  being  placed 
in  such  a  state  as  the  present,  is  not  pretended  to 
be  accounted  for.  It  is  a  discipline  to  some  who 
attend  to  and  follow  the  notices  of  virtue  arid  relig- 
ion ;  and  if  it  be  not  to  the  generality,  this  can  no 
more  be  urged  as  a  proof  against  its  being  intend- 
ed for  moral  discipline  than  the  decay  of  the  great- 
er part  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables  and 
bodies  of  animals  put  in  a  way  to  improve  to  ma- 
turity and  perfection  can  be  urged  as  an  objection 
against  their  being  intended  for  that  end,  to  which 
only  one  in  a  million  attains  to.* 

2d  OBJECTION.  As  far  as  a  course  of  behavior 
materially  virtuous  proceeds  from  hope  and  fear, 
so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and  strengthening  of 
self-love. 

ANSWER.  Doing  what  God  commands,  because 
he  commands  it,  is  obedience,  though  it  proceeds 
from  hope  or  fear;  and  a  course  of  such  obedience 
will  form  habits  of  it.  There  is  no  foundation  for 
this  great  nicety  ;  for  veracity,  justice,  and  charity 
(regard  to  which  must  form  habits  of  self-govern- 

*  I  can  not  forbear  adding,  though  it  is  not  to  the  present 
purpose,  that  the  appearance  of  such  an  amazing  waste  in  na- 
ture, with  respect  to  these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes, 
is  to  us  as  unaccountable  as,  what  is  much  more  terrible,  the 
present  and  future  ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents  by  them- 
selves, i.  e.,  by  vice. — Butler. 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  03 

ment),  respect  to  God's  authority,  and  to  our  own 
chief  interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coincident,  but 
each  of  them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and  natural  princi- 
ple of  action.* 

3d  OBJECTION.  How  can  passive  submission  and 
resignation!  be  in  any  way  necessary  to  qualify  for 
a  state  of  perfect  happiness,  since  nothing  but  afflic- 
tions can  give  occasion  for ;  or  require  this  virtue  ? 

ANSWER.  Experience  contradicts  this  assertion. 
Even  prosperity  begets  extravagant  and  unbounded 
thoughts.  Imagination  is  as  much  a  source  of  dis- 
content as  any  thing  in  our  external  condition.  It 
is,  indeed,  true,  that  there  can  be  no  scope  for  pa- 
tience when  sorrow  shall  be  no  more ;  but  there 
may  be  need  of  a  temper  of  mind  which  shall  have 
been  formed  by  patience.  For,  though  self-love, 
considered  as  an  active  principle  leading  us  to  pur- 
sue our  real  and  chief  interest,  must  coincide  with 
the  principle  of  obedience  to  God's  command  (this 
obedience  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  interest  be- 

*  Religion  is  so  far  from  disowning  the  principle  of  self-love, 
that  it  often  addresses  itself  to  that  very  principle,  and  al- 
ways to  the  mind  in  that  state  where  reason  presides ;  and 
there  can  no  access  be  had  to  the  understanding  but  by  con- 
vincing men  that  the  course  of  life  we  should  persuade  them 
to  is  not  contrary  to  their  interest. — Butler's  Sermons. 

t  Resignation  to  the  will  of  God  is  the  whole  of  piety;  it 
includes  in  it  all  that  is  good,  and  is  a  source  of  the  most  get- 
tied  quiet  and  composure  of  mind.  It  may  be  said  to  be 
perfect  when  our  will  is  lost  and  resolved  into  His. — Butler1* 
Sermons. 


34  OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.        [PART.  I. 

ing  synonymous),  yet  it  can  not  be  said  so  certainly 
to  coincide,  considered  merely  as  the  desire  of  our 
own  interest,  any  more  than  particular  affections 
can,  i.  e.,  so  as  to  be  incapable  of  unlawful  excite- 
ments. So  that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon 
this  account,  be  requisite  for  all  creatures — habits, 
i.  e.,  what  are  formed  by  use.  However,  in  gen- 
eral it  is  obvious  that  both  self-love  and  particular 
affections  in  human  creatures,  considered  only  as 
passive  feelings,  distort  and  rend  the  mind,  and, 
therefore,  require  discipline  to  moderate  them. 
But  the  proper  discipline  for  resignation  is  afflic- 
tion, since  a  right  behavior  under  that  trial  will 
habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  submission,  which, 
with  the  active  principle  of  obedience,  make  up  the 
character  which  belongs  to  us  as  dependent  crea- 
tures. 

4th  OBJECTION.  All  the  trouble  and  danger,  un- 
avoidably accompanying  such  discipline,  might  have 
been  saved  us  by  our  being  made  at  once  the  crea- 
tures which  we  were  to  be. 

ANSWER.  This  is  contrary  to  the  general  conduct 
of  nature ?,  which  is  not  to  save  us  trouble  or  danger, 
but  to  furnish  us  with  capacities  for  going  through 
them,  and  to  oblige  us  to  do  so.  Acquirements  of 
our  own  experience  and  habits  are  the  natural  sup- 
ply to  our  deficiencies,  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural 
to  set  ourselves  to  acquire  the  qualifications  as  the 
external  things  which  we  stand  in  need  of. 


CHAP.  V.]      OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION.  85 

IV.  There  is  a  third  sense  of  the  word  probation  : 
a  theatre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
characters  to  the  creation  of  God.  This  may,  per- 
haps, be  only  a  consequence  of  our  being  in  a  state 
of  probation  in  the  other  senses.  However,  this 
manifestation  of  the  real  character  of  men  may 
have  respect  to  a  future  life  in  ways  unknown  to 
us :  particularly  it  may  be  a  means  of  their  being 
disposed  of  suitably  to  their  characters,  and  of  its 
being  made  known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  ex- 
ample, that  they  are  thus  disposed  of. 
H 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  V. 

1.  What  is  the  only  question  of  real  importance  to 
us,  that  arises  from  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a 
state  of  probation   here  ?     And  how  may  it   be   an- 
swered ? 

2.  State,  1st,  the  general  analogy  by  which  Butler 
illustrates  this  subject;  and,  2d,  the  four  distinct  con- 
siderations by  which  he  shows  the  extent  and  force  of 
that  analogy. 

3.  How  does  he  explain  the  passage  in  Ecclesiasti- 
cus,  chap,  xlii.,  24 ;  and   what  consequence  does  he 
deduce  from  it? 

4.  State  what  are  our  capacities  of  acquiring  knowl- 
edge ;  and  by  what  power  we  may  acquire  settled  al- 
terations of  our  character. 

5.  What  comparison  may  we  institute  between  the 
habits  of  the  body  and  those  of  the  mind  ? 

6.  Give  a  summary  of  the  argument  showing  the 
momentous  difference  between  practical  habits  and  pas- 
sive  impressions  on  the    mind ;    noting  especially  the 
only  way  in  which  the  latter  can  become  useful  to  us. 

7.  Prove  that  the  possession  of  capacities   implies 
the  necessity  also  of  using  them. 

8.  By  what  considerations  may  we  distinctly   see 
how,  and  in  what  respects,  the  present  life  may  be  a 
preparation  for  a  future  state  ? 

9.  Show  that,  from  the  very  constitution  of  our  na- 
ture being  deficient,  there  is  a  necessity  for  discipline 
in  human  creatures. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  V.  87 

10.  What  meaning  does  Butler  affix  to  the  term  "a 
sense  of  our  interest,"  when  he  proves  it  is  perfectly 
compatible  with  moral  rectitude  ?    State  his  argument 
on  this  point. 

11.  How  does  it  seem  distinctly  conceivable,  from 
the  very  nature  of  particular  affections  implanted  in 
them,  that  creatures,  made  upright,  may  fall? 

*  12.  How  does  it  appear  that  upright  creatures,  by 
pursuing  their  integrity,  may  raise  themselves  to  a 
more  secure  state  of  virtue?  What  inference  is 
drawn  from  the  two  foregoing  positions  ? 

13.  By   what   arguments   is   it   proved   that   "this 
world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  the 
purpose,  not  merely  of  improving,  but  of  renewing 
men  ? 

14.  Answer  the  following  objections.    1st.  The  pres- 
ent state  becomes  to  most  men  a  discipline  of  vice  in- 
stead of  virtue. 

15.  2d.  Actions  proceeding  from  hope  or  fear,  though 
they  be  materially  virtuous,  only  discipline  and  strength- 
en self-love. 

16.  3d.  How  can  passive  submission  and  resignation, 
which  are  required  only  in  afflictions   (and  they  are 
occasioned  by  a  state  of  sin),  serve   to  qualify  us  for 
perfect  happiness  and  virtue  ? 

17.  4th.  Might  not  all  our  trouble  and  danger  in  this 
state  of  discipline  have  been  saved  by  God  making  us 
at  once  the  creatures  which  he  intends  us  finally  to  be  ? 

18.  What  purpose  may  be  served  by  the  manifesta- 
tions of  the  real  character  of  individuals  in  this  life  ? 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF    THE    OPINION     OF    NECESSITY    CONSIDERED     AS    IN- 
FLUENCING   PRACTICE. 

I.  The  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  Intelligent  Author  of  na- 
ture, taken  for  granted  in  this  Treatise,  is  not  affected  by 
the  opinion  of  Universal  Necessity,     For,  1st,  when  a  Fa- 
talist asserts  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity,  he  must  mean 
by  an  agent,  acting  necessarily  ;  and,  2d,  the  necessity  by 
which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  act  does  not  exclude 
intelligence  and  design. 

II.  Neither  does  the  opinion  of  Universal  Necessity  affect  the 
system  of  there  being  a  Moral  Governor,  or  of  our  being  in 
a  state  of  religion ;  for,  if  that  opinion  can  be  reconciled 
with  our  condition  under  the  present  Moral  Government, 
it  can  be  reconciled  with  that  which  religion  teaches  us  to 
expect ;  but,  in  the  former  case,  it  is  found  to  be  practically 
false. 

III.  The  opinion  of  Universal  Necessity  does  not  affect  the 
practical  proof  of  religion,  derived  from  the  particular  final 
causes  of  pleasure  and  pain  annexed  to  actions,  combined 
with  the  external  evidence  of  Natural  Religion. 

I.  AN  objection  may  be  made  from  universal  ne- 
cessity against  the  existence  of  an  Intelligent  Au- 
thor of  nature,  which  has  been  taken  for  granted 
throughout  this  treatise  as  a  thing  proved,  as  it 


CHAP.  VI.]    OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.         89 

may  be  supposed  that  such  necessity  will  account 
for  the  origin  and  preservation  of  all  things.  But, 
in  the  first  place,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist  that 
every  thing  is  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly 
have  been  otherwise,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  this 
necessity  does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice, 
preference,  and  acting  from  certain  principles  and 
to  certain  'ends,  because  all  this  every  man  may 
every  moment  be  conscious  of.  So  that  the  asser- 
tion that  every  thing  is  by  necessity  of  nature  is 
not  an  answer  to  the  question  whether  the  world 
came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  Intelligent  Agent 
forming  it  thus  or  not  ]  but  to  quite  another  ques- 
tion— whether  it  came  into  being  in  that  way  and 
manner  which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  that  way 
and  manner  which  we  call  freely  ?  For,  suppose 
farther,  that,  in  a  dispute  between  a  fatalist  and  one 
who  believed  himself  a  free  agent,  a  house  was  in- 
stanced ;  they  would  both  agree  that  it  was  built 
by  an  architect ;  the  point  of  their  difference  would 
be,  whether  he  built  it  necessarily,  or  freely  1  We 
ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,*  uncaused, 

*  As  to  the  meaning  of  necessary  existence,  logicians  have 
long  since  determined  that  there  are  but  two  modes  according 
to  which  any  Being  can  be  said  to  exist,  or  to  be  what  it  is ; 
and  these  are  contingency  and  necessity.  Where  the  non-ex- 
istence of  a  Being  is  possible,  that  is,  where  we  can,  without 
a  contradiction,  suppose  it  not  to  exist,  that  Being  exists  con- 
tingently, or  contingency  is  the  mode  of  its  existence.  But 
if  there  is  any  Being  who  demonstrably  must  exist,  and  whose 
non-existence  is  therefore  impossible  and  inconce viable,  that 


90  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.     [PART  I. 

by  any  agent :  for  we  find  within  ourselves  the 
idea  of  infinity,  i.  c.,  immensity  and  eternity,  impos- 
sible even  in  imagination  to  be  removed  out  of  be- 
ing ;  and  from  hence  (for  this  abstract,  as  much  as 
any  other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude  that 
there  is,  arid  can  not  but  be,  an  Infinite  and  Im- 
mense Eternal  Being,  answering  this  idea,  existing 
prior  to  all  design  contributing  to  his  *  existence ; 
and,  therefore,  from  the  scantiness  of  language,  we 
say  necessity  is  the  foundation  of  his  existence. 
But  there  can  not  be  said  to  be  this  kind  of  neces- 
sity for  the  existence  of  every  thing — a  necessity 
antecedent  in  nature  to  design,  for  many  reasons  : 
but  chiefly  because  it  is  admitted  that  design  in  the 
actions  of  men  contributes  to  many  alterations  in 
nature. 

II.  The  condition  of  mankind  under  the  present 
moral  government  being  greatly  analogous  to  our 
condition  under  a  farther  government,  which  reli- 
gion teaches  us — if  any  assert,  as  the  fatalist  must, 
that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity  is  reconcil- 
able with  the  former,  there  immediately  arises  a 
question,  in  the  way  of  analogy,*  whether  he  must 

Being  exists  necessarily,  or  necessity  is  the  mode  of  its  exist- 
ence. But  necessity  can  in  no  sense  be  considered  as  the 
cause,  or  even  as  the  ground  or  reason  of  any  existence,  or 
of  any  effect  whatever. — Hamilton  on  the  Existence  of  God. 
*  "  Fatalists  are  fond  of  inferring  moral  necessity  from  phys- 
ical, in  the  way  of  analogy,  In  effect,  says  Voltaire,  it  would 
be  very  singular  that  all  nature,  all  the  planets,  should  obey 


CHAP.  VI.]     OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.          91 

not  also  own  it  to  be  reconcilable  with  the  latter, 
i.  e.,  with  the  system  of  religion  itself,  and  the  proof 
of  it.  Suppose,  then,  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one 
from  his  youth  up  in  his  own  principles — to  eradicate 
the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation 
out  of  his  mind,  by  teaching  him  that  he  can  not  pos- 
sibly behave  otherwise  than  he  does ;  suppose  the 
child  to  judge,  from  this  system,  what  treatment  he 
is  to  expect  from  reasonable  men,  upon  his  com- 
ing abroad  into  the  world — as  the  fatalist  judges 
from  it  what  he  is  to  expect  from  the  Author  of 
nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future  state.  At  first 
he  would  have  a  great  degree  of  conceit  and  vanity 
at  being  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame 
with  which  his  playfellows  were  fettered  ;  but  this 
is  not  all;  he  must  evidently,  by  constant  correction, 
have  the  want  of  those  natural  perceptions  of  blame 
and  commendation  supplied,  which  this  system  de- 
stroyed, and  thus  be  convinced  that,  if  it  be  not 

eternal  laws,  and  that  there  should  be  a  little  animal  five  feet 
high,  who,  in  contempt  of  these  laws,  could  act  as  he  pleased, 
solely  according  to  his  caprice.  We  do  too  much  honor  to 
such  reasoning  when  we  reply  to  it  in  the  bold  but  sublime 
words  of  a  great  genius  :" 

Know'st  thou  th'  importance  of  a  soul  immortal  1 

Behold  this  midnight-glory,  worlds  on  worlds  ! 

Amazing  pomp  !     Redouble  this  amaze ; 

Ten  thousand  add ;  add  twice  ten  thousand  more ; 

Then  weigh  the  whole.     One  soul  outweighs  them  all, 

And  calls  the  astonishing  magnificence 

Of  unintelligent  creation  poor. 

BEATTLE. 


92  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.     [PART  I. 

false,  it  is  misapplied  when  applied  to  practice. 
Or,  supposing  his  temper  could  remain  still  form- 
ed to  the  system,  upon  his  coming  abroad  inte 
the  world  he  would  be  insupportable  to  society, 
and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it 
would  render  it  so  to  him ;  and  he  could  not  fail 
of  soon  committing  some  act  for  which  he  would 
be  delivered  over  into  the  hands  of  civil  justice. 
Any  other  practical  application  of  this  opinion  will 
be  found  equally  fallacious ;  for  instance,  that  there 
is  no  need  for  taking  care  to  preserve  life,  for,  if 
we  are  destined  to  live,  we  shall  live  without  it; 
and,  if  to  die,  we  can  not  prevent  it.  None  of  these 
practical  absurdities  result  from  reasoning  upon  the 
supposition  that  we  are  free;  and,  therefore,  though 
it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion  of  necessity  were 
speculatively  true,  yet,  with  regard  to  practice,  it  is 
as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our  experience  reaches; 
that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  present  life.  And  how 
can  people  think  themselves  so  very  secure,  that 
the  same  application  of  the  same  opinion  may  not 
mislead  them  also,  in  some  analogous  manner,  with 
respect  to  a  future  one,  on  which  is  dependent  a 
more  general  and  more  important  interest  ]  For 
religion  being  a  practical  subject,  and  the  analogy 
of  nature  showing  us  that  we  have  not  faculties  to 
apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical 
subjects,  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject 
of  religion,  and  thence  conclude  that  we  are  free 


CHAP.  VI.]    OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.          93 

from  its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this  conclusion  can 
not  be  depended  upon.  Nor  does  this  contain  any 
reflection  upon  reason,  but  only  upon  what  is  un- 
reasonable— applying  our  reason  to  subjects  to 
which  experience  shows  us  they  are  not  suited. 
Farther,  we  find  within  ourselves  a  will,  and  are 
conscious  of  a  character,  i.  e.y  that  frame  of  mind 
whereby  we  act  in  one  manner  rather  than  another. 
Now,  if  this  in  us  be  reconcilable  with  fate,  it  is 
reconcilable  with  it  in  the  Author  of  nature  (be- 
sides natural  government  and  final  causes  imply  a 
character  and  a  will  in  the  Governor  concerning 
the  creatures  whom  He  governs) ;  and  it  is  as  rec- 
oncilable with  the  particular  character  of  benevo- 
lence, veracity,  and  justice  in  Him,  which  attributes 
are  the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other 
character,  since  we  find  this  necessity  no  more  hin- 
ders men  from  being  benevolent  than  cruel — true 
than  faithless — just  than  unjust — or,  if  the  fatalist 
pleases,  what  ice  call  unjust.  For  it  is  said,  indeed, 
that  what,  upon  supposition  of  freedom,  would  be 
just  punishment,  upon  supposition  of  necessity  be- 
comes manifestly  unjust;  because  it  is  punishment 
inflicted  for  doing  what  persons  could  not  avoid 
doing.  As  if  the  necessity  which  is  supposed  to 
destroy  the  injustice  of  murder,  for  instance,  would 
not  also  destroy  the  injustice  of  punishing  it.  How- 
ever, as  little  to  the  purpose  as  this  objection  is  in 
itself,  it  shows  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  in- 


94  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.     [PART  I. 

justice  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  even  while 
we  are  making  suppositions  destructive  of  them. 

III.  But,  though  it  is  most  evident  that  universal 
necessity,  if  it  be  reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is 
reconcilable  with  that  character  in  the  Author  of 
nature,  which  is  the  foundation  of  religion,  yet 
does  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  proof  that  He  is  of 
that  character,  and  consequently  the  proof  of  reli- 
gion ?  By  no  means ;  for  we  find  that  happiness 
and  misery  are  not  our  fate  in  any  such  sense  as 
not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our  behavior,  but 
that  they  are  the  consequences  of  it.  But  as  the 
doctrine  of  liberty,  though  experienced  to  be  true, 
may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties,  and  as  necessity 
seems  to  be  the  basis  of  infidelity,  we  shall  prove 
more  distinctly  and  particularly  that  necessity  does 
not  destroy  the  obligations  of  religion.  The  proof, 
from  final  causes,  of  an  Intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
is  not  affected  by  it.  And  it  is  a  matter  of  fact— 
and,  therefore,  there  can  be  no  objection  against  it 
from  necessity — that  He  governs  the  world  by  the 
method  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  also  that 
He  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by  which  we 
distinguish  between  actions  virtuous  and  vicious. 
This  is  a  rule  of  such  authority,  that  we  can  not 
depart  from  it  without  being  self-condemned.  It  in 
plainly  a  Divine  command,  immediately  producing 
a  sense  of  duty,  being  a  direction  of  the  Author  of 
nature  to  creatures  capable  of  looking  upon  it  as 


CHAP.  VI.]    OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.          95 

such;  and  his  having  annexed  to  some  actions  an 
inseparable  sense*  of  good  desert,  and  to  others  of 
ill,  surely  amounts  to  declaring  upon  whom  his 
punishment  shall  be  hereafter  inflicted,  and  his  re- 
wards be  bestowed.t  But  besides  this,  natural 
religion  hath  an  external  evidence  which  the  doc- 
trine of  necessity,  if  it  could  be  true,  would  not  ef- 
fect. 1st.  Somewhat  of  this  system  has  been  pro- 
fessed in  all  ages  and  countries  of  which  we  have 
any  information.  This  general  consent  shows  the 
system  to  be  conformable  to  the  common  sense  of 
mankind.  2d.  It  is  a  certain  historical  fact,  as  far 
as  we  can  trace,  that  religion  was  believed  in  the 
first  ages  of  the  world,  and  this  when  it  was  un- 
adulterated by  superstition.  The  only  alternative 
is,  either  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation, 
or  that  it  is  natural  and  obvious,  and  forces  itself 
upon  the  mind.  The  former  is  the  conclusion  of 

*  From  hence  might  easily  be  deduced  the  obligation  of 
religious  worship,  were  it  only  to  be  considered  as  a  means 
of  preserving  upon  our  minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  govern- 
ment of  God,  and  securing  our  obedience  to  it ;  which  yet  is 
an  extremely  imperfect  view  of  that  most  important  duty. — 
Butler. 

t  The  conclusion,  that  God  will  finally  reward  the  rights 
eous  and  punish  the  wicked,  is  not  here  drawn  from  it  ap- 
pearing to  us  jit  that  He  should,  but  from  its  appearing  that 
He  has  told  us  He  will.  However,  I  am  far  from  intending 
to  deny  that  the  will  of  God  is  determined  by  what  is  fit,  by 
the  right  and  reason  of  the  case ;  though  such  abstract  sub- 
jects are  rather  to  be  declined,  or,  at  least,  treated  with 
caution. — Butler. 


96  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.     [PART  I. 

learned  men,  rendered  more  probable  by  the  in-' 
aptness  of  uncultivated  minds  for  speculation,  and 
by  the  early  pretenses  to  revelation,  otherwise  not 
easily  accounted  for.  3d.  There  is  express  histor- 
ical, or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as  history, 
of  the  system  of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by 
revelation ;  and  why  should  not  the  most  ancient 
tradition  be  admitted  as  some  additional  proof  of 
a  fact  against  which  there  is  no  presumption ;  and 
this  proof  is  mentioned  here,  because  it  tends  to 
show  that  religion  came  into  the  world  by  revela- 
tion prior  to  all  consideration  of  the  proper  author- 
ity of  any  book  supposed  to  contain  a  revelation, 
and  even  prior  to  all  consideration  whether  the 
revelation  itself  be  purely  handed  down. 

It  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected,  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion, 
which  are  only  general,  that,  as  speculative  reason 
may  be  neglected,  prejudiced,  and  deceived,  so 
also  may  our  moral  understanding  be  impaired 
and  perverted,  and  the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially 
attended  to ;  this  should  admonish  us  not  to  take 
custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  honor,  or 
imaginations  of  present  ease,  use,  and  convenience 
to  mankind  for  the  only  moral  rule. 

The  foregoing  observations  together  amount  to  a 
practical  proof,  sufficient  to  influence  the  actions  of 
men,  who  act  upon  thought  and  reflection,  if  it  were 
admitted  that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  contrary. 


CHAP.  VI.]     OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.         97 

OBJECTION.  "  There  are  many  probabilities  which 
can  not  be  shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet 
may  be  overbalanced  by  greater  probabilities  on 
the  other  side ;  much  more  by  demonstration. 
And  there  is  no  occasion  to  object  against  particu- 
lar arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion,  when  the 
opinion  itself  may  be  clearly  shown  to  be  false. 
Now  the  method  of  government  by  rewarding  and 
punishing  good  and  ill  desert,  as  such,  supposes 
that  we  are  free,  and  not  necessary,  agents ;  and  it 
is  incredible  that  the  Author  of  nature  should  gov- 
ern us  upon  a  supposition,  as  true,  which  he  knows 
to  be  false,*  and,  therefore,  absurd  to  think  that  he 
will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions  hereafter, 
especially  considered  as  of  good  or  ill  desert." 

ANSWER.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows 
that  the  conclusion,  from  this  reasoning,  is  false, 
wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  free- 
dom, indeed,  clearly  shows  where — in  supposing 
ourselves  necessary,  when,  in  truth,  we  are  free 
agents.  But,  upon  supposition  of  necessity,  the 
fallacy  lies  in  taken  for  granted  that  it  is  incredible 

*  Hume  goes  so  far  as  to  affirm,  "  that,  though  man,  in 
truth,  is  a  necessary  agent,  having  all  his  actions  determined 
by  fixed  and  immutable  laws,  yet,  this  being  concealed  from 
him,  he  acts  with  the  conviction  of  being  a  free  agent." 
Who  conceals  it?  Does  the  Author  of  nature  conceal  it,  and 
this  writer  discover  it  ? 

To  laugh  were  want  of  goodness  and  of  grace, 
And  to  be  grave  exceeds  all  power  of  face. 

BEATTIK. 


98  OF  THE  OPINION  OF  NECESSITY.     [PART  I. 

that  necessary  agents  should  be  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished. It  is  matter  of  fact  that  men  are  rewarded 
and  punished  for  their  actions,  considered  as  vir- 
tuous and  vicious ;  so  that,  if  it  be  incredible  that 
necessary  agents  should  be  thus  rewarded  and 
punished,  then  men  are  not  necessary,  but  free. 
But  if,  on  the  contrary — which  is  the  supposition 
we  have  been  arguing  upon — it  be  insisted  that 
men  are  necessary  agents,  then  there  is  nothing  in- 
credible in  the  farther  supposition  of  necessary 
agents  being  thus  rewarded  and  punished,  since 
we  ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 

Is,  then,  the  common  assertion  true,  that  the 
opinion  of  necessity  is  essentially  destructive  of  all 
religion  ?  It  is  true,  1st,  in  a  practical  sense,  that 
atheists  encourage  themselves  in  vice  by  this  no- 
tion. 2d.  In  the  strictest  sense,  that  it  is  contrary 
to  the  whole  constitution  of  nature,  and  so  to  every 
thing.  But  it  is  not  true  ;  as  we  have  seen  that 
necessity,  supposed  reconcilable  with  the  consti- 
tution of  things,  is  not  also  reconcilable  with  nat- 
ural religion;  its  proof  remains  unaffected  by  it, 
and,  therefore,  the  proof  of  revealed  religion. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VI. 

1.  Show  that  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  intel- 
ligent Author  of  nature  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion 
of  universal  necessity;  and  give  a  familiar  illustration 
of  the  argument. 

2.  Explain  the  meaning  of  ascribing  to  God  a  neces- 
sary existence.     Why  can  not  any  thing  similar  be  pre- 
dicted of  all  natural  objects  ? 

3.  In  what  manner  does  Hamilton  distinguish  be- 
tween the  existence  of  God  and  creatures  ? 

4.  By  what  examples  does  Butler  illustrate  his  as- 
sertion, that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity,  when 
practically  applied  to  our  condition  in  the  present  life, 
is  found  to  be  fallacious  ? 

5.  How  is  it  proved  that,  in  the  application  of  the 
above  opinions  to  the  things  of  a  future  life,  it  will  be 
found  equally  fallacious  ? 

6.  Show  that  from  the  fact  of  "  our  finding  within 
ourselves  a  will,  and  our  being  conscious  of  a  certain 
character  belonging  to  us,"  arguments  may  be  deduced 
against  the  idea  of  Universal  Necessity  affecting  the 
system  of  a  Moral  Governor. 

7.  Prove  that  the  opinion  of  necessity  does  not  af- 
fect the  practical  proof  of  religion,  derived  from  the 
particular  final  causes  of  pleasure  and  pain  annexed  to 
actions. 


100  QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VI. 

8.  State  the  heads  under  which  it  is  argued,  that 
natural  religion  has  an  external  evidence  that  can  not 
be  affected  by  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 

9.  Answer  upon  his  own  grounds  the  following  ob- 
jection of  a  fatalist,  viz.,  "the  method  of  government 
by  rewards  and  punishments  in  a  future  life  must  go 
upon  the  supposition  that  we  are  not  necessary  agents; 
but  the  Author  of  nature  knows  that  we  are  so  ;  and, 
therefore,  will  not  reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions 
hereafter  under  the  notion  that  they  are  of  good  or 
ill  desert." 

10.  In  what  sense  is  it  true  that  the  doctrine  of  ne- 
cessity is  essentially  destructive  of  all  religion  ? 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  CONSIDERED  AS  A 
SCHEME  OR  CONSTITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY  COMPRE- 
HENDED. 

I.  Admitting  the  credibility  of  the  general  doctrine  of  re- 
ligion as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  may  yet  be  objections 
against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  it.     Analogy 
affords  a  general  answer  to  such  objections,  by  showing 
that  God's  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme  beyond 
our  comprehension. 

II.  This  appears  more  clearly  from  particular  analogies.     1st. 
In  the  natural  government  means  are  used  to  accomplish 
ends,  and  often  such  means  as  appear  to  us  unsuitable. 
2d.    The   natural   government  is  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  with  which  we  are  unacquainted. 

III.  Objection  answered,  viz  : — "  This  is  only  arguing  from 
our  ignorance,  which  may  as  well  be  made  use  of  to  inval- 
idate the  proof  of  religion." 

I.  HAVING  shown  the  credibility  of  religion,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  may  yet  be  objections  against 
the  wisdom,  equity,  and  goodness  of  the  Divine 
government  implied  in  the  notion  of  religion,  and 
against  tbe  method  by  which  this  government  is 
conducted.  To  these  objections  analogy  can  fur- 


102  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.      [PART  I. 

nish  no  direct  answer.  For  the  credibility  or  cer- 
tainty of  a  matter  of  fact,  which  is  all  that  analogy 
can  directly  prove,  does  not  immediately  prove 
any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  goodness  of 
it.  But  analogy  furnishes  a  remote  answer — it 
suggests,  and  makes  it  credible,  that  this  govern- 
ment must  be  a  scheme  or  system,  as  distinguished 
from  a  number  of  single,  unconnected  acts  of  dis- 
tributive justice  and  goodness,  and  a  scheme  be- 
yond our  comprehension.* 

GENERAL  ANALOGY.  Upon  supposition  that  God 
exercises  a  moral  government  over  th6  world,  the 
analogy  of  his  natural  government  suggests  and 
makes  it  credible  that  his  moral  government  must 
be  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our  comprehension. — 
1st.  It  must  be  a  scheme — for  the  world,  and  the 
whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears  to  be  so, 
— to  be  a  scheme  or  system,  whose  parts  corre- 
spond to  each  other,  and  to  a  whole,  as  really  as 
any  work  of  art,  or  as  any  particular  model  of  a 
civil  constitution  and  government.  And  as  there 
is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  with  which  we 
are  acquainted,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to 
have  a  respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events, 
so,  possibly,  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  im- 

*  The  ignorance  of  man  is  a  favorite  doctrine  with  Bishop 
Butler.  It  occurs  again  in  the  second  part  of  the  Analogy ; 
it  makes  the  subject  of  his  15th  Sermon,  and  we  meet  with 
it  also  in  his  Charge. 


CHAP.  VII.]     OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.         103 

mediate  natural  relation  to  other  actions  and  events, 
may  yet  have  a  remote  one,  beyond  the  compass 
of  this  present  world.  Things,  apparently  the 
most  inconsiderable,  are  perpetually  observed  to  be 
necessary  conditions  to  the  most  important  mat- 
ters ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever,  for  aught  we 
know  to  the  contrary,  may  be  a  necessary  condition 
to  any  other.  In  short,  there  is  not  any  one  thing 
of  which  we  can  give  the  whole  account,  of  all  its 
causes,  ends,  and  adjuncts  necessary  to  its  existence. 
Thus  it  appears  that  the  natural  government  is  a 
scheme,  and  a  scheme  so  incomprehensible,  that 
a  man  must  really  know  nothing  at  all  who  is  not 
sensible  of  his  ignorance  in  it.  This  immediately 
suggests,  and  strongly  shows  the  credibility,  that 
the  moral  world  and  government  of  it  may  be  so 
too.  Indeed,  the  natural  and  moral  constitution 
and  government  are  so  connected  as  to  make  up 
together  but  one  scheme  ;  and  it  is  highly  probable, 
but  more  than  is  necessary  to  be  proved  at  present, 
that  the  first  is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in 
subserviency  to  the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world 
is  for  the  natural  and  organized  bodies  for  minds. 
In  the  same  way,  then,  every  act  of  Divine  justice 
and  goodness  may  be  supposed  to  look  much  be- 
yond itself  and  its  immediate  object ;  it  may  have 
some  reference  to  other  parts  of  God's  moral  ad- 
ministration, and  to  a  general  moral  plan :  and 
every  circumstance  of  this  government  may  be  ad- 


104  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.      [PART  I. 

justed  beforehand,  with  a  view  to  the  whole  of  it ; 
as,  for  example,  the  time,  degrees,  and  ways  in 
which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  warfare  and 
discipline,  and  in  which  wickedness  is  permitted  to 
have  its  progress;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, &c.,  &c.*  And  supposing  this  to  be  the 
case,  it  is  most  evident  that  we  are  not  competent 
judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the  small  .parts  of  it 
which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present  life,  and 
therefore  we  are  supplied  with  an  answer  to  all 
objections  to  it.  For,  suppose  it  were  objected, 
"  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil  might  easily 
have  been  prevented  by  repeated  interpositions,  so 
guarded  as  to  preclude  all  mischief  arising  from 
them.  Or,  if  this  were  impracticable,  that  a  scheme 
or  system  of  government  is  itself  an  imperfection, 
since  more  good  might  have  been  produced  with- 
out it,  by  continued  single,  unconnected  acts  of  dis- 
tributive justice  and  goodness,  because  these  would 
have  occasioned  no  irregularities."  The  answer 
is  obvious.  Were  these  assertions  true,  yet  the 
government  of  the  world  might  be  just  and  true, 

*  There  is  no  manner  of  absurdity  in  supposing  a  veil,  011 
purpose,  drawn  over  some  scenes  of  infinite  power,  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  the  sight  of  which  might,  some  way  or  other, 
strike  us  too  strongly ;  or  that  better  ends  are  designed  and 
served  by  their  being  concealed  than  could  be  by  their  being 
exposed  to  our  knowledge.  The  Almighty  may  cast  clouds 
and  darkness  round  about  Him  for  reasons  and  purposes  of 
which  we  have  not  the  least  glimpse  or  conception. — Butler's 
Sermons. 


CHAP.  VII.]     OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.          105 

notwithstanding ;  for,  at  the  most,  they  would  infer 
nothing  more  than  that  it  might  have  been  better. 
But,  indeed,  they  are  mere  arbitrary  assertions,  no 
man  being  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  possi- 
bilities of  things  to  bring  any  proof  of  them  to  the 
lowest  degree  of  probability ;  for  though  what  is 
asserted  may  seem  to  be  possible,  yet  many  in- 
stances may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of 
our  reach,  of  suppositions  absolutely  impossible, 
which  few  would  perceive  to  be  such,  and  perhaps 
no  one,  at  first  sight,  suspect.  Some  unknown  re- 
lation, or  some  unknown  impossibility,  may  render 
what  is  objected  against  just  and  good,  nay,  good 
in  the  highest  practicable  degree. 

HB  PARTICULAR  ANALOGIES  :  1st.  As  in  the 
scheme  of  the  natural  world  no  ends  appear  to  be 
accomplished  without  means,. so  we  find  that  means 
very  undesirable  often  conduce  to  bring  about  ends, 
in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as  greatly  to  overbal- 
ance the  disagreeableness  of  the  means.  Experi- 
ence also  shows  many  means  to  be  conducive  and 
necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before 
experience,  we  should  have  thought  would  have 
had  even  a  contrary  tendency.  In  the  same  way, 
the  things  objected  against  in  the  moral  govern- 
ment, may  be  means  by  which  an  overbalance  of 
good,  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  produced;  and 
likewise,  it  appears  to  be  no  presumption  against 
this,  that  we  do  not  see  those  means  to  have  any 


106  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.      [PART  I. 

such  tendency,  or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a 
contrary  one. 

In  order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  con- 
clusion from  any  of  these  observations,  it  is  to  be 
observed,  that  though  the  actual  permission  of  evil 
may  be  beneficial  to  the  world  (/.  e.,  less  mischiev- 
ous than  if  it  had  been  forcibly  prevented  by  an- 
other person),  yet  it  would  have  been  much  more 
beneficial  if  this  evil  had  never  been  done.  Thus, 
in  the  natural  world,  some  disorders  bring  their 
own  cures — some  diseases  are  themselves  remedies. 
Many  a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  gout  or  a  fever ;  yet  it  would  be  thought  mad- 
ness to  assert  that  sickness  is  a  better  or  more  per- 
fect state  than  health  ;  though  the  like  has  been 
asserted  with  regard  to  the  moral  world. 

2d.  The  natural  government  of  the  wrorld  is  car- 
ried on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be 
wise  and  good  reasons  :  and  that  there  are  such 
may  be  concluded  from  analogy.  For  we  have 
scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments  but  what  we  are,  in 
some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in  procuring  our- 
selves, by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee 
likely  to  procure  them  ;  now  there  could  not  be 
this  foresight  were  not  the  government  of  the  world 
earned  on  by  general  laws.  Though  every  single 
case  may  be  at  length  found  to  have  been  provided 
for,  even  by  these,  yet,  by  general  laws,  the  pre- 
vention of  all  irregularities  may  be  naturally  im- 


CHAP.  VII.]    OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.         107 

possible.  Objected.  Could  not  then  the  necessary 
defects  of  general  laws  be  remedied  by  interposi- 
tions 1  Ans.  This  were  to  be  wished,  if  these  in- 
terpositions would  have  no  other  effects ;  but  it  is 
plain  they  would  have  some  visible  and  immediate 
bad  effects — for  instance,  they  would  encourage 
idleness  and  negligence,  and  they  would  render 
doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is  ascertained 
by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the  world  is 
carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  it  is  certain  they 
would  have  distant  effects,  and  very  great  ones  too, 
by  means  of  the  wonderful  connections  before  men- 
tioned :  thus,  for  aught  we  know,  interpositions 
would  produce  greater  evil  than  they  would  pre- 
vent, arid  prevent  greater  good  than  they  would 
produce ;  so  that  the  not  interposing,  so  far  from 
being  a  ground  of  complaint,  is  an  instance  of 
goodness. 

III.  Objected  against  this  whole  argument  from 
our  ignorance.  "  We  must  argue  from  what  we 
know,  not  from  what  we  are  unacquainted  with; 
or,  however,  the  answers  here  given  to  objections 
against  religion  might  equally  be  made  use  of  to 
invalidate  its  proof. 

ANSWER:  1st.  Though  -toted  ignorance  in  any 
matter  equally  precludes  all  proof  concerning  it, 
and  objections  against  it,  yet  partial  ignorance 
does  not.  The  proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the 
moral  character  of  God,  and  consequently  that  his 


108  OF  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.      [PART  I. 

government  is  moral.  We  may  know  this,  and 
yet  not  know  the  means  for  accomplishing  it ;  so 
that  objections  against  the  means  actually  made  use 
of  might  be  answered  by  our  ignorance — though 
the  proof  that  such  an  end  was  intended  might  not 
be  at  all  invalidated  by  it.  2dly.  Admitting  that 
the  proof  of  religion  was  affected  by  it,  yet  it  is  un- 
deniably true  that  moral  obligations  would  remain 
certain  ;  for  they  arise  immediately  and  necessarily 
from  the  judgment  of  our  own  mind,  unless  per- 
verted, which  we  can  not  violate  without  being 
self-condemned  ;  and  the  credibility  that  the  con- 
sequences which  religion  teaches  us,  may  result, 
would  make  them  certain  from  considerations  of 
interest. 

But,  3dly,  the  above  analogies  show  that  the 
way  of  arguing  made  use  of  in  objecting  against  re- 
ligion is  delusive,  because  they  show  it  is  not  at  all 
incredible,  that,  could  we  comprehend  the  whole, 
we  should  find  the  permission  of  the  disorders 
objected  against  to  be  consistent  with  justice  and 
goodness,  and  even  instances  of  them.  Now  this 
is  not  applicable  to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to 
the  objections  against  it,  and  therefore  can  not  in- 
validate that  proof,  as  it  does  these  objections. 

4thly.  Strictly  speaking,  as  it  appears  from  the 
last  observation,  the  answers  above  given  are  not 
taken  merely  from  our  ignorance,  but  from  some- 
what which  analogy  shows  us  concerning  it. 


CHAP.  VII.]     OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.         109 

CONCLUSION.*  The  credibility  of  religion,  from 
experience  and  facts  here  considered,  should  afford 
sufficient  motives  to  religion,  and  ought  to  make 
men  live  in  the  general  practice  of  virtue  and  piety. 
The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion,  on  the  side  of 
vice,  is  no  reason,  and  is  but  a  sorry  excuse  ;  for 
men,  in  their  temporal  concerns,  are  inured  and  ne- 
cessitated to  govern  their  passions.  But  the  prop- 
er motives  to  religion  are  the  proper  proofs  of  it, 
from  our  moral  nature,!  from  the  presages  of  con- 
science, and  from  our  natural  apprehension  of  God 
under  the  character  of  a  righteous  Governor  and 
Judge — a  nature,  conscience,  and  apprehension 

*  A  connected  view  of  the  preceding  Part,  similar  to  that 
in  the  conclusion  of  the  original,  may  be  formed  by  reading 
in  continuation  the  short  summaries  prefixed  to  each  chap- 
ter. 

t  St.  Paul  commences  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans  with  the 
professed  acknowledgment,  or  rather  the  authoritative  asser- 
tion, of  the  two  great  evidences  of  Natural  Religion — the  one 
legible  in  the  book  of  the  Creation,  the  other  indigenous  in 
the  soul  of  man  This  latter  is  the  moral  constitution  of  our 
souls,  which  is  the  transcript,  obscured  and  defaced  indeed, 
but  still  the  transcript  of  the  great  law  of  God :  that  law 
which  the  very  Heathen  know,  and  can  not  avoid  knowing, 
because  "  they  have  the  work  of  it  written  in  their  hearts," 
and  their  thoughts  "  accusing  or  excusing  them"  by  its  dic- 
tates. And  when  St.  Paul  charges  the  Gentiles  with  the 
knowledge  of  this  law,  it  is  such  a  knowledge,  as  in  his  mind, 
was  sufficient  to  bring  them  under  the  capacity,  and  conse- 
quent obligation,  of  some  obedience  ;  otherwise  his  whole  doc- 
trine and  inculcation  of  that  law,  as  subjecting  them  to  judg- 
ment, would  be  a  lifeless  argument. — Davison  on  Primitive 
Sacrifice. 

K 


110  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD.      [PART  I. 

given  us  by  Him ;  and  from  the  confirmation  of 
the  dictates  of  reason  given  us  by  life  and  immortal- 
ity brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel ;  and  the  wrath 
of  God  revealed  from  heaven,  against  all  ungodli- 
ness and  unrighteousness  of  men. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VII. 

1.  What  answer  can  analogy  furnish  to  objections 
against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  God's 
moral  government? 

2.  How  does  it  appear  that  God's  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world  is  a  scheme,  and  one  that  is  incom- 
prehensible ? 

3.  To  what  extent  does  Butler  assert  that  the  Di- 
vine, natural,  and  moral  governments  are  connected ; 
and  what  does  he  suppose  to  be  credible  from  them  ? 

4.  Prove  that,  from  our  very  ignorance  of  the  uni- 
versal scheme  of  Divine  government,  we  are  supplied 
with  a  reasonable  answer  to  all  objections  against  it. 

5.  "  In  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world  no  ends  are 
accomplished  without  means ;  and  good  ends  are  often 
brought  about  by  means  undesirable  and   apparently 
unsuitable.''1      Apply   this    to   the  case  of  the  moral 
world. 

6.  What  good  reasons  may  be  given  for  the  fact, 
that  the  natural  government  of  the  world   is  carried 
on  by  general  laws  ? 

7.  Answer  the  following  objections : 

1st.  That  we  must  argue  from  what  we  know,  not 
from  what  we  are  unacquainted  with. 

8.  2d  Objection.  That  the  answers  here  given  to  ob- 
jections against  religion  might  equally  be  made  use  of 
to  invalidate  its  proof. 

9.  What  conclusion  does  Butler  draw  from  all  that 
he  has  advanced  in  respect  of  natural  religion? 


t 

SCHEME  OF  PART  II. 


OF    REVEALED    RELIGION. 

CHAP.  I.  The  Christian  Revelation  is  important  as  a  clear 
and  authoritative  republication  of  Natural  Re- 
ligion, and  as  containing  Duties  additional  to 
those  of  Natural  Religion,  which  duties  we 
are  bound  to  perform. 

CHAP.  IT.  For  the  supposed  presumptions  against  Revela- 
tion in  general,  are  obviated  by  Analogy — 

CHAP.  III.,  IV.,  V.,  VI.  As  well  as  objections  against  the 
Christian  Revelation  in  particular.  First,  as 
a  Matter  of  Fact.  Secondly,  as  being  con- 
trived by  Wisdom,  Justice,  and  Goodness. 
Thirdly,  as  being  proved  by  sufficient  Evi- 
dence— 

CHAP.  VII.  Namely,  the  positive  Evidence  for  its  Truth ;  of 
which  Analogy  furnishes  a  great  confirmation, 
notwithstanding 

CHAP.  VIII.  The  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  ar- 
guing from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion. 


PART  II. 
OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF    THE    IMPORTANCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY. 

I.  The  importance  of  Christianity  is  here  considered,  as  it  can 
not  but  be  a  proper  introduction  to  a  Treatise  concerning 
the  credibility  of  it ;  especially  as  there  are  some  who  re- 
ject revelation  as  in  its  very  notion  incredible  ;  and  others 
who  think  it  of  indifferent  value,  as  they  both  consider  the 
light  of  nature  to  be  sufficient. 

II.  The  importance  of  Christianity  is  more  distinctly  shown 
by  considering  it,  1st.  As  a  republication  of  Natural  Relig- 
ion, being  authoritative,  with  new  light,  and  other  circum- 
stances of  peculiar  advantage.     2d,  As  containing  an  ac- 
count of  things  not  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence 
of  which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us. 

III.  Two  deductions  are  added  by  way  of  illustration,  stating 
the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts,  and 
the  preference  due  to  the  former. 


114  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

I.  SOME  persons  avowedly  reject  all  revelation, 
as  in  its  very  notion  incredible,  and  necessarily  fic- 
titious, as  the  light  of  nature  is  considered  to  be 
fully  sufficient.*  Indeed,  if  it  were  so,  no  reve- 
lation would  have  been  given.  But  that  it  is  not, 
appears  from  the  state  of  religion  in  the  Heathen 
world  before  revelation,  and  its  present  state  in 
those  countries  which  have  borrowed  no  light  from 
it — from  the  doubts  of  the  greatest  men  concerning 
vital  points,  and  the  inattention  and  ignorance  of 
mankind  in  general.  It  is  not  likely  that  any  could 
reason  out  natural  religion  clear  of  superstition. 
Certainly  the  generality  would  want  the  power,  or 
the  inclination.  But  admitting  that  they  did  not, 
and  so  might  reason  it  out,  revelation  might  be  re- 
quired, and  might  afford  the  greatest  assistance  and 
advantage.t  Therefore  to  affirm  that  revelation  is 
superfluous,  is  not  less  extravagant  than  saying 
that,  men  being  so  completely  happy  in  the  pres- 
ent life,  it  implies  a  contradiction  to  suppose  they 
could  be  more  so. 

*  That  the  principles  of  natural  religion  have  come  to  be 
so  far  understood  and  admitted  as  they  are,  may  fairly  be  tak- 
en for  one  of  the  effects  of  the  Gospel  revelation ;  a  proof 
of  its  actual  influence  on  opinions  at  least,  instead  of  a  dis- 
proof of  its  necessity  or  use. — Damson  on  Prophecy. 

t  Socrates,  Plato,  Confucius,  and  others,  the  bright  and 
shining  lights  of  antiquity,  have  given  their  authority  to  the 
opinion  of  the  probability  of  a  revelation  from  God. —  Vide 
Leland  on  the  Advantages  and  Necessity  of  the  Christian 
Revelation. 


CHAP.  I.]     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  115 

But,  2dly,  there  are  other  persons  not  to  be 
ranked  with  these,  who,  with  little  regard  to  the 
evidence  of  revelation,  or  even  upon  the  supposition 
of  its  truth,  affirm  that  its  only  design  must  be  to 
establish  the  moral  system  of  nature,  and  to  enforce 
the  practice  of  natural  piety  and  virtue ;  but  that 
it  is  immaterial  whether  these  things  are  believed 
and  practiced  upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of 
nature  or  of  revelation.  Now,  this  opinion  bor- 
ders very  nearly  upon  the  former,  and  therefore  the 
particular  consideration  of  it  will  be  a  confirmation 
of  the  answer  above  given.  At  first  sight  it  is  evi- 
dent, if  God  has  given  a  revelation,  we  can  not 
consider  it  an  indifferent  matter  whether  we  obey 
or  disobey  the  commands  contained  in  it,  unless  we 
are  certain  that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for  them, 
and  that  they  are  now  ceased ;  and  this  is  a  thing 
impossible. 

II.  But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more 
distinctly  appear,  by  considering  it,  1st,  as  a  repub- 
lication  and  external  institution  of  natural  or  essen- 
tial religion ;  and,  2dly,  as  containing  an  account 
of  a  dispensation  of  things  not  discoverable  by 
reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several  distinct 
precepts  are  enjoined  us. 

1st.  It  is  a  republication  of  natural   religion.* 

*  It  has  been  admitted  by  Infidels,  that  Christianity  is  a 
republication  of  the  law  of  nature  ;  but  they  deny  that  there 
are  any  additional  advantages  arising  out  of  this  republication. 


116  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

It  instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the 
world — that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
Being,  and  under  his  government — that  virtue  is 
His  law,  and  that  there  will  be  a  future  righteous 
judgment.  This  republication  presents  natural  re- 
ligion free  from  the  superstition  under  which  it  was 
in  a  manner  lost.  It  is  authoritative,  and  so  af- 
fords the  evidence  of  testimony  for  the  truth  of  it. 
For  though  the  miracles  and  prophecies  recorded 
in  Scripture  were  intended  to  prove  a  particular 
dispensation  of  Providence,  yet  they  prove  God's 
general  providence  as  our  moral  Governor  arid 
Judge  ;*  for  these  two  are  necessarily  connected, 
and  they  are  both  alike  taught  by  those  that 
wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies. 
While  the  law  of  Moses,  then,  and  the  Gospel  of 
Christ,  afford  the  only  evidence  of  revealed  relig- 
ion, they  afford  an  additional  evidence,  and  a  new 
practical  proof  of  natural  religion  ;  for  would  not 
the  working  of  miracles,  and  foretelling  of  future 
events,  add  credibility  and  authority  to  a  person, 

So  that  if  they  do  not  themselves  draw  the  conclusion,  they 
leave  it  to  be  inferred,  that  Christianity  is  useless.  This 
latter  is  the  method  and  design  of  the  author  of  "  Christianity 
as  Old  as  the  Creation." 

*  Miracles  not  only  contain  a  new  demonstration  of  God's 
existence,  but  strengthen  the  proofs  it  draws  from  the  frame 
of  the  world,  and  clear  them  from  the  two  principal  objec- 
tions of  Atheism,  viz.,  either  that  the  world  is  eternal,  or  that 
it  owed  its  existence  to  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms.— 
Vide  Farmer  on  Miracles. 


CHAP.  L]     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  117 

e.  g.,  teaching  natural  religion  to  a  nation  wholly  ig- 
norant of  it  1  or  would  it  not  be  a  great  confirma- 
tion to  a  person  who  had  never  heard  of  a  revela- 
tion, believing  from  principles  of  reason  in  the 
moral  system  of  things,  but  yet  wavering  from  per- 
ceiving in  the  world  little  or  no  practical  sense  of 
these  things,  to  hear  that  this  system  was  distinctly 
revealed,  and  that  the  revelation  was  proved  by 
miracles  ]  Farther,  this  is  a  clear  republication  of 
the  doctrine  of  a  future  state — of  the  danger  of 
a  course  of  wickedness,  and  especially  of  the  effica- 
cy of  repentance.  Life  and  immortality  are  emi- 
nently brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel.  Moreover, 
revelation  considered  only  as  subservient  to  natural 
religion,  is  important  as  an  external  institution  of 
it.  As  miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the  first 
preachers  of  Christianity,  in  order  to  their  introdu- 
cing it  into  the  world,  a  visible  church  was  estab- 
lished, in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  suc- 
cessively throughout  all  ages.  This  visible  church 
is  like  a  city  built  upon  a  hill,  a  standing  memorial 
to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our  Maker 
— a  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God.  It  pi-events 
its  forgetting  the  reality  of  religion,  by  the  form  of 
it  being  ever  before  our  eyes ;  and  it  has  a  further 
tendency  to  promote  natural  religion,  as  being  an 
instituted  method  of  education,  that  the  body  of 
CJirist,  as  the  Scripture  speaks,  should  be  edified. 
The  benefit  of  a  visible  church  being  thus  apparent, 


118  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

it  follows  that  positive  institutions  are  beneficial,  for 
the  visibility  of  the  church  consists  in  them.  The 
importance  of  Christianity  in  this  view,  then,  is  far 
from  being  inconsiderable.  It  lays  every  Christian 
practically  under  an  obligation  to  contribute  to- 
ward continuing  and  carrying  it  on.*  If  any  one 
will  yet  doubt  whether  there  arises  from  Christian- 
ity any  benefit  to  natural  religion,  let  him  consider 
whether  the  generality  of  mankind  in  the  Heathen 
world  were  in  as  advantageous  a  situation  with 
regard  to  natural  religion,  as  they  are  now  among 
us? 

OBJECTED.  Christianity  has  been  perverted,  and 
has  had  little  good  influence. 

ANSWER.  Even  admitting  this  assertion  (though 
the  effects  of  Christianity  have  been  by  no  means 
small,  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects,  properly  speaking, 
any  effects  of  it  at  all),t  the  dispensations  of  Provi- 
dence are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their  perversions, 
but  by  their  genuine  tendencies — by  what  they 
would  effect  if  mankind  performed  their  duty ;  for 

*  From  these  things  appears  the  weakness  of  all  pleas  for 
neglecting  the  public  service  of  the  church.  For  though  a 
man  prays  with  as  much  devotion  and  less  interruption  at 
home,  and  reads  better  sermons  there,  yet  that  will  by  no 
means  excuse  the  neglect  of  his  appointed  part  of  keeping  up 
the  profession  of  Christianity  among  mankind.  This  neglect, 
were  it  universal,  must  be  the  dissolution  of  the  whole  visible 
church. — Bishop  Butler's  Sermon  before  the  Society  for  the 
Propagation  of  the  Gospel. 

\   Vide  Paley's  Evidences,  Part  III.,  Chap.  7. 


CHAP.  I.]     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  119 

such  an  objection  applies  with  the  same  force  against 
the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  nature  by  reason,  as 
we  see  that  has  been  perverted,  and  thus  it  leads  to 
downright  Atheism. 

2d.  But  revelation  makes  known  to  us,  in  addition 
to  the  general  providence  of  God  in  natural  religion, 
a  particular  dispensation  of  providence  carrying  on 
by  His  Son  and  Spirit.  From  this  being  revealed, 
important  duties  arise  on  our  part  to  the  Son  and 
Holy  Ghost.  We  are  to  be  baptized  in  their  name, 
as  well  as  in  the  name  of  the  Father.  Now,  the 
importance  of  these  duties  may  be  judged  of  by 
considering  that  they  arise  not  merely  from  positive 
command,  but  also  from  the  offices,  which  appear 
from  Scripture  to  belong  to  these  Divine  Persons 
in  the  Gospel  dispensation,  or  from  the  relations 
which  they  are  declared  to  stand  in  to  us.  Now, 
considering  religion  as  divided  into  internal  and 
external,  under  the  first  notion,  the  essence  of  nat- 
ural religion  may  be  said  to  consist  in  religious 
regards  to  God  the  Father  Almighty,  and  the  es- 
sence of  revealed  religion,  as  distinguished  from 
natural,  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to  the  Son 
and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligations  we  are 
under,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of 
these  Divine  Persons  respectively,  arise  from  the 
respective  relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us. 
How  these  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by 
reason,  as  those  belonging  to  the  first  Person  are,  or 


120  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

by  revelation,  as  those  belonging  to  the  other  two 
Persons,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case,  because 
the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves,  not 
out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them. 
The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office  in 
that  great  dispensation  of  Providence — the  redemp- 
tion of  the  world — the  one  our  Mediator,  the  other 
our  Sanctifier.  Before  revelation,  we  could  be  un- 
der no  obligations  from  these  offices  and  relations, 
yet  upon  their  being  revealed,  the  duty  of  religious 
regards  to  both  these  Divine  Persons,  as  imme- 
diately arises  from  them,  as  charity  toward  our 
fellow-creatures  arises  out  of  the  common  relations 
between  us  and  them.  But  it  will  be  asked,  What 
are  these  inward  religious  regards  1  I  answer,  the 
religious  regards  of  reverence,  honor,  love,  trust, 
gratitude,  fear,  hope.  In  what  external  manner  this 
inward  worship  is  to  be  expressed  is  a  matter  of 
pure  revealed  command  ;  as  perhaps  the  external 
manner  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  wor- 
shipped, may  be  more  so  than  we  are  ready  to 
suppose. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  is,  that  Christianity 
can  never  be  esteemed  of  little  consequence,  till  it 
be  positively  supposed  false.  If  Christ  be  what 
Scripture  declares  him  to  be,  no  one  can  say  what 
may  follow  not  only  the  obstinate,  but  the  careless 
disregard  of  the  high  relations  He  stands  in  to  us 
as  our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God.  If  we  re- 


CHAP.  I.]     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  121 

quire  the  assistance  of  the  Holy  Ghost  to  renew 
our  nature  for  another  state  (as  Scripture  declares 
— "  Except  a  man  be  born  of  water  and  the  Spir- 
it, he  can  not  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God.'' — 
John,  iii.,  5),  is  it  a  slight  matter  whether  we  make 
use  of  the  means,  expressly  commanded  by  God 
for  obtaining  this  Divine  assistance,  when  analogy 
shows  us  that  without  using  the  appointed  means 
we  can  not  expect  any  benefit  ]  Reason  shows  us 
nothing  of  the  particular  immediate  means  of  ob- 
taining either  temporal  or  spiritual  benefits.  This, 
therefore,  we  must  learn,  either  from  experience  or 
revelation.  And  the  present  case  does  not  admit 
of  experience. 

III.  The  two  following  deductions  may  be  prop- 
er to  be  added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing 
observations,  and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

First.  Hence  we  may  clearly  see  where  lies  the 
distinction  between  what  is  positive,  and  what  is 
moral,  in  religion. 

Moral  Precepts,  are  precepts  the  reasons  of 
which  we  see. 

Positive  Precepts,  are  precepts  the  reasons  o£ 
which  we  do  not  see.* 

*  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  pre- 
cepts, considered  respectively  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the 
latter  have  somewhat  of  a  moral  nature,  we  may  see  the 
reason  of  them  considered  is  this  view.  Moral  and  positive 
precepts  are  in  some  respects  alike,  in  other  respects  differ- 
ent. So  far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both : 

L 


122  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

Moral  Duties,  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case 
itself,  prior  to  external  command. 

Positive  Duties,  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of 
the  case  itself,  but  from  external  command :  nor 
would  they  be  duties  at  all  but  for  such  command. 

The  manner  in  which  the  relation  is  made 
known,  does  not  constitute  a  duty  positive,  as  has 
i>een  already  shown  in  the  instance  of  Baptism  ; 
nor  does  it  constitute  a  duty  moral,  as  has  been 
also  shown  in  the  instance  of  religious  regards  to 
Christ.  Hence,  also,  we  may  see  that  positive 
institutions  are  founded  either  on  natural  religion, 
as  Baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father  (though  this 
has  also  a  reference  to  the  Gospel  dispensation,  for 
it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ) — or  on  revealed  religion,  as  Baptism 
in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Secondly.  From  the  distinction  between  what  is 
moral  and  what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the 
ground  of  that  peculiar  preference  which  the  Scrip- 
ture teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the  former.  Positive 
institutions,  in  general,  as  distinguished  from  this  or 
that  particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  com- 

BO  far  as  they  are  different,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  for- 
mer, but  not  of  the  latter. — Butler. 

But  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  because  we  can  not  see  the 
reasons  for  them,  that  God  has  not  the  wisest  and  best  rea- 
sons for  imposing  them.  This  would  not  be  worth  remarking, 
if  Deistical  writers,  who  deny  the  possibility  of  such  pre- 
cepts, did  not  confound  positive  with  arbitrary  precepts. 


CHAP.  I.J     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  123 

mands,  since  the  reasons  of  them  appear.  Thus, 
for  instance,  the  external  worship  of  God  is  a  moral 
duty,  though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  so.  Care, 
then,  is  to  be  taken,  when  a  comparison  is  made 
between  positive  and  moral  duties,  that  they  be 
compared  no  farther  than  as  they  are  different. 
This  being  premised,  should  there  be  a  moral  and 
positive  precept  enjoined  by  the  same  authority, 
and  should  it  be  impossible,  In  certain  conjectures, 
to  obey  both — which  is  to  be  preferred  1  Undoubt- 
edly the  moral.  For,  1st,  there  is  an  apparent 
reason  for  the  preference,  and  none  against  it,  since 
we  see  the  reason  of  the  moral,  but  not  of  the  pos- 
itive precept.  2d.  The  positive  institutions  enjoin- 
ed by  Christianity  are  means  to  a  moral  end :  and 
the  end  must  be  acknowledged  more  excellent  than 
the  means.  3d.  The  observance  of  positive  insti- 
tutions is  no  religious  obedience  at  all,  otherwise 
than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This 
is  the  logical  way  of  deciding  the  matter;  but,  in 
a  practical  and  more  lax  way  of  considering  it, 
moral  law  and  positive  institutions  are  both  alike 
matter  of  revealed  command :  but  the  Author  of 
nature  has  given  an  intimation  which  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred, by  writing  the  moral  law  upon  our  hearts, 
and  interweaving  it  with  our  nature.  k  But  we  are 
not  left  to  reason  alone ;  for,  first,  Scripture,  by  its 
general  tenor  and  particular  declarations,  con- 
demns the  idea  to  which  men  have  been  always 


124          IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

prone — that  peculiar  positive  rites  constitute  relig- 
ion, in  place  of  obedience  to  moral  precepts.  Sec- 
ondly, in  comparing  positive  and  moral  duties  to- 
gether, it  always  puts  the  stress  of  religion  upon  the 
latter,  and  never  upon  the  former;  as  our  Lord 
himself,  when  the  Pharisees  censured  him  for  eat- 
ing with  publicans  and  sinners,  and  also  when  they 
censured  his  disciples  for  plucking  the  ears  of  corn 
on  the  Sabbath  day,  answered,  "  I  will  have  mercy 
and  not  sacrifice"  (Mat.,  ix.,  13,  and  xii.,  7) ;  and,  by 
this  manner  of  expression,  authoritatively  deter- 
mined, in  general,  which  should  have  the  prefer- 
ence :  for  it  is  as  applicable  to  any  other  instance 
of  a  comparison  between  positive  and  moral  du- 
ties as  to  this  upon  which  it  was  spoken.  And 
that  He  intended  to  explain  wherein  the  general 
spirit  of  religion  consists,  appears  from  the  Phari- 
see, on  both  occasions,  not  understanding  the  mean- 
ing of  it ;  for  the  literal  sense  of  the  passage  (Hos., 
vi.)  has  no  difficulty  in  it.  But  as  it  is  one  of  the 
peculiar  weaknesses  of  human  nature,  when,  upon 
comparison  of  two  things,  one  is  found  to  be  of 
greater  importance  than  the  other,  to  consider  the 
other  as  of  scarcely  any  importance  at  all,*  we 

*  A  neglect  of  the  ordinances  of  religion  of  Divine  appoint- 
ment is  the  sure  system  of  a  criminal  indifference  about  those 
higher  duties  by  which  men  pretend  to  atone  for  the  omission. 
It  is  too  often  found  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  licentious  life, 
and  for  the  most  part,  ends  in  the  highest  excess  of  profligacy 
and  irreligion." — Bishop  Horsely's  Sermons  on  the  Sabbath. 


CHAP.  I.]     IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  125 

ought  to  remember  how  great  presumption  it  is  to 
make  light  of  any  institutions  of  Divine  appoint- 
ment, and  that  our  obligation  to  obey  all  God's 
commands,  of  whatever  kind  they  may  be,  are  ab- 
solute and  indispensable. 

NOTE. — The  account  now  given  of  Christianity  enforces 
upon  us  the  obligation  of  searching  the  Scriptures  ;  and  if 
there  be  found  any  passages  therein,  the  apparent  meaning 
of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  religion,  such,  we  may  con- 
clude, is  not  the  real  meaning.  But  it  is  not  at  all  a  pre- 
sumption against  an  interpretation  of  Scripture,  that  it  con- 
tains a  doctrine  which  the  light  of  nature  can  not  discover,  or 
a  precept  which  the  law  of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 
L* 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  I. 

1.  Give  summarily  the  scheme  of  the  second  part 
of  this  book ;  in  which  the  support  given  to  revealed 
religion  by  analogy  is  described. 

2.  Show  the    extravagance   of  the    assertion   that 
Revelation  is  in  its  very  notion  not  incredible,  as  being 
superfluous. 

3.  Refute  the  argument  that  "  the  only  design  of 
Revelation  must  be  to  enforce  the  practice  of  natural 
piety ;  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  we  believe   and 
practice  upon  the  evidence  of  nature,  or  of  revealed 
religion." 

4.  What  are  the  two  views  which  must  be  taken  of 
Christianity,  in  order  that  we  may  understand  its  im- 
portance ? 

5.  In  what  manner  does  the  revelation  of  Christ- 
ianity confirm  and  support  natural  religion  ? 

6.  How  is  it  proved   that  this  Revelation,  consid- 
ered only  as  subservient  to  natural  religion,  is  import- 
ant, as  an  external  institution  of  it  ? 

7.  Answer  the  objection  "  that  Christianity  has  been 
proved,  and  has  had  little  good  influence." 

8.  What  important  duties  arise  on  our  part  to  God 
the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit,  from  Christianity  re- 
vealing to  us  the  particular  dispensation  of  Providence, 
carrying  on  through  them  ? 

9.  What  are  the  two  instances  by  which  Butler  il- 
lustrates his  conclusion,  "  that  Christianity  can  never 
be  esteemed  of  little  consequence  till  it  be  positively 
supposed  false  ? 

10.  Show  clearly  where  is  the  distinction  between 
what' is  moral  and  what  is  positive  in  religion. 

11.  Prove  that  the   peculiar  preference,  which  the 
Scripture  teaches  us  is  due  to  the  former,  is  reason- 
able. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF    THE    SUPPOSED    PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  A  REVELA- 
TION   CONSIDERED    AS    MIRACULOUS. 

Before  the  positive  evidence  for  Christianity  is  considered, 
together  with  the  objections  against  that  evidence,  the  preju- 
dices against  revelation  in  general,  and  the  Christian  revela- 
tion in  particular,  must  be  removed ;  to  the  former  the  pres- 
ent chapter  is  devoted. 

I.  There  is  no  presumption  from  analogy  against  the  general 
scheme  of  Christianity ;  for  it  is  no  presumption  against  it 
that  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason  and  experience,  or 
that  it  is  unlike  the  course  of  nature ;  and  there  can  be  no 
other  kind  of  presumption. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation,  consider- 
ed as  miraculous,  in  the  beginning  of  the  world,  for  this  is  a 
question  about  a  matter  of  fact,  or  about  the  extent  of  the 
exertion  of  an  ordinary  power,  or  about  the  extent  of  the 
exertion  of  a  power  called  extraordinary,  but  certainly 
exerted. 

III.  There  is  no  presumption  against  it  from  analogy  after 
the  settlement  of  a  course  of  nature,  for  we  have  not  a 
parallel  case  to  compare  with  it,  &c.,  &c.,  &c. 

I.  IT  is  commonly  supposed  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature, 
against  the  Christian  scheme,  at  least,  against  mir- 


123  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION     [PART  II. 

acles,  so  as  that  stronger  evidence  is  necessary  to 
prove  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  than  would  be 
sufficient  to  convince  us  of  other  events,  or  matters 
of  fact.*  Now  there  is  no  appearance  of  a  pre- 
sumption, from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  the 

*  Hume  has  gone  farther ;  he  asserts,  "  the  credit  we  give 
to  testimony  is  derived  solely  from  experience" — "  a  miracle 
is  contrary  to  experience." — "  No  testimony  should  ever  gain 
credit  to  an  event,  unless  it  is  more  extraordinary  that  it  should 
be  false,  than  that  the  event  should  have  happened." — "  It  is 
contrary  to  experience  that  a  miracle  should  be  true,  but  not 
contrary  to  experience  that  testimony  should  be  false."  In 
short,  he  considers  miracles  as  impossible,  for,  speaking  of  the 
Abbe  de  Paris's  miracles,  he  says,  "  What  have  we  now  to 
oppose  to  such  a  cloud  of  witnesses,  but  the  absolute  impossi- 
bility OR  miraculous  nature  of  the  events  they  relate.71  Be- 
sides the  answers  here  given,  vide  the  Introduction  to  "  The 
Analogy,"  and  that  to  "  Paley's  Evidences."  The  fallacy  of 
Hume's  reasoning  consists  in  this,  that  he  argues  from  the 
laws  of  matter  and  motion  established  in  the  world,  which 
laws,  being  confessedly  arbitrary  constitutions  of  the  Creator, 
the  manner  of  their  operation  can  not  be  drawn  from  any 
previous  reasoning,  but  must  be  drawn  solely  from  experi- 
ence ;  but  if  we  admit  the  existence  of  a  God,  we  must  admit 
that  we  can  discover  by  reasoning  "  a  priori"  a  connection 
between  an  Almighty  cause  and  every  effect  which  is  the 
object  of  power.  To  establish  his  position  it  is  necessary  to 
prove,  that  nothing  is  possible  but  what  is  established  in  the 
usual  course  of  nature.  And  as  to  his  objection  from  tes- 
timony— for  he  opposes  the  uncertainty  of  testimony  to  the 
certainty  of  contrary  experience — this  is  answered  Infra.,  III. 
Farther,  that  the  evidence  of  testimony  is  superior  to  that  of 
experience,  and  that  they  are  somewhat  connected,  so  that  the 
weakening  of  the  one  weakens  the  other,  is  shown  in  "  Price's 
Dissertations,"  page  400,  and  in  "  Dr.  Adam's  Essay  on  Mir- 
acles," page  5. 


CHAP.  II.]        AGAINST  A  REVELATION.  129 

general  scheme  of  Christianity — that  God  created, 
and  invisibly  governs  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ; 
and  by  him  will  hereafter  judge  it  in  righteousness  ; 
and  that  good  men  are  under  the  secret  influence 
of  his  spirit.  For,  if  there  be  a  presumption  from 
analogy,  it  must  be  either  because  it  is  not  discov- 
erable by  reason  or  experience ;  or  else,  because  it 
is  unlike  the  known  course  of  nature,  which  is  so 
discoverable.  Now  there  is  none  on  the  first  ac- 
count, because  that  things  lie  beyond  the  natural 
reach  of  our  faculties  is  no  sort  of  presumption 
against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  ;  because  it  is 
certain  there  are  innumerable  things  in  the  consti- 
tution and  government  of  the  universe  which  are 
thus  beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties.  And 
there  is  no  presumption  on  the  second  account,  for, 
in  the  natural  government  of  the  world,  as  well  as 
in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we  see  things  in  a 
great  degree  unlike  one  another,  and  therefore  we 
ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness  between 
things  visible  and  invisible.  However,  the  Christian 
and  natural  schemes  are  by  no  means  entirely  un- 
like. So  that  whether  we  call  this  general  Christ- 
ian dispensation  miraculous  or  not,  we  see  there  is 
no  presumption  against  it  from  analogy.  But  we 
are  to  consider  miracles  as  visible*  and  invisible. 

*  A  miracle  is  defined  by  Hume  to  be  a  violation  of  a  law 
of  nature,  by  a  particular  volition  of  the  Deity,  or  by  the  in- 
terposing of  an  invisible  agent.  It  is  correctly  defined  by 


130  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION    [PART  II. 

The  former  furnish  a  proof  of  a  Divine  mission  ; 
the  latter,  being  secret,  do  not,  but  require  them- 
selves to  be  proved  by  visible  miracles,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  incarnation  of  Christ.  Revelation  itself, 
too,  is  miraculous,  and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it 
— the  supposed  presumption  against  these  we  shall 
now  consider. 

II.  There  can  be  no  peculiar  presumption  from 
the  analogy  of  nature  against  a  revelation,  consider- 
ed as  miraculous  at  the  beginning  of  the  world — no 
such  presumption  as  is  implied  in  the  word  mirac- 
ulous; for  a  miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative 
to  a  course  of  nature,  and  implies  somewhat  differ- 
ent from  it,  considered  as  being  so.  Now,  either 
there  was  no  course  of  nature  at  that  time,  or  if 
there  were,  we  do  not  know  what  the  course  of 
nature  is  upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And 
therefore  this  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  question 
about  a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  question  of  fact, 
admitting  of  the  report  of  tradition,  like  other  mat- 
ters of  fact  of  equal  antiquity.  Or  else  it  is  a  ques- 
tion about  the  extent  to  which  an  ordinary  power 
exerted  itself — a  power  different  from  the  present 
course  of  nature  (but  not,  as  we  have  seen,  to  be 
called  miraculous)  namely,  whether  this  power 
merely  made  man,  or  exerted  itself  farther  in  giv- 
ing him  a  revelation.  Or  even  if  the  power  be 

others,  as  an  extraordinary  work,  i»  which  the  interposition 
of  Divine  Power  is  clear  and  indisputable. 


CHAP.  II.]        AGAINST  A  REVELATION.  131 

called  miraculous,  it  will  make  no  difference,  for 
the  power,  whatever  it  be  called,  was  exerted ; 
and  the  question  will  then  be,  the  extent  to  which 
an  extraordinary  power  exerted  itself.  Against 
this  there  is  as  little  presumption  as  there  would 
be,  if  it  were  granted  that  our  Saviour  exerted  mi- 
raculous powers,  against  his  exerting  it  in  a  greater 
degree,  or  in  more  or  fewer  instances.  If,  then, 
this  is  a  fact,  admitting  the  testimony  of  tradition, 
what  is  that  testimony  ]  not  that  religion  was  rea- 
soned out,  but  altogether  the  contrary — that  it  came 
into  the  world  by  revelation.  This  was  mentioned 
in  the  former  part  of  this  treatise,  as  affording  a 
confirmation  of  natural  religion ;  and  here  we  see 
it  has  a  tendency  to  remove  any  prejudices  against 
a  subsequent  revelation. 

III.  But  it  may  be  objected  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption  from  analogy  against  mira- 
cles ;  particularly  against  revelation,  after  the  set- 
tlement, and  during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of 
nature. 

GENERAL  ANSWER.  Before  we  can  raise  an  ar- 
gument from  analogy,  for  or  against  a  revelation, 
considered  as  miraculous,  we  should  be  acquainted 
with  a  similar  or  parallel  case.  And  nothing  short 
of  the  history  of  a  world  in  like  circumstances  with 
our  own  can  be  a  parallel  case ;  and  had  we  even 
this,  it  would  be  but  a  single  instance,  and  a  pre- 
sumption from  it  must  be  infinitely  precarious. 


132  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION     [PART  EL 

PARTICULAR  ANSWERS  :  1st.  There  is  a  very 
strong  presumption  against  common  speculative 
truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts  prior  to 
the  proof  of  them,  which,  yet,  is  overcome  by  almost 
any  proof.  The  question,  therefore,  whether  there 
be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  from  analogy,  is 
of  no  consequence ;  for  if  there  be  a  small  addi- 
tional presumption  against  miracles,  is  that  worth 
reckoning  with  the  millions  to  one  that  there  are 
against  the  most  common  facts  ?*  The  only  ma- 
terial question  is,  whether  there  be  any  such  pre- 

*  As  this  has  been  controverted,  and  as  it  does  not  appear 
to  have  been  Locke's  opinion  (for  in  his  chapter  on  Proba- 
bility he  says,  in  things  happening  indifferently,  there  is 
nothing  for  nor  against  them),  it  may  be  useful  to  confirm  the 
account  of  Butler  by  a  passage  from  Price's  Dissertations. 
"  In  many  cases  of  particular  histories,  which  are  immediately 
believed  upon  the  slightest  testimony,  there  would  have  ap- 
peared to  us,  previously  to  this  testimony,  an  improbability 
of  almost  infinity  to  one  against  their  reality,  as  any  one  must 
perceive  who  will  think  how  sure  he  is  of  the  falsehood  of  all 
facts  that  have  no  evidence  to  support  them,  or  which  he  has 
only  imagined  to  himself.  It  is,  then,  very  common  for  the 
slightest  testimony  to  overcome  an  almost  infinite  improba- 
bility. In  order  to  discover  whether  there  is  this  improba- 
bility, let  the  connection  of  such  facts  with  testimony  be 
withdrawn,  and  then  let  it  be  considered  what  they  are.  If 
upon  doing  this,  i.  e.,  upon  making  them  objects  of  imagina- 
tion unsupported  by  any  proof,  they  became  improbable,  the 
point,  I  should  think,  will  be  determined;  for,  to  find  that  a 
fact,  when  its  connection  with  testimony  is  withdrawn,  be- 
comes improbable,  is  the  same  as  to  find  that  independently 
of  testimony  it  is  improbable. —  Vide  Price's  Four  Disserta- 
tions. 


CHAP.  II.]        AGAINST  A  REVELATION.  133 

sumption  against  miracles  as  to  render  them  in  any 
sort  incredible. 

2d.  Leaving  out  the  consideration  of  religion,  the 
presumption  against  miracles  is,  beyond  all  com- 
parison, less  than  against  common  facts,  before  any 
evidence  for  either.  For  we  are  so  ignorant,  as  to 
what  the  course  of  nature  depends  on,  that  there  is 
no  improbability  for  or  against  supposing  that  length 
of  time  may  have  given  cause  for  changing  it. 

3d.  But  taking  in  the  consideration  of  religion, 
we  see  distinct  reasons  for  miracles,  namely,  to  af- 
ford mankind  instruction,  additional  to  that  of 
nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it ;  and  this  gives 
a  positive  credibility  to  their  history  in  cases  where 
these  reasons  hold. 

4th.  Miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common 
natural  events,  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena 
of  nature,  such  as  comets,  the  power  of  magnetism 
and  electricity ;  and  as  distinguished  from  such 
phenomena  there  is  no  peculiar  presumption  against 

miracles. 

M 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  II. 

1.  Explain  what   Butler  means  by   "  the   general 
scheme  of  Christianity ;"  and  show  that  there  is  no 
appearance  of  a  presumption  from  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture against  it. 

2.  By  what  arguments  does  Hume  attempt  to  prove 
that  we  ought  not  to  believe  in  any  miracles  ?     Where- 
in does  the  fallacy  of  his  reasoning  consist? 

3.  Give  the  correct  definition  of  a  "  miracle  ;"  and 
illustrate  by  examples  the  two  classes,  into  which  they 
are  divided,  of  visible  and  invisible. 

4.  Why  can  there  be  no  peculiar  presumption  from 
the  analogy  of  nature  against  a  revelation,  considered 
as  miraculous,  at  the  beginning  of  the  world  ? 

5.  Describe  the  three  views,  under  which  alone  the 
subject  of  a  revelation  from  the  beginning  can  be  fairly 
considered. 

6.  Why  may  we  safely  admit  the  testimony  of  tra- 
dition as  to  the  original  revelation  ?     And  what  is  that 
testimony  ? 

7.  Give  a  general  answer  to  the  objection  that  "af- 
ter the  settlement,  and  during  the  continuance  of  a  course 
of  nature,  there  is  a  presumption  from  analogy  against 
miracles." 

8.  What  comparison  does  Butler  draw  between  mir- 
acles and  ordinary  facts,  in  order  to  show  what  is  the 
only  material  question  respecting  the  former?     How 
does  Price  support  these  assertions  ? 

9.  What  weight  does  the  consideration  of  religion 
add  to  the  testimony  concerning  miracles  ? 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING  WHAT  WERE  TO  BE 
EXPECTED  IN  A  REVELATION,  AND  THE  CREDI- 
BILITY, FROM  ANALOGY,  THAT  IT  MUST  CONTAIN 
THINGS  APPEARING  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS. 

Objections  against  the  scheme  of  Christianity,  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  the  evidences  of  it  are  frivo- 
lous, for  analogy  furnishes  a  general  answer  to  them. 

I.  That  .we  are  incompetent  judges  of  it. 

II.  That  it  is  probable,  beforehand,  that  men  will  imagine 
they  have  strong  objections  against  a  revelation,  however 
unexceptionable. 

III.  This  leads  to  the  determining  the  office  of  reason,  namely, 
to  judge  only  of  the  meaning,  the  morality,  and  evidence  of 
revelation. 

VARIOUS  OBJECTIONS  :  The  whole  scheme  of 
Christianity  is  objected  to ;  the  whole  mariner  in 
which  it  is  put  and  left  in  the  world ;  several  par- 
ticular relations  in  Scripture ;  things  in  it  appear- 
ing to  men  fooliskn ess  ;  things  appearing  matters  of 
offense;  the  incorrectness  of  the  style  of  revelation, 
especially  of  the  Prophetic  parts,  in  consequence  of 
the  rashness  of  interpreters,  and  the  hieroglyphic 


136  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II. 

and  figurative  language*  in  which  they  are  ex- 
pressed. 

I.  General  Ansiocr  to  all  objections  against  Chris- 
tianity considered  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Upon  sup- 
position of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  credible  before.- 
hand  that  we  should  be  incompetent  judges  of  it 
to  a  great  degree,  and  that  it  would  contain  many 
things  apparently  liable  to  great  objections  in  case 
it  be  judged  of  otherwise  than  by  the  analogy  of 
nature.  Not  that  the  faculty  of  reason  is  to  be  de- 
preciated— for  it  is  not  asserted  that  a  supposed 
revelation  can  not  be  proved  false  from  internal 
characters  ;  for  it  may  contain  clear  immoralities 
or  contradictions,  and  either  of  these  would  prove 
it  false  ;  this  belongs  to  reason  to  decide.  ( Vide 
this  Chap.  III.) 

Proof  from  analogy  that  we  are  likely  to  be  in- 
competent judges.  If  the  natural  and  the  revealed 
dispensations  are  both  from  God,  if  they  coincide 
and  together  make  up  one  scheme  of  Providence, 
our  being  incompetent  judges  of  one,  must  render 
it  credible  that  we  may  also  be  incompetent  judges 
of  the  other.  Since,  then,  upon  experience,  the 
natural  dispensation  is  found  to  be  greatly  different 
from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been  ex- 
pected, and  is  supposed  to  be  liable  to  great  objec- 

*  Thus  Voltaire  pretended  to  believe  that  Ezekiel  eat  the 
roll  of  parchment  in  reality,  which  the  Prophet  expressly  as- 
serts to  have  been  a  mere  vision. 


CHAP.  III.]     OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.  137 

tions,  this  renders  it  highly  credible,  that  if  they 
judge  of  the  revealed  dispensation  in  like  manner, 
they  will  find  it  different  from  expectations  formed 
beforehand,  and  apparently  liable  to  great  objec- 
tions. Thus,  suppose  a  prince  to  govern  his  do- 
minions in  the  wisest  manner  possible,  by  common 
known  laws,  and  that  upon  some  exigencies  he 
should  suspend  them — if  one  of  his  subjects  were 
not  a  competent  judge  beforehand  of  the  wisdom 
of  the  ordinary  administration,  it  could  not  be  ex- 
pected that  he  would  be  a  competent  judge  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  Thus  we  see  gener- 
ally that  the  objections  of  an  incompetent  judg- 
ment must  needs  be  frivolous.  But  let  us  apply 
these  observations  to  a 

PARTICULAR  EXAMPLE.  Upon  supposition  of  a 
revelation,  let  us  compare  our  ignorance  concern- 
ing inspiration  before  experience,  with  our  igno- 
rance concerning  natural  knowledge.  We  are  not 
judges  beforehand. 

1st.  What  degree  or  kind  of  natural  information 
it  were  to  be  expected  God  would  afford  men,  each 
by  his  own  reason  or  experience ;  nor,  2d,  how  far 
he  would  enable  and  effectually  dispose  them  to 
communicate  it ;  nor,  3d,  whether  the  evidence  of 
it  would  be  certain,  highly  probable,  or  doubtful; 
nor,  4th,  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal 
clearness  and  conviction  to  all ;  nor,  5th,  whether 
it  or  the  faculty  of  obtaining  it  would  be  given  us 


138  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II. 

at  once,  or  gradually.  In  like  manner,  respecting 
supernatural  knowledge,  we  are  ignorant  before- 
hand, 1st,  what  degree  of  it  should  be  expected ; 
2d,  how  far  miraculous  interposition  would  be 
made  to  qualify  men  for  communicating  it ;  3d, 
whether  its  evidence  would  be  certain,  highly  prob- 
able, or  doubtful ;  4th,  whether  its  evidence  would  be 
the  same  to  all ;  and,  5th,  whether  the  scheme  should 
be  revealed  at  once  or  gradually — committed  to  wri- 
ting, or  left  to  be  handed  down  by  verbal  tradition. 

OBJECTION.  But  we  know  that  a  revelation,  in 
some  of  the  above  circumstances,  one,  for  instance, 
not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  secured  against 
the  danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have  answered 
its  purposes. 

ANSWER.  What  purposes  ]  It  would  not  have 
answered  all  these  purposes  which  it  has  now  an- 
swered ;  but  it  would  have  answered  others,  or  the 
same  in  different  degrees  :  and  could  we  tell  before- 
hand which  were  the  purposes  of  God  1  It  must, 
therefore,  be  quite  frivolous  to  object  to  revelation, 
in  any  of  the  fore-mentioned  respects,  against  its  be- 
ing left  in  one  way  rather  than  another ;  for  this 
would  be  to  object  against  things  because  they  are 
different  from  expectations,  which  has  been  shown 
to  be  without  reason.  And  thus  we  see  that  the 
only  question  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity 
is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation,  not  whether  it 
be  attended  with  every  circumstance  which  we 


CHAP.  III.]     OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.  139 

should  have  looked  for  ;  and  concerning  the  author- 
ity of  Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be ; 
not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  pro- 
mulgated, as  weak  men  imagine  it  should  be.  And 
therefore,  neither  obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccura- 
cy of  style,  nor  various  readings,  nor  early  disputes 
about  the  authors  of  particular  parts,  nor  multi- 
plied objections  of  this  kind,  could  overthrow  the 
authority  of  Scripture,  unless  the  Prophets,  Apos- 
tles, or  our  Lord  had  promised  that  it  should  be 
secure  from  these  things.  So  that  there  are  several 
ways  of  arguing,  which,  though  just  with  regard 
to  other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scripture, 
at  least  not  to  the  Prophetic  parts  of  it.  We  can 
not  argue  that  this  can  not  be  the  sense  of  any  par- 
ticular passage  of  Scripture,  for  then  it  would  have 
been  expressed  more  plainly,  or  have  been  repre- 
sented under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphic  ; 
yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus  with  respect  to  com- 
mon books,  because  in  Scripture  we  are  not,  as  we 
are  in  common  books,  competent  judges  how  plain- 
ly, or  under  how  apt  an  image  the  true  sense  ought 
to  have  been  represented.  The  only  question  is, 
what  appearance  there  is  that  this  is  the  sense,  and 
scarce  any  at  all  how  much  more  determinately  it 
might  have  been  expressed. 

OBJECTION.  But  is  it  not  self-evident  that  inter- 
nal improbabilities  of  all  kinds  weaken  external 
probable  proof] 


140  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II 

ANSWER.  Doubtless ;  but  to  what  practical  pur- 
pose can  this  be  alleged  in  the  present  case,  since 
internal  improbabilities,  which  rise  even  to  moral 
certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  most  ordinary  testi- 
mony ;  and  since  we  scarcely  know  what  are  im- 
probabilities as  to  the  matter  before  us. 

II.  The  analogy  of  nature  shows  beforehand,  not 
only  that  it  is  highly  credible  men  may,  but  also 
probable  that  they  will,  imagine  they  have  strong 
objections  against  revealed  knowledge,  however 
really  unexceptionable ;  for  so,  prior  to  experience, 
they  would  think  they  had  against  the  whole  course 
of  natural  instruction.  Prior  to  experience,  they 
would  think  they  had  objections  against  the  instruc- 
tion which  God  affords  to  brute  creatures  by  in- 
stincts and  propensions,  and  to  men,  by  these,  to- 
gether with  reason,  merely  on  account  of  the  means 
by  which  such  instruction  is  given.  For  instance, 
would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly  improbable 
that  men  should  have  been  so  much  the  more  capa- 
ble of  discovering,  even  to  certainty,  the  laws  of 
matter  and  of  the  planetary  motions  than  the  causes 
and  cures  of  diseases,  wherein  human  life  appears 
so  much  more  nearly  concerned,  or  that  they  should 
discover  in  an  instant,  and  unexpectedly,  by  the 
faculty  of  invention,  what  they  have  been  in  vain 
searching  after,  perhaps  for  years  ]  or,  that  language 
— the  only  means  of  communicating  our  thoughts, 
should,  in  its  very  nature,  be  inadequate,  ambigu- 


CHAP.  III.]     OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.  141 

ous,  and  liable  to  abuse,  both  from  neglect  and  de- 
sign 1  or  that  brutes  should,  in  many  respects,  act 
with  a  sagacity  and  foresight  often  superior  to  what 
is  used  by  man  ]  These  general  observations  will 
furnish  an  answer  to  almost  all  objections  against 
Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against 
its  evidence ;  because  these  objections  are  no  more, 
nor  greater,  than  analogy  shows  beforehand  to  be 
highly  credible  that  there  might  seem  to  lie  against 
revelation.  This  will  more  clearly  appear  by  apply- 
ing these  observations  to  a 

PARTICULAR  OBJECTION.  The  gifts  said  to  be 
miraculous,  exercised  by  some  persons  in  the  apos- 
tolic age  in  a  disorderly  manner,  were  not  really 
miraculous  ;  for  had  they  been  so,  they  would  have 
been  committed  to  other  persons,  or  these  persons 
would  have  been  endued  with  prudence  also,  or 
have  been  continually  restrained  in  the  exercise  of 
their  miraculous  power.* 

ANSWER.  That  is,  in  other  words,  God  should 
have  miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  differ- 
ent manner ,  or  higher  degree.  But  from  the  above 
observations  it  appears  undeniable,  that  we  are  not 

*  It  is  an  objection  of  the  same  kind,  and,  therefore,  to  be 
answered  in  the  same  way — that  the  apostles  were  ignorant 
of  the  true  nature  of  demoniacs ;  for,  even  if  their  ignorance 
be  admitted  on  this  or  any  other  point  of  the  like  kind,  it  can 
not  be  concluded  that  they  could  not  be  taught  Divine  truth, 
without  a  knowledge  of  bodily  diseases,  or  of  other  points 
equally  extraneous  from  the  design  of  their  mission. 


142  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II. 

judges  in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were  to  be 
expected  he  should  miraculously  interpose.  Let 
us  look  to  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  and 
see  are  the  superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence, 
and  knowledge  conferred  only  on  persons  of  pru- 
dence and  decency  1  And  it  is  to  be  supposed  that 
persons  endued  with  miraculous  gifts,  had  the  same 
influence  over  them  as  if  they  were  natural  en- 
dowments. Farther,  our  natural  instruction  is  not 
always  given  us  in  a  way  most  suited  to  recom- 
mend it,  but  often  with  circumstances  apt  to  preju- 
dice us  against  it. 

The  analogy  between  natural  and  revealed  in- 
struction farther  appears  from  this  circumstance, 
that  the  improvements  and  hindrances  of  both  are 
of  the  same  kind.  Practical  Christianity,  like  the 
common  rules  of  our  conduct  in  temporal  affairs,  is 
plain  and  obvious.  The  more  accurate  knowledge 
of  Christianity,  like  many  parts  of  natural  and  civil 
knowledge,  may  require  exact  thought  and  careful 
consideration.  The  perfect  understanding  of  reve- 
lation, if  it  come  to  pass  before  the  restitution  of  ali 
things,  and  without  miraculous  interposition,  must 
be  arrived  at  in  the  same  wray  as  that  of  natural 
knowledge  is  attained  to,  namely,  by  pursuing 
hints  arid  intimations  which  are  generally  disre- 
garded by  others.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible  that 
the  Bible,  though  so  long  in  our  possession,  should 
contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered  (possibly 


CHAP.  III.]     OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.  143 

only  to  be  developed  by  events  as  they  come  to 
pass);  in  the  same  way  as  with  the  same  phenom- 
ena, and  the  same  faculties  of  investigation,  as  men 
were  possessed  of  long  ago,  great  discoveries  have 
been  lately  made  in  natural  knowledge. 

OBJECTION.  "  This  analogy  between  natural  and 
supernatural  light  fails  in  a  material  respect;  for 
natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no  consequence." 

ANSWER.  We  have  been  speaking  of  the  general 
instruction  which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us. 
Besides,  some  parts  of  natural  knowledge  are  of  the 
greatest  consequences.  But  suppose  the  analogy 
did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respect,  yet  it  might 
be  abundantly  supplied  from  the  whole  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  nature  ;  which  shows  that  God 
does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to  our  notions 
of  the  advantages  and  consequence  they  would  be 
to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  His  method  of 
dispensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would  make 
out  an  analogy  full  to  the  point. 

Objection  against  Christianity  as  a  Remedy: 
"  Scripture  represents  Christianity  as  an  expedient 
to  recover  a  lost  world,  to  supply  the  deficiencies 
of  natural  light.  Is  it  then  credible  that  this  sup- 
ply should  be  so  long  withheld,  and  then  be  made 
known  to  so  small  a  part  of  mankind — should  be  so 
deficient,  obscure,  doubtful,  and  liable  to  the  like 
perversions  and  objections  as  the  light  of  nature  it- 
self? 


144  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II. 

ANSWER.  Without  determining  bow  far  this  is  so 
in  fact,  it  is  by  no  means  incredible  from  analogy 
that  it  might  be  so ;  for  are  the  remedies  which  na- 
ture has  provided  for  diseases,  certain,  perfect,  or 
universal  1  The  same  principles  which  would  lead 
us  to  conclude  that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us 
also  to  conclude  that  there  could  be  no  occasion 
for  them,  i.  e.,  that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all ; 
and  these  principles  being  found  fallacious,  from 
the  fact  that  they  are  diseases,  would  render  it 
credible  beforehand  that  they  may  be  false  with  re- 
spect to  these  remedies — as,  by  experience,  we  find 
they  are — since  the  remedies  of  diseases  are  far 
from  being  certain,  perfect,  or  universal. 

III.  Does  it  follow  from  all  these  things  that 
reason  can  do  nothing  1  By  no  means,  unless  it 
follows  that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any  thing 
from  our  inability  to  judge  of  all  things.  Reason 
can  and  ought  to  judge  (as  has  been  partly  shown 
already),  not  only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the 
morality  and  evidence  of  revelation.  First,  it  is 
the  province  of  reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of 
Scripture,  that  is,  not  whether  it  contains  things 
different  from  what  we  should  have  expected  from  a 
wise,  just,  and  good  Being  ;  for  objections  of  this 
kind  have  been  now  obviated  ;  but  whether  it  con- 
tains things  plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  jus- 
tice, or  goodness — to  what  the  light  of  nature  teaches 
us  of  God.  There  is  no  objection  of  this  kind 


CHAP.  III.]     OCR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.  145 

against  Scripture  but  such  as  would  equally  apply 
against  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 

OBJECTION.  But  are  there  not  some  particular 
precepts  in  Scripture  requiring  actions  immoral 
and  vicious  ]* 

ANSWER.  There  are  some  requiring  actions  that 
would  be  immoral  and  vicious,  but  for  such  precept; 
but  the  precept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the 
case  and  of  the  action ;  for  these  precepts  are  not 
contrary  to  immutable  morality — they  require  only 
the  doing  an  external  action,  e.  g.,  taking  away 
the  property  or  life  of  any,  to  which  men  have  no 
right,  but  what  arises  solely  from  the  grant  of 
God  ;  when  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to 
have  any  right  at  all  in  either.  If,  indeed,  it  were 
required  to  cultivate  the  principles,  and  act  from 
the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty,  the 
command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case  or 
of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances.  But  are 
not  these  precepts  liable  to  be  perverted  by  de- 
signing men,  and  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthu- 
siastic 1  True,  they  are ;  but  this  is  not  an  objec- 
tion against  revelation,  but  against  the  whole  no- 
tion of  religion  as  a  trial,  and  against  the  general 
constitution  of  nature.  Secondly,  reason  is  to 
judge  of  the  evidence  of  revelation,  and  the  objec- 
tions against  it  (which  will  form  the  subject  of  the 

*  For  example,  the  command  given  by  God  to  destroy  the 
nation  of  Canaan. —  Vide  Graves  on  the  Pentateuch. 

N 


146  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING.     [PART  II. 

7th  chapter).  And  it  can  also  comprehend  what 
is  to  be  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political 
views ;  and,  therefore,  can  furnish  a  presumptive 
proof  that  a  supposed  revelation  does  not  proceed 
from  them,  and  is  consequently  tine. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  III. 

1.  Name  the  three  principal  divisions  under  which 
the  subjects  in  this  chapter  are  comprehended. 

2.  What  are  the  various  objections  usually  brought 
against  the  Christian  revelation ;    and  what   general 
answer  may  be  given  to  them,  assuming  Christianity 
to  be  a  matter  of  fact  1 

3.  Prove  from  analogy  that  we  are  likely  to  be  in- 
competent  judges  as  to  what  were  to  be  expected  in  a 
Divine  revelation. 

4.  State  fully  the  particular  example,  in  which  But- 
ler compares  our  ignorance  concerning  inspiration,  be- 
fore experience,  with  our  ignorance  concerning  natural 
knowledge. 

5.  How  is  the  objection  obviated  that  «*  Revelation, 
unless  given  in  such  or  such  a  way  (i.  e.,  according  to 
the  objector's  judgment  of  what  was  proper)  would 
not  answer  its  purposes  ?" 

6.  Give  the  argument  by  which  the  following  asser- 
tion is  proved,  viz.,  that  the  analogy  of  nature  shows  it 
to  be  probable,  beforehand,  that  men  will  imagine  they 
have  strong  objections  against  a  revelation,  however 
unexceptionable." 

7.  Answer  the  objection  against  Christianity,  drawn 
from  the  abuse  of  gifts  and  powers,  said  to  be  mirac- 
ulous, by  persons  exercising  them. 

8.  Show  that  the  improvements  and  hinder 'ances  of 
both  natural  and  revealed  instruction  are  of  the  same 
kind. 

9.  Answer  the  objection,  that,  ««  If  Christianity  be 
so  great  a  remedy,  why  it  has  been  so  long  withhold- 
en,  and  now  so  little  known  ?" 

10.  What  is  the  proper  province  of  reason  in  judg- 
ing of  revelation  ? 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF    CHRISTIANITY    CONSIDERED  AS  A   SCHEME,   OR    CON- 
STITUTION,   IMPERFECTLY    COMPREHENDED. 

I.  Admitting  the  credibility  of  Christianity  as  a  matter  of 
fact  there  may  yet  be  objections  against  the  wisdom,  jus- 
tice, and  goodness  of  it.     Analogy  furnishes  a  general  an- 
swer to  such  objections,  by  showing  that  Christianity  (like 
God's  moral  government,  Chap.  VII.,  Part  I.)  must  be  a 
scheme  beyond  our  comprehension. 

II.  This   appears    more    clearly  from  particular  Analogies. 
1st.  Means  are  used  to  accomplish  ends ;  and,  2d,  it  is  car- 
ried on  by  general  laws. 

III.  The  principal  objections  in  particular,  may  be  answer- 
ed by  particular  and  full  Analogies  in  Nature.     One  of 
these  objections,  being  against  the  whole  scheme  of  Christi- 
anity, is  considered  here,  namely,  "  That  it  supposes  God 
to  have  been  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  using  roundabout 
means  to  accomplish  man's  salvation." 

I.  IT  has  appeared,  from  the  seventh  chapter  of 
the  First  Part,  that  objections  against  the  wisdom, 
justice,  and  goodness  of  the  constitution  of  nature 
may  be  answered  by  its  being  a  constitution  or 
scheme  imperfectly  comprehended.  We  now  pro- 
ceed to  consider  the  like  objections  against  revela- 
tion. And  it  is  evident,  if  Christianity  be  a  scheme, 
and  of  the  same  kind,  the  like  objections  against  it 
must  admit  of  the  like  answer. 


CHAP.  IV.]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  149 

Now,  Christianity  is  a  scheme  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. The  moral  government  and  general 
plan  of  Providence  is  gradually  proceeding,  so  that 
finally  every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his  de- 
serts, and  truth  and  right  finally  prevail.  And 
Christianity  is  a  particular  scheme  under  this  gen- 
eral plan  of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it  conducive 
to  its  completion,  consisting  itself  also  of  various 
parts — a  mysterious  economy  for  the  recovery  of 
the  world  by  the  Messiah  (John  xi.,  52  ;  and  2  Pet., 
iii.,  13) — after  successive  manifestations  of  this  great 
and  general  scheme  of  Providence  (1  Pet.,  i.,  11, 
12) — the  incarnation  and  passion  of  the  Redeemer 
(Phil.,  ii.) — the  miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy 
Ghost — the  invisible  government  of  the  church — 
Christ's  second  coming  to  judgment,  and  the  re-es- 
tablishment of  the  kingdom  of  God  (John,  v.,  22, 
23;  Mat.,  xxviii.,  18  ;  1  Cor.,  xv.).  Surely  this  is 
a  scheme  of  things  imperfectly  comprehended  by 
us ;  or,  as  the  Scripture  expressly  asserts  it  to  be, 
a  great  mystery  of  Godliness  (1  Tim.,  iii.,  16). 

II.  But  this  will  more  fully  appear,  by  consider- 
ing, 1st,  that  it  is  obvious  means  are  made  use  of 
to  accomplish  ends  in  the  Christian  dispensation  as 
much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things ;  and  thus 
the  things  objected  against,  how  foolish  soever  they 
may  appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very  best  means 
of  accomplishing  the  very  best  ends.  And,  2dly, 
that  the  Christian  dispensation  may  have  been  all 

N* 


150  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  [PART  II. 

along  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature,  carried  on 
by  general  laws.  To  show  the  credibility  of  this, 
let  us  consider  upon  what  grounds  the  course  of 
nature  is  said  to  be  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
We  know  several  of  the  general  laws  of  matter ; 
and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behavior  of  living 
agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know 
in  a  manner  nothing  by  what  laws  storms  and 
tempests,  earthquakes,  famine,  pestilences  become 
the  instruments  of  destruction  to  mankind ;  by 
what  laws  some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  and 
others  live  to  extreme  old  age ;  by  what  laws  one 
man  is  so  superior  to  another  in  understanding ; 
and  innumerable  other  things  which  we  know  so 
little  of  as  to  call  them  accidental,  though  we  know 
there  can  not  be  such  a  thing  as  chance.  Thus  it 
appears  that  it  is  from  analogy — from  finding  that 
the  course  of  nature,  in  some  respects,  and  so  far, 
goes  on  by  general  laws — that  we  conclude  this  of 
the  rest.  And  if  this  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a 
conclusion,  it  is  a  just  ground  also,  at  least,  to  ren- 
der it  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for  answering  ob- 
jections, that  God's  miraculous  interpositions  may 
have  been  all  along  in  like  manner,  by  general  laws 
of  wisdom  ;  and,  if  so,  there  is  no  more  reason  to 
expect  that  every  exigence  should  be  provided  for 
by  them  than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should 
be  by  the  general  laws  of  nature. 

III.  Objected  against  the  whole  scheme  of  Christ- 


CHAP.  IV.]  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  151 

ianity :  "  The  Gospel  scheme  seems  to  suppose, 
that  God  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a.  long 
series  of  intricate  means  in  order  to  accomplish  His 
ends — the  recovery  and  salvation  of  the  world  ;  just 
as  men,  for  want  of  understanding  or  power,  are 
forced  to  go  roundabout  ways  to  arrive  at  their 
ends." 

ANSWER.  The  use  of  means  is  the  system  of  na- 
ture (and  means  which  we  often  think  tedious). 
The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits 
of  the  earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower  is  an  in- 
stance of  this.  Rational  creatures  form  their  char- 
acters by  the  gradual  accession  of  knowledge ;  our 
existence,  too,  is  successive,  and  one  state  of  life  is 
appointed  to  be  a  preparation  for  another.  Men 
are  impatient,  and  for  precipitating  things — the 
Author  of  nature  appears  deliberate  throughout 
His  operations.  This  is  a  plain  answer  to  the  ob- 
jection ;  but  we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things 
are  considered,  by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the 
single  notion  of  means  and  ends,  so  as  that  it  may 
be  said,  this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely 
means,  in  His  regard. 


QUESTIONS—CHAPTER  IV. 

1.  In  obviating  objections  against  the  wisdom,  jus- 
tice, and  goodness  of  Christianity,  with  what  does  But- 
ler compare  it;  and  what  connection  does  he  assert  to 
exist  between  it  and  the  general  plan  of  Providence  ? 

2.  Name  two  particular  analogies,  by  the  considera- 
tion of  which  the  credibility  of  Christianity  being  a 
scheme  imperfectly  comprehended  by  us,  will  more 
fully  appear. 

3.  Upon  what  grounds  is  it  said  that  the  course  of 
nature  is  carried  on  by  general  laws  ?     What  infer- 
ence may  be  drawn  from  this  subject,  applicable  to 
miraculous  interpositions? 

4.  How  may  the  principal  objections  in  particular 
against  Christianity  be  answered  ? 

5.  Answer  the  following  particular  objection,  viz., 
'*  The  Gospel  scheme  supposes  God  to  have  been  re- 
duced to  the  necessity  of  using  roundabout  means  to 
accomplish  man's  salvation." 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF    THE    PARTICULAR    SYSTEM    OF    CHRISTIANITY THE 

APPOINTMENT    OF    A    MEDIATOR,    AND    THE    REDEMP- 
TION   OF    THE    WORLD    BY    HIM. 

J.  Proceeding  to  answer  other  Particular  Objections. — An- 
alogy shows  that  there  can  be  no  objection  against  the  gen- 
eral  notion  of  a  Mediator. 

II.  This  analogy  appears  more  fully  upon  the  supposition  of 
future  punishments  following  in  the  way  of  natural  conse- 
quences. 

III.  The  Analogy  of  Nature  shows  that  there  is  no  probability 
that  behaving  well  for  the  future,  or  any  thing  that  we 
could  do,  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent  the  conse- 
quences of  vice. 

IV.  The  Scripture  view  of  Redemption  explained,  and  two 
Objections  against  the  Atonement  answered,  viz.,  "  That  we 
can  not  see  the  efficacy  of  it,  and  that  it  represents  the  in- 
nocent as  suffering  for  the  guilty." 

I.  THE  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  im- 
agined presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  a 
Mediator  between  God  and  man;  for  we  find  all 
living  creatures  are  brought  into  the  w^orld,  and 
their  life,  in  infancy,  is  preserved  by  the  instrumen- 


154  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.        [PART  II. 

tality  of  others  ;  and  every  satisfaction  of  it  is  be- 
stowed by  the  like  means.  Is  riot  then  the  suppo- 
sition that  His  invisible  government  is,  in  part,  at 
least,  carried  on  by  the  like  means  as  credible  as 
the  contrary  1  The  light  of  nature,  therefore,  fur- 
nishes no  presumption  against  the  general  notion  of 
a  mediator*  (and  it  is  against  this  that  the  objection 
is  urged,  not  against  mediation  in  that  high,  emi- 
nent, and  peculiar  sense  in  which  Christ  is  our 
Mediator),  since  we  find  by  experience  that  God 
does  appoint  mediators  to  be  the  instruments  of 
good  and  evil  to  us — the  instruments  of  His  justice 
and  His  mercy. 

II.  The  moral  government  of  the  world  (which 
must  be  supposed  before  we  can  consider  the  re- 
vealed doctrine  of  its  redemption  by  Christ)  implies 
that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery  in 
some  future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of 
God  ;  but  since  wre  are  altogether  unacquainted 

*  The  instances  of  Codrus,  the  last  Athenian  king,  exposing 
himself  to  inevitable  death;  and  Marcus  Curtius,  a  noble 
Roman,  leaping  into  the  gulf,  have  been  both  considered, 
from  the  certainty  of  the  offering,  and  the  feelings  of  their 
respective  nations,  as  proofs  of  a  disposition  in  mankind  to 
think  that  the  voluntary  and  certain  death  of  a  person  reputed 
noble  and  innocent  (Pliny  says  of  Curtius,  "  virtvie  ac  pietate 
ac  morte  pracclara  expleverat"),  may  prevent  impending  and 
Divinely  threatened  calamities.  Vide  the  Epistle  to  the  Ro- 
mans, v.,  7,  8.  "  For  scarcely  for  a  righteous  man  will  one 
die ;  yet  peradventure  for  a  good  man  some  would  even  dare 
to  die.  But  God  commendeth  his  love  towards  us,  in  that 
while  we  were  yet  sinners  Christ  died  for  us." 


CHAP.  V.]       SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  155 

how  future  punishment  is  to  follow  wickedness, 
there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  that  it  may  follow 
of  course,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence, 
from  God's  original  constitution  of  the  world  (in 
the  same  way  as  many  miseries  follow  particular 
courses  of  action  at  present) — from  the  nature  He 
has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which  He 
places  us ;  or  in  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly 
trifling  upon  a  precipice  falls  down,  breaks  his 
limbs,  and  without  help  perishes — all  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequence. 

OBJECTION.  Is  not  this  taking  the  execution  of 
justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to 
nature  ? 

ANSWER.  When  things  come  to  pass  according 
to  the  course  of  nature,  this  does  not  prevent  'them 
from  being  His  doing,  who  is  the  God  of  nature  ; 
and  Scripture  ascribes  those  punishments  to  Divine 
justice,  which  are  known  to  be  natural.  Yet,  after 
all,  this  supposition  is  of  no  consequence,  but  a 
mere  illustration  of  our  argument ;  for,  as  it  must 
be  admitted  that  future  punishment  is  not  a  matter 
of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of  reason,  equity,  and 
justice,  so  it  amounts  to  perhaps  the  same  thing, 
whether  they  follow  by  a  natural  consequence  or 
in  any  other  way.  Without  this  supposition,  we 
have  a  sufficient  analogy,  but  with  it,  we  have  a 
full  analogy  in  the  course  of  nature  for  a  provision 
made  for  preventing  the  future  consequences  of 


15G  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         [PART  II. 

vice  from  following  inevitably,  and  in  all  cases. 
For  there  is  at  present  a  provision  made,  that  all 
the  bad  natural  consequences  of  men's  actions  should 
not  always  actually  follow,  but  should  in  certain 
degrees  be  prevented.  As  the  Author  of  nature 
permits  evil,  so  He  has  provided  reliefs,  and  in 
many  cases,  perfect  remedies  for  it — reliefs  and 
remedies  even  for  that  evil  which  is  the  fruit  of  our 
own  misconduct,  and  which  otherwise  would  have 
ended  in  our  destruction.  And  this  is  an  instance 
both  of  severity  and  of  indulgence  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature.  Thus  all  the  bad  consequences, 
now  mentioned,  of  a  man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice 
might  be  prevented ;  or  some,  at  least,  by  the  as- 
sistance of  others,  in  obedience  to  the  suggestion  of 
their  nature,  and  by  this  assistance  being  accepted. 
Now,  suppose  the  constitution  of  nature  were  other- 
wise; that  the  natural  bad  consequences  of  actions, 
foreseen  to  have  such  consequences,  could  not,  in 
any  instance,  be  prevented,  after  the  actions  were 
committed,  no  one  can  say  whether  such  a  more 
severe  constitution  of  things  might  not  have  been 
really  good.  But  the  contrary  being  the  case,  this 
may  be  called  mercy  or  compassion,  in  the  original 
constitution  of  the  world — compassion,,  as  distin- 
guished from  goodness  in  general.  Therefore,  the 
whole  known  constitution  and  course  of  things  af- 
fording us  instances  of  such  compassion,  it  would 
be  according  to  the  analogy  of  nature  to  hope  that 


CHAP.  V.]        SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  157 

however  ruinous  the  natural  consequences  of  vice 
might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of  God's  govern- 
ment over  the  universe ;  yet  provision  might  be 
made,  possibly  might  have  been  originally  made, 
for  preventing  these  ruinous  consequences  from  in- 
evitably following,  at  least  from  following  univers- 
ally arid  in  all  cases.  Some  will,  perhaps,  wonder 
at  finding  it  spoken  of  as  at  all  doubtful,  that  the 
ruinous  consequences  of  vice  might  be  prevented, 
having  scarcely  any  apprehension  or  thought  at  all 
concerning  the  matter.  But,  judging  from  the  pres- 
ent scene,  we  find  the  effects  of  even  rashness  and 
neglect  are  often  extreme  misery,  irretrievable 
ruin,  and  even  death.  Now,  it  is  natural  to  appre- 
hend that  the  bad  consequences  of  irregularity  will 
be  greater  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  so. 
And  there  is  no  comparison  between  these  irregu- 
larities and  the  greater  instances  of  vice,  whereby 
mankind  have  presumptuously  introduced  confu- 
sion and  misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God.  So  that, 
as  no  one  can  say  in  what  degree  fatal  the  unpre- 
vented  consequences  of  vice  may  be,  according  to 
the  general  rule  of  Divine  government,  so  it  is,  by 
no  means,  intuitively  certain,  how  far  these  conse- 
quences could  possibly  be  prevented,  consistently 
with  the  eternal  rule  of  right,  or  with  what  is,  in. 
fact,  the  moral  constitution  of  nature.  However, 
there  would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that  the  uni- 
versal government  was  not  so  severely  strict,  but 

O 


158  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.        (TART  n. 

that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  having  those 
penal  consequences  prevented.     Yet, 

III.  There  seems  no  probability  that  any  thing 
we  could  do  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent 
them ;  for  we  do  not  know  all  the  reasons  which 
render  future  punishments  necessary,  nor  all  the 
natural  consequences  of  vice,  nor  in  what  mariner 
they  would  follow  if  unprevented,  and,  therefore, 
we  can  not  say  whether  we  could  do  any  thing 
which  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them.  Far- 
ther, that  repentance  and  reformation  alone,  and 
by  itself,  is  wholly  insufficient  to  prevent  the  future 
consequences  of  vice,*  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition 
in  which  we  should  have  been  had  we  preserved 
our  innocence,  appears  plainly  credible  from  anal- 
ogy ;  for  we  see  it  does  not  avail  in  a  much  lower 
capacity.  In  their  temporal  capacity,  men  ruin 
their  fortunes,  and  bring  on  diseases,  by  extrava- 
gance and  excess.  Will  sorrow  for  these  follies 

*  The  case  of  penitence  is  clearly  different  from  that  of  in 
nocence — it  implies  a  mixture  of  guilt  precontracted,  and 
punishment  proportionably  deserved ;  it  is  consequently  in- 
consistent with  rectitude  that  both  should  be  treated  alike  by 
God.  The  present  conduct  of  the  penitent  will  receive  God's 
approbation;  but  the  reformation  of  the  sinner  can  not  have  a 
retrospective  effect ;  the  agent  may  be  changed,  but  his  for- 
mer sins  can  not  be  thereby  canceled.  The  convert  and  the 
sinner  are  the  same  individual  person,  and  the  agent  must  be 
answerable  for  his  whole  conduct. — Balgny's  Essay  on  Re- 
demption. 

Cicero  goes  no  farther  on  this  head  than  to  assert — Quern 
poenitet  peccasse,  pene  est  innocens. — Dr.  Shuckford. 


CHAP. -V.]       SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  159 

past,  and  behaving  well  for  the  future,  alone  and 
of  itself,  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  them  1 
On  the  contrary,  their  natural  abilities  of  helping 
themselves  are  often  impaired  ;  or,  if  not,  yet  they 
are  absolutely  forced  to  seek  assistance  from  others 
for  retrieving  their  affairs. 

2d.  It  is  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  govern- 
ment, that  reformation  alone  would  prevent  all  the 
judicial  bad  consequences  of  having  done  evil  :* 
and  though  it  might  prevent  them  in  some  cases, 
yet  we  could  not  determine  in  what  degree  and  in 
what  cases  it  would  do  so. 

3d.  It  is  also  contrary  to  the  general  sense  of 
mankind,  as  appears  from  the  general  prevalence 
of  propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world.t 

IV.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call 

*  If  it  be  said  that  this  would  not  be  proper  in  human  gov- 
ernments, because  they  may  easily  be  deceived  by  false  shows 
of  repentance ;  I  answer,  that,  supposing  human  governors 
could  certainly  distinguish  a  true  repentance  from  a  false  one, 
the  inconvenience  of  such  a  constitution  to  the  public  would 
still  be  the  same ;  for  it  would  encourage  persons  to  commit 
crimes,  in  hopes  of  doing  it  with  impunity,  since  every  crim- 
inal would  think  that,  in  order  to  escape  punishment,  he  had 
nothing  more  to  do  but  to  repent,  and  that  this  alone  would 
satisfy  the  law  ;  and  he  would  be  apt  to  flatter  himself  that 
this  was  at  any  time  in  his  power. — Leland  against  Tindal. 

t  That  the  heathen  supposed  their  animal  sacrifices  to  be 
not  only  of  an  expiatory,  but  of  a  vicarious  nature,  might  be 
shown  from  a  variety  of  passages.  The  following  from  the 
Book  of  Ovid's  Fasti  is  full  to  the  point : 

"  Cor  pro  corde,  precor,  pro  fibris,  sumite  fibras 
Hanc  auimam  vobis  pro  meliore  damus." 


160  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         [PART  II. 

it  which  you  please,  Revelation  comes  in — confirms 
every  doubting  fear  which  could  enter  into  the 
heart  of  man  concerning  the  future  unpre vented 
consequence  of  wickedness — supposes  the  world  to 
be  in  a  state  of  ruin  (a  supposition  which  seems  the 
very  groundwork  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and 
which,  if  not  provable  by  reason,  yet  is  in  no  wise 
contrary  to  it) — teaches  us 'too,  that  the  rules  of 
Divine  government  are  such  as  not  to  admit  of 
pardon  immediately  and  directly  upon  repentance, 
or  by  the  sole  efficacy  of  it ;  but  then  teaches,  at 
the  same  time,  what  nature  might  justly  have  hoped, 
that  the  moral  government  of  the  universe  was  not 
so  rigid  but  that  there  was  room  for  an  interposi- 
tion ;  and  that  God  hath  mercifully  provided  this  in- 
terposition to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  human 
kind.  "  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his 
only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  kelieveth  in  him 
(i,  c.,  in  a  practical  sense)  should  not  perish"  He 
gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness  to  the 
world  as  He  affords  particular  persons  the  friendly 
assistance  of  their  fellow-creatures;  when  without 
it,  their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain  conse- 
quence of  their  follies — in  the  same  way  of  good- 
ness, I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely 
higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us,  and 
gave  himself  for  us,  with  a  love  which  he  himself 
compares  to  that  of  human  friendship ;  though,  in 
this  case,  all  comparisons  must  fall  infinitely  short 


CHAP.  V.]       SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  161 

of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illustrated  by  them. 
He  interposed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  the 
appointed  or  natural  punishment  that  would  other- 
wise have  been  executed  upon  them.*  Nor  is 
there  any  thing  here  inconsistent  with  Divine  good- 
ness ;  for  were  we  to  suppose  the  constitution  of 
things  to  be  such  that  the  whole  creation  must 
have  perished,  but  for  something  appointed  by  God 
to  prevent  it,  even  this  supposition  would  not  be 
inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with  the  most  absolute- 
ly perfect  goodness. 

*  It  can  not,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  that  it  is  affirmed  or 
implied,  in  any  thing  said  in  this  chapter,  that  none  can  have 
the  benefit  of  the  general  redemption  but  such  as  have  the 
advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present 
life.  But  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions, 
which  have  been  brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and  de- 
termined, are  not  in  the  least  entered  into  here — questions 
which  have  been,  I  fear,  rashly  determined,  and,  perhaps, 
with  equal  rashness  contrary  ways.  For  instance,  "  Whether 
God  could  have  saved  the  world  by  other  means  than  the 
death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the  general  laws  of  his  gov- 
ernment?" .  And  "  Had  not  Christ  come  into  the  world,  what 
would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of 
men — those  just  persons  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for  whom 
Manasses,  in  his  prayer,  asserts  repentance  was  not  appoint- 
ed?" The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is  greatly 
ambiguous ;  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered 
without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition  that  we 
know  the  whole  of  the  case.  And,  perhaps,  the  very  inquiry, 
What  would  have  followed,  if  God  had  not  done  as  he  has  ? 
may  have  in  it  some  very  great  impropriety,  and  ought  not  to 
be  carried  on  any  farther  than  is  necessary  to  help  our  partial 
conceptions  of  things. — Butler. 


162  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         [PART  II. 

OBJECTION.  But  Christianity  supposes  mankind  to 
be  naturally  in  a  very  strange  state  of  degradation. 

ANSWER.  This  is  true,  but  it  is  not  Christianity 
which  has  put  us  into  this  state,  and  there  will  be 
little  reason  to  object  against  the  Scripture  account, 
if  we  consider  the  miseries  and  wickedness  of  the 
world  ;  the  wrongness  which  the  best  experience 
within  themselves  ;  and  that  the  natural  appear- 
ances of  human  degradation  were  so  strong,  that 
the  heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from  them,  and 
that  the  earth,  our  habitation,  has  the  appear- 
ances of  being  a  ruin.  It  was,  according  to  Scrip- 
ture, the  crime  of  our  first  parents  that  placed  us  in 
this  state,  and  this  account  of  the  occasion  of  our 
being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition 
is  particularly  analogous  to  what  we  see  in  the 
daily  course  of  natural  Providence,  as  the  recovery 
of  the  world  by  Christ  has  been  shown  to  be  so  in 
general. 

But  let  us  consider  the  Scripture  account  of  the 
particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed  in  the 
redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  of  mediator, 
in  the  largest  sense  between  God  and  man.  He  is 
the  light  of  the  world* — the  revealer  of  the  will  of 
God  in  the  most  eminent  sense.  He  is  a  propiti- 
atory sacrifice t — the  Lamb  of  God\ — our  High 

*  John,  i.,  and  viii.,  12. 

t  Rom.,  iii.,  25,  and  v.,  11;  Cor.,  v.,  7;  Eph.,  v.,  2;  1 
John,  ii.,  2  ;  Mat.,  xxvi.,  28. 

t  John,  i.,  29,  36,  and  throughout  the  Book  of  Revelation. 


CHAP.  V.]       SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  163 

Priest* — and,  what  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is 
described  beforehand,  in  the  Old  Testament,  under 
the  same  characters  of  a  Priest  and  an  expiatory 
victim.f 

OBJECTION.  Christ's  atonement  is  merely  by  way 
of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the  Mosaic  law. 

ANSWER.  The  Apostle,  on  the  contrary,  asserts, 
that  the  "  law  was  a  shadow  of  good  things  to 
come  ;"|  that  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a  shadow 
or  type  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ  (Heb.,  viii.,  4, 
5),  in  like  manner,  as  the  tabernacle  made  by  Mo- 
ses, was  a  copy  of  that  shown  him  in  the  mount. 
Nor  can  any  thing  be  more  express  than  the  fol- 
lowing passage  :  "  It  is  not  possible  that  the  blood 
of  bulls  arid  of  goats  should  take  away  sin.  Where- 
fore, when  he  cometh  into  the  world,  he  saith,  sac- 
rifice and  offering  (i.  e.,  of  bulls  and  goats)  thou 
wouldest  not,  but  a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me. 
Lo  !  I  come  to  do  thy  will,  O  God.  By  the  which 
will  we  are  sanctified  through  the  offering  of  the 
body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  all."  Heb.,  x.,  4,  5, 
7,  9,  10.  Again,  "  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear 
the  sins  of  many,  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him 
shall  he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin,  unto 
salvation."  Heb.,  ix.,  28.  Without  sin,  i.  e.,  with- 
out bearing  sin  —  without  being  a  sin-offering. 

*  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews, 
t  Is.,  liii. ;  Dan.,  ix.,  24 ;  Ps.,  ex.,  4. 
J  Heb.,  x.,  1. 


164  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         [PART  II 

Moreover,  Scripture  declares  that  there  is  an  ef- 
ficacy in  what  Christ  did  and  suffered  for  us,  addi- 
tional to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  example, 
and  government.  That  Jesus  should  die  for  that 
nation  (the  Jews),  and  not  for  that  nation  only,  but 
that  also,  plainly  by  the  efficacy  of  his  death,  he 
should  gather  together  in  one  the  children  that  are 
scattered  abroad  ;*  that  he  suffered  for  sins,  the 
just  for  the  unjust  ;t  that  he  gave  his  life — himself 
a  ransom  ;\  that  he  is  our  advocate,  intercessor,  and 
propitiation. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  nature  of  Christ's  office, 
according  to  the  three  heads  under  which  it  is  usu- 
ally treated  of,  namely  Prophet,  Priest,  and  King, 
reserving  the  second  head  for  the  last,  in  order  to 
answer  the  objections  against  it.  First.  He  was, 
by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet — that  Prophet 
that  should  come  into  the  world\  to  declare  the  Di- 
vine will.  He  taught  authoritatively  ;  He  gave  to 
the  moral  system  of  nature  the  additional  evidence 
of  testimony  ;  He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in 
which  God  would  be  worshipped,  the  efficacy  of 

*  John,  xi.,  51,  52.  t  1  Pet.,  iii.,  18. 

t  Mat.,  xx.,  29.  Vide,  also,  Mark,  x.,  45  ;  1  Tim.,  ii.,  6  ; 
2  Pet.,  ii.,  1;  Rev.,  xiv.,  4;  1  Cor.,  vi.,  20;  1  Pet.,  i.,  19; 
Rev.,  v.,  9;  Gal.,  iii.,  13;  Heb.,  vii.,  25;  1  John,  ii.,  1,  2; 
Heb.,  ii.,  10,  and  v.,  9;  2  Cor.,  v.,  19;  Rom.,  v.,  10;  Eph., 
ii.,  16;  Heb.,  ii.,  14.  See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the 
Book  of  Job,  xxxiii.,  24;  Phil.,  ii.,  8,  9;  John,  iii.,  35,  and 
v.,  22,  23;  Rev.,  v.,  12,  13. 

$  John,  vi.,  14. 


CHAP.  V.]       SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  165 

repentance,  and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments; and  He  set  us  a  perfect  example,  that 
we  should  follow  his  steps.  Secondly.  He  is  a 
King,  as  he  has  a  kingdom  which  is  not  of  this 
world.  He  founded  a  visible  church,  to  be  a 
standing  memorial  of  religion,  and  invitation  to  it ; 
over  this  He  exercises  an  invisible  government, 
"  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints — for  the  edifying 
his  body."*  All  persons  who  live  in  obedience  to 
his  laws  are  members  of  this  church,  and  for  these 
he  is  gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and  will  come  again 
to  receive  them  to  himself  ;\  and  likewise  to  take 
vengeance  on  those  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not 
liis  Gospel.\ 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office  there  are  no 
objections,  but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  be- 
ginning of  this  chapter. 

Thirdly.  As  to  the  priesthood  of  Christ,  he  of- 
fered himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice  for  the  sins  of 
the  world.  Expiatory  sacrifices  were  commanded 
the  Jews,  and  obtained  among  other  nations  from 
traditions,  the  original  of  which  was  probably  rev- 
elation. These  were  continually  repeated.  "But 
now,  once  in  the  end  of  the  world,  Christ  appeared 
to  put  away  sin,  by  the  sacrifice  of  himself."§  How 
the  atonement  has  this  efficacy,  which  the  heathen 
sacrifices  had  not,  and  the  Jewish  had  only  in  a 

*  Eph.,  iv.,  12.     t  John,  xiv.,  2;  Rev.,  iii.,  21,  and  xi.,  15. 
t  2  Thes.,  i.,  8.  $  Heb.,  ix.,  26. 


166  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         [PART  II. 

very  limited  degree,  Scripture  has  not  revealed  to 
us.  Some  have  gone  beyond  what  the  Scripture 
has  authorized  in  explaining  it;  and  others,  be- 
cause they  could  not  explain  it,  have  rejected  it, 
and  confine  the  office  of  Chiist,  as  Redeemer  of  the 
world,  to  his  instruction,  example,  and  government 
of  the  church.  Whereas  the  Gospel  doctrine  is, 
not  only  that  He  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
but  that  He  made  it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by 
what  He  did  and  suffered  for  us ;  that  he  revealed 
to  sinners  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  salvation, 
and  how  they  might  obtain  it,  and  also  put  them 
in  that  capacity. 

1st  OBJECTION.  We  do  not  see  the  necessity  or 
expediency  of  the  sacrifice  of  Christ. 

ANSWER.  Our  ignorance  with  regard  to  the 
means,  manner,  and  occasion  of  future  punish- 
ments, and  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  future 
happiness,  shows  evidently  that  we  are  not  judges, 
antecedently  to  revelation,  whether  a  Mediator  was 
or  was  not  necessary.  And  for  the  very  same 
reasons,  upon  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  Medi- 
ator, we  are  not  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation, 
of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office.  And,  therefore, 
no  objection  can  be  urged  against  any  part  of  that 
office,  until  it  can  be  shown  positively  not  to  be 
requisite  to  the  ends  proposed,  or  that  it  is  in  itself 
unreasonable.  There  seems  to  be  something  of 
this  positive  kind  in  this. 


CHAP.  V.]        SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  167 

2d  OBJECTION.  "  The  doctrine  of  Christ's  being 
appointed  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  repre- 
sents God  as  being  indifferent  whether  he  punished 
the  innocent  or  the  guilty." 

ANSWER.  1.  This  is  not  an  objection  against 
Christianity  merely ;  but  concludes  as  much  against 
the  constitution  of  nature,  since,  in  the  daily  course 
of  natural  providence,  it  is  appointed  that  innocent 
persons  should  suffer  for  the  guilty.  The  objection 
does  not  apply  the  more  against  the  appointment 
in  Christianity,  because  it  is  of  infinitely  greater 
importance,  since  notwithstanding,  it  may  be,  as  it 
plainly  is,  an  appointment  of  the  same  kind,  but  it 
would  apply  (if  it  had  any  force)  more  against  the 
appointment  in  nature,  where  we  are  commanded, 
and  even  necessitated,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of 
others;  whereas  the  sufferings  of 'Christ  were  vol- 
untary. Yet,  there  is  no  objection  to  the  former ; 
for,  upon  the  completion  of  the  moral  scheme  ev- 
ery one  shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  Bui 
during  the  progress  of  this  scheme,  vicarious  pun- 
ishments may  be  fit  and  absolutely  necessary.  2d. 
This  method  of  our  redemption  is  unanswerably 
justified  by  its  apparent  natural  tendency — -its 
tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  laws, 
and  to  deter  his  creatures  from  sin. 

This  (though  by  no  means  an  account  of  the 
whole  of  the  case)  would  be  a  sufficient  answer  to 
objections  of  the  foregoing  kind,  which  are  insisted 


168  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.        [PART  II. 

upon,  either  from  ignorance  of  what  are  to  be  con- 
sidered God's  appointments,  or  forgetfulness  of  the 
daily  instances  of  this  case  in  those  appointments ; 
and,  from  this  ignorance  or  forgetfulness,  together 
with  their  inability  of  seeing  how  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  could  contribute  to  the  redemption  of  the 
world,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will,  they 
conclude  that  they  could  not  contribute  to  it  any 
other  way.  But  to  see  the  absurdity  of  such  an 
objection  against  Christianity,  or,  as  it  really  is, 
against  the  constitution  of  nature,  let  us  consider 
what  it  amounts  to — that  a  Divine  appointment  can 
not  be  necessary  or  expedient,  because  the  object- 
or does  not  discern  it  to  be  so,  though  he  must 
own  that  the  nature  of  the  case  is  such  as  renders 
him  incapable  of  judging  whether  it  be  so  or  not, 
or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary,  though  it  were  so ! 
The  presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  to  par- 
ticular things  revealed  in  Scripture,  seems  almost 
lost  in  the  folly  of  them ;  and  the  folly  of  them  is 
yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as  usually  they 
are,  against  things  in  Christianity  analogous  or  like 
to  those  natural  dispensations  of  Providence  which 
are  matter  of  experience.  And  the  absurdity  is 
still  farther  heightened  by  the  consideration  that 
we  are  not  actively  concerned  in  the  parts,  the  ex- 
pediency of  which  can  not  be  understood,  for  these 
relate  to  the  Divine  conduct,  which  is  a  very  differ- 
ent subject  from  our  duty,  with  respect  to  which 


CHAP.  V.]        SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  169 

none  need  plead  want  of  information.  The  con- 
stitution of  the  world,  and  God's  natural  govern- 
ment over  it,  is  all  a  mystery,  as  much  as  the 
Christian  dispensation.  Yet,  under  the  first,  He 
has  given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life  (though 
it  is  but  an  infinitely  small  part  of  natural  provi- 
dence which  experience  teaches  us),  and,  under 
the  others,  all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness. 
There  is  no  obscurity  in  the  common  precepts  of 
Christianity;  though,  if  there  were,  a  Divine  com- 
mand ought  to  impose  the  strongest  obligation  to 
obedience.  But  the  reasons  of  all  the  Christian 
precepts  are  evident.  Positive  institutions  are  nec- 
essary to  keep  up  and  propagate  religion.  The 
internal  and  external  worship  which  we  owe  to 
Christ  arises  out  of  what  He  has  done  and  suffered 
for  us — out  of  His  authority,  and  the  relation  He 
(according  to  revejation)  stands  in  to  us. 
P 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  V. 

1.  Show  that  there  can  be  no  objection  from  analogy 
against  the  general  notion  of  a  Mediator. 

2.  In  reasoning  upon  the  redemption  of  the  world, 
what  supposition  may  we,  without  absurdity,  assume, 
respecting  the  way  in  which  punishment  may  follow 
sin? 

3.  Answer  the  objection   that  «*  supposing  punish- 
ment to  be  the  natural  consequence  of  sin,  is  taking  the 
execution  of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God." 

4.  Give  fully  the  argument  illustrating  the  assertion 
that  "  with  this  supposition,  we  have  a  full  analogy,  in 
the  course  of  nature,  for  a  provision  made  for  prevent- 
ing the  future  consequences  of  vice  from  following  in- 
evitably and  in  all  cases." 

5.  How  may  we  prove  the  unreasonableness  of  those 
who  wonder  at  finding  it  spoken  of  as  at  all  doubtful 
that  the  ruinous  consequences  of  vice  might  have  been 
prevented  ? 

6.  What  considerations  show  the  improbability  that 
behaving  well  for  the  future,  or  any  thing  that  we  could 
do,  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent  the  fatal  conse- 
quences of  vice  ? 

7.  What  confirmation  is  given  to  the  teaching  of  the 
light  of  nature  by  the   Scriptural  view  of  man's  re- 
demption? 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  V.  171 

8.  Prove  that  there  is  no  weight  in  the  objection 
that  **  Christianity  supposes   mankind  to  be  naturally 
in  a  very  strange  state  of  degradation." 

9.  Explain  at  large,  under  three  different  heads, 
the  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed  in 
the  redemption  of  the  world. 

10.  Against  what  part  of  Christ's  office  have  most 
objections  been  urged,  and  how  have   men   erred  on 
contrary  sides  in  their  reasonings  concerning  it  ? 

11.  Answer  the  following  objections:  1st.  We  do 
not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ. 

12.  2d  Objection.     The  doctrine  of  Christ's  being 
appointed  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  repre- 
sents God  as  being  indifferent  whether  He  punished 
the  innocent  or  the  guilty. 

13.  By  what  arguments   does    Butler  expose    the 
presumption  and  folly  of  these,  and  similar  objections, 
to  particular  things  revealed  in  Scripture  ? 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF  THE  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  IN  REVELATION, 
AND  OF  THE  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  THE  PROOF 
OF  IT. 

I.  The  next  Objections  to  be  considered  are,  1.  That  Rev- 
elation is  left  upon  doubtful  evidence,  and,  therefore,  it 
can  not  be   true.     2.   Revelation  is  not  Universal,  and, 
therefore,  can  not  be  true.     These  Objections  are  answered 
by  full  Analogies  in  the  Constitution  of  Nature. 

II.  Admitting  Revelation  to  be  uncertain  in  its  evidence,  the 
three  following  practical  reflections  will  tend  to  remove  all 
causes  of  complaint:  1.  The  evidence  of  Religion  not  ap- 
pearing obvious,  may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some 
men's  Trial,  in  the  religious  sense.     2.  Doubting  implies 
some  degree  of  evidence,  and  puts  men  into  a  general 
state  of  Probation,  in  the  moral  and  religious  sense  ;  and 
consequently,  3.  These  difficulties  are  no  more  to  be  com- 
plained of  than  external  circumstances  of  temptation. 

III.  But  this  uncertainty  may  partly  arise  from  our  own  neg- 
lect. 

IV.  An  apparent  Analogy  against  the  fitness  of  doubtful  evi 
dence  answered. 

I.  IT  has  been  objected,  1st,  that  if  the  evidence 
of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns  into 
a  positive  argument  against  it ;  because  it  can  not 


CHAP.  VI.]     WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY,  ETC.  173 

be  supposed  that,  if  it  were  really  true,  it  would  be 
left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evidence;  2d,  that 
revelation  can  not  be  true  from  its  want  of  Uni- 
versality. 

Now  the  weakness  of  these  objections  may  be 
shown  by  observing  the  suppositions  upon  which 
they  are  founded,  which  are  really  such  as  these  : 
1.  It  can  not  be  thought  that  God  would  bestow 
any  favor  at  all  upon  us  unless  in  the  degree  we 
imagine  might  be  most  to  our  particular  advantage  ; 
and,  2,  that  it  can  not  be  thought  he  would  bestow 
a  favor  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same 
upon  all. 

General  Answer  to  the  1st  Objection.  Let  the 
objectors  to  revelation,  on  account  of  its  supposed 
doubtfulness,  consider  what  that  evidence  is  which 
they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their  temporal  inter- 
ests. There  are  various  circumstances  which 
render  it  uncertain  and  doubtful ;  such  as  the  diffi- 
culty and  almost  impossibility  of  balancing  pleasure 
and  pain,  to  see  on  which  side  the  overplus  lies — 
of  making  allowances  for  the  difference  of  feeling 
which  we  may  have,  when  we  have  obtained 
the  object  in  view — and  of  the  casualties  which 
may  prevent  our  obtaining  it,  e.  g.,  sudden  death — 
the  danger  of  our  being  deceived  by  the  appear- 
ances of  things,  especially  if  we  are  inclined  to  fa- 
vor deceit.  Yet  all  this  is  considered  to  be  justly 
disregarded,  upon  account  of  there  appearing 


174  WANT  OF  UiNIVERSALITY          [PART  II. 

greater  advantages  in  case  of  success,  though  there 
be  but  little  probability  of  it ;  and  even  when  the 
probability  is  greatly  against  success,  if  there  be 
only  a  possibility  that  we  may  succeed. 

General  Answer  to  the  2d  Objection.  These  ob- 
jectors should  observe  that  the  Author  of  nature, 
in  numberless  instances,  bestows  upon  some  what 
he  does  not  upon  others  who  seem  equally  in  need 
of  it ;  for  instance,  health  and  strength,  capacities 
of  prudence  and  of  knowledge,  riches,  and  all  ex- 
ternal advantages  ;  and,  notwithstanding  these  va- 
rieties and  uncertainties,  God  exercises  a  natural 
government  over  the  world ;  and  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  institution  of 
life,  with  regard  to  our  health  and  our  affairs  under 
this  government. 

Now,  let  us  more  particularly  consider  what  is 
to  be  found  in  the  evidence  and  reception  of  reve- 
lation analogous  to  the  preceding,  and  we  will  see 
farther  the  futility  of  these  objections.  As  neither 
the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  has  been  uni- 
versal, and,  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a  greater 
or  less  part  of  the  world  at  different  times,  so  like- 
wise at  different  times,  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived 
during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from 
Moses  till  after  the  captivity,  had  higher  evidence 
of  the  truth  of  their  religion  than  those  had  who 
lived  in  the  interval  between  the  captivity  and  the 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  175 

coming  of  Christ.  And  the  first  Christians  had 
higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought  in  attesta- 
tion of  Christianity  than  we  have  now.  They  had 
also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the  truth  of  it, 
of  which  we  have  little  remaining — the  presumptive 
proof  from  the  influence  which  it  had  upon  the 
lives  of  the  generality  of  its  professors.  And  we, 
or  future  ages,  may  possibly  have  a  proof  of  it, 
which  they  could  not  have,  from  the  conformity 
between  the  prophetic  history,  and  the  state  of  the 
world  and  of  Christianity.  And,  farther,  if  we 
were  to  suppose  the  evidence  which  some  have  of 
religion  to  amount  to  little  more  than  seeing  that 
it  may  be  true  ;  others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of 
its  truth  ;  and  others  severally  to  have  all  the  inter- 
mediate degrees  of  evidence  between  these  two ; 
if  we  put  the  case  that  revelation,  for  the  present, 
was  only  intended  to  be  a  small  light  in  the  midst 
of  a  world  greatly  overspread  with  darkness,  so 
that  some  at  a  remote  distance  might  receive  some 
glimmerings  of  it,  and  yet  not  be  able  to  discern  its 
origin ;  and  others,  in  a  nearer  situation,  should 
have  its  light  obscured  in  different  ways  and  de- 
grees ;  and  others  within  its  clearer  influence,  en- 
livened and  directed  by  it,  and  yet,  even  to  these, 
that  it  should  be  no  more  than  a  liglit  shining  in  a 
dark  place  ;  all  this  would  be  perfectly  uniform 
with  the  conduct  of  Providence  in  the  distribution 
of  His  other  blessings.  If  the  fact  of  the  case  really 


176  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY         [PART  II. 

were,  that  some  have  received  no  light  at  all  from 
Scripture,  as  many  heathen  nations ;  that  others 
have  had,  by  this  means,  natural  religion  enforced 
upon  them,  but  never  had  Scripture  revelation, 
with  its  real  evidence,  proposed  to  them,  like,  per- 
haps, the  ancient  Persians  and  modern  Moham- 
medans ;  that  others  have  had  revelation  proposed 
to  them,  but  with  such  interpolations  in  its  system, 
and  with  its  evidence  so  blended  with  false  mira- 
cles, &c.,  as  to  produce  doubt  and  uncertainty,  which 
may  be  the  case  with  some  thoughtful  men  in  most 
Christian  nations ;  and,  lastly,  that  others  have  Chris- 
tianity proposed  to  them  in  its  proper  light,  but 
yet  not  light  sufficient  to  satisfy  curiosity.  Now, 
if  this  be  a  true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral 
and  religious  light  and  evidence,  there  is  nothing 
in  it  but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifest  analogies  in 
the  present  natural  dispensations  of  Providence. 

But  does  not  this  unequal  distribution  appear 
harsh  and  unjust  1  By  no  means ;  for  every  one 
shall  be  equitably  dealt  with  :  no  more  shall  be 
required  of  any  one  than  what  might  have  been 
equitably  expected  of  him,  from  the  circumstances 
in  which  he  was  placed :  i.  e.,  every  man  shall  be 
accepted  according  to  what  he  had,  not  according  to 
what  he  had  not.  This,  however,  doth  not  imply 
that  all  persons'  condition  here  is  equally  advan- 
tageous with  respect  to  futurity ;  and  their  being 
placed  in  darkness  is  no  more  a  reason  why  per- 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  177 

sons  should  not  endeavor  to  get  out  of  it,  and  why 
others  should  not  endeavor  to  bring  them  out  of  it, 
than  it  is  a  reason  why  ignorant  people  should  not 
endeavor  to  learn,  or  should  not  be  instructed. 

II.  What,  in  general,  may  be  the  account  or  rea- 
son of  these  things  ]  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  sup- 
pose that  the  same  wise  and  good  principle,  what- 
ever it  was,  which  disposed  the  Author  of  nature  to 
make  different  kinds  and  orders  of  creatures,  dis- 
posed Him  also  to  place  creatures  of  the  like  kinds 
in  different  situations  :  and  that  the  same  principle 
which  disposed  Him  to  make  creatures  of  different 
moral  capacities,  disposed  Him  to  place  creatures 
of  like  moral  capacities,  in  different  religious  situa- 
tions, and  even  the  same  creatures,  at  different 
periods  of  their  being.  And  the  account,  or  rea- 
son of  this,  is  also,  most  probably,  the  account  why 
the  constitution  of  things  is  such,  that  creatures  of 
moral  capacities,  for  a  considerable  part  of  their 
life,  are  not  all  subjects  of  morality  and  religion. 

But  can  we  not  give  a  more  particular  account 
of  these  things  ?  Here  we  must  be  greatly  in  the 
dark,*  were  it  only  that  we  know  so  veiy  little,  even 

*  To  expect  a  distinct,  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole 
subject,  clear  of  difficulties  and  objections,  is  to  forget  our 
nature  and  condition,  neither  of  which  admit  of  such  knowl- 
edge with  respect  to  any  science  whatever:  and  to  inquire 
with  this  expectation,  is  not  to  inquire  as  a  man,  but  as  one 
of  another  order  of  creatures. — Butler's  Sermon  on  the  Ig» 
norance  of  Man. 


178  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  [PART  II. 

of  our  own  case.  We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  system  ; 
our  present  state  probably  connected  with  the  past, 
as  it  is  with  the  future.  A  system  in  its  very  notion 
implies  variety,  so  that  were  revelation  universal,  yet 
from  men's  different  capacities  of  understanding, 
from  the  different  lengths  of  their  lives,  from  their 
difference  of  education,  temper,  and  bodily  consti- 
tution, their  religious  situations  would  be  widely 
different,  and  the  disadvantages  of  some  in  compar- 
ison to  others  would  be  altogether  as  much  as  at 
present ;  and  the  true  account  of  our  being  placed 
here  must  be  supposed  also  to  be  the  true  account 
of  our  ignorance  of  the  reasons  of  it.  But  the  fol- 
lowing practical  reflections  may  deserve  the  consid- 
eration of  those  persons  who  think  the  circumstances 
of  mankind,  or  their  own,  in  the  fore-mentioned  . 
respects,  a  subject  of  complaint.  1st.  The  evi- 
dence of  religion  not  appearing  obvious,  may  con- 
stitute one  particular  part  of  some  men's  trial,  in 
the  religious  sense,  as  it  gives  scope  for  a  virtuous 
exercise,  or  vicious  neglect  of  their  understanding, 
in  examining,  or  not  examining,  into  that  evidence. 
There  seems  no  possible  reason  to  be  given  why 
we  may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral  probation  with 
regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  understanding  upon 
the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to 
our  behavior  in  common  affairs.  For  religion  is 
not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deduction  arid 
inference ;  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not  forced 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  179 

upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be  by  some  collected 
by  heedful  attention  to  premises.  The  careful  and 
solicitous  examination  of  the  evidence  of  religion 
before  conviction,  is  an  exercise  of  the  same  inward 
principle  that  renders  a  person  obedient  to  its  pre- 
cepts after  conviction ;  and  neglect  is  as  much  real 
depravity  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

2d.  Even  if  the  evidence  of  religion  were,  in  the 
highest  degree,  doubtful,  it  would  put  men  into  a 
general  state  of  probation,  in  the  moral  and  religious 
sense.  For,  suppose  a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt 
whether  such  a  person  had  not  done  him  the  great- 
est favor,  or  whether  his  whole  temporal  interest 
was  not  depending  on  that  person,  he  could  not 
consider  himself  (if  he  had  any  sense .  of  gratitude 
or  of  prudence)  in  the  same  situation  as  if  he  had 
no  such  doubt;  or  as  if  he  were  certain  he  had  re- 
ceived no  favor  from  such  a  person, .or  that  he  no 
way  depended  upon  him.  So  that,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  religion,  there  is  not  so  great 
a  difference  as  is  generally  imagined  between  what 
ought  in  reason  to  be  the  rule  of  life  to  those  who 
really  doubt  and  those  who  are  fully  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  religion.*  Their  hopes,  and  fears,  arid 

*  For  would  it  not  be  madness  for  a  man  to  forsake  a  safe 
road,  and  prefer  to  it  one  in  which  he  acknowledges  there  is 
an  even  chance  he  should  lose  his  life,  though  there  were  an 
even  chance,  likewise,  of  his  going  safe  through  it?  Yet 
there  are  people  absurd  enough  to  take  the  supposed  doubt- 
fulness of  religion  for  the  same  thing  as  a  proof  of  its  falsehood, 


180  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  [TAUT  II. 

obligations  will  be  in  various  degrees ;  but  as  the 
subject-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  same, 
so  the  subject-matter  of  their  obligations  is  not  so 
very  unlike.  For  doubting  gives  occasion  arid  mo- 
tives to  consider  farther  the  important  subject ;  to 
preserve- a  sense  that  they  may  be  under  the  Divine 
moral  government,  and  an  awful  solicitude  about 
religion,  so  as  to  bind  them  to  refrain  from  all  im- 
morality and  profaneness  ;  and  such  conduct  will 
tend  to  improve  in  them  that  character  which  the 
practice  of  religion  would  in  those  fully  convinced 
of  its  truth.  And  they  are  farther  accountable  for 
their  example,  if  with  a  character  for  understanding, 
or  in  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world,  they  dis- 
regard all  religion,  though  doubtful  to  them  ;  and 
very  accountable,  as  they  may  do  more  injury  this 
way,  or  might  do  more  good  by  the  opposite,  than 
by  acting  ill  or  well,  in  the  common  intercourse 
among  mankind. 

The  ground  of  these  observations  is,  that  doubt- 
ing necessarily  implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for 
that  of  which  we  doubt:  for  no  person  would  be 
in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts, 
accidentally  entering  his  mind,  and  of  which  he  had 


after  they  have  concluded  it  doubtful,  from  hearing  it  often 
called  in  question.  This  shows  how  infinitely  unreasonable 
skeptical  men  are  with  regard  to  religion,  and  that  they 
really  lay  aside  their  reason,  upon  this  subject,  as  much  as  the 
most  extravagant  enthusiast. — Butler's  Charge. 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  181 

no  evidence  at  all.  In  the  case  of  an  even  chance, 
we  should  commonly  say  we  had  no  evidence  at  all 
for  either  side  ;  yet  this  case  is  equivalent  to  all 
others,  where  there  is  such  evidence  on  both  sides 
of  a  question  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concern- 
ing the  truth  :  and  in  all  these  cases,  although  there 
is  no  more  evidence  on  the  one  side  than  on  the 
other,  there  is  much  more  for  either  than  for  the 
truth  of  a  number  of  random  thoughts.  And  thus, 
it  will  appear  that  there  are  as  many  degrees  be- 
tween no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of  it 
which  affords  ground  for  doubt,  as  there  are  be- 
tween that  degree  which  is  the  ground  of  doubt^ 
and  demonstration.  And  it  is  as  real  an  imperfec- 
tion in  the  moral  character,  not  to  be  influenced  "by 
a  lower  degree  of  evidence,  when  discerned*  as  it 
is  in  the  understanding  not  to  discern  it.  The 
lower  degrees  of  evidence  will  be  discerned  or 
overlooked,  according  to  the  fairness  and  honesty 
of  men,  as  in  speculative  matters,,  according  to 
their  capacity  of  understanding. 

3dly.  The  speculative  difficulties  ki  which  the 
evidence  of  religion  is  involved,  are  no  more  a  just 
ground  of  complaint  than  external  circumstances  of 
temptation,  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it, 
after  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth.  (And  there  is  no 
ground  for  objection  here,  for  temptations  render  our 
state  a  more  improving  state  of  discipline,  by  giving 
occasion  to  a  more  attentive  and  continued  exercise 

Q 


132  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY          [PART  II. 

of  the  virtuous  principle.)  Now,  it  will  appear, 
that  the  same  account  may  be  given  of  the  doubtful 
evidence  of  religion,  as  of  temptation  and  difficul- 
ties, with  regard  to  practice ;  for  they  belong  to  a 
state  of  probation.  (1st.)  As  implying  trial  and  diffi- 
culties. The  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence  affords 
opportunities  to  an  unfair  mind  of  explaining  away 
and  deceitfully  hiding  from  itself  that  evidence 
which  it  might  see,  and  of  being  flattered  with  the 
hopes  of  escaping  the  consequences  of  vice ;  though 
it  is  clearly  seen  that  these  hopes  are,  at  least,  un- 
certain, in  the  same  way  as  the  common  temptation 
to  many  instances  of  folly,  which  end  in  temporal 
infamy  and  ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope  of  not 
being  detected,  and  of  escaping  with  impunity,  i.  c.. 
the  doubtfulness  of  the  proof  beforehand  that  such 
foolish  behavior  will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin. 
The  examination  of  this  evidence  requires  an  at- 
tentive, solicitous,  and,  perhaps,  painful  exercise  of 
the  understanding.  And  there  are  circumstances 
in  men*s  situations,  in  their  temporal  capacities, 
analogous  to  those  concerning  religion.  In  so??w 
situations  the  chief  difficulty,  with  regard  to  conduct, 
is  not  the  doing  what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known, 
but  the  principal  exercise  is  recollection,  and  being 
guarded  against  deceit.  In  other  situations,  the 
principal  exercise  is  attention,  in  order  to  discover 
what  is  the  prudent  part  to  act. 

(?d.)  This,  and,  indeed,  temptation  in  general,  as 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  183 

it  calls  forth  some  virtuous  efforts  additional  to 
what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting,  can  not 
but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  improvement  of 
virtue,  nay,  may  form  the  principal  part  of  some 
persons'  trial ;  for  as  the  chief  temptations  of  the 
generality  of  the  world  are  the  ordinary  motives  to 
injustice  or  pleasure,  or  to  live  in  the  neglect  of 
religion,  from  a  frame  of  mind  almost  insensible  to 
any  thing  distant,  so  there  are  others,  without  this 
shallowness  of  temper,  of  a  deeper  sense  as  to  what 
is  invisible  and  future,  who,  from  their  natural  con- 
stitution and  external  condition,  may  have  small 
temptations  and  difficulties  in  the  common  course 
of  life.  Now,  when  these  latter  persons  have  a 
full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  religion,  its  practice  is 
to  them  almost  unavoidable ;  yet  these  persons  may 
need  Discipline  and  exercise  in  a  higher  degree 
than  they  would  have  by*  such  an  easy  practice  of 
religion. 

(3d.)  This  may  be  necessary  for  their  probation 
in  the  third  sense  of  the  word,*  for  a  farther  mani- 
festation of  their  moral  character  to  the  creation  of 
God,  than  such  a  practice  of  it  would  be. 

III.  But  all  the  preceding  reflections  suppose 
that  men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  re- 
ligion, does  not  arise  from  their  neglect  or  preju- 
dices; but  may  it  not  be  owing  to  their  own  fault  1 
Levity,  carelessness,  passion,  and  prejudice  do  hin- 
*  Vide  Chap.  IV.,  Part  I. 


184  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY          [PART  II. 

der  us  from  being  rightly  informed  with  respect  to 
common  things,  and  they  may  in  like  manner  (and 
perhaps  in  some  farther  providential  manner)  hin- 
der us  with  respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects. 
But  does  not  the  Scripture  declare  that  every  one 
shall  not  understand  ?*  Certainly.  But  it  does  not 
determine  how  this  shall  be  effected  ;  and  it  make^ 
no  difference  whether  it  be  effected  by  the  evidence 
of  Christianity  being  originally  and  with  design  so 
ordered,  as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading 
moral  obligations  should  not  see  it,  and  that  honest- 
minded  persons  should  ;t  or  whether  it  come  to 
pass  by  any  other  means.  Farther,  the  general 
proof  of  natural  religion  lies  level  to  the  meanest 
capacity ;  for  all  men,  however  employed  in  the 
world,  are  capable  of  being  convinced  that  there  is 
a  God  who  governs  the  world  ;  and  they  feel  them- 
selves to  be  of  a  moral  nature  and  accountable 
creatures.  And  as  Christianity  entirely  falls  in 

*  Daniel,  xii.,  10.  See  also  Is.,  xxix.,  13,  14  ;  Mat.,  vi.,  23. 
and  xi.,  25,  and  xiii.,  11, 12;  John,  iii.,  19,  and  v.,  44;  1  Cor., 
ii.,  14  ;  2  Cor.,  iv.,  4;  2  Tim.,  iii.,  13;  and  that  affectionate, 
as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so  very  many  times  incul- 
cated, He  that  hath  ears  to  hear  let  him  hear.  Grotius  saw 
so  plainly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and  other  passages  of 
Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say  that  the  proof  given  of 
Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been  for  this  very 
purpose.  "  Ut  ita  sermo  Evangelii  tanquam  lapis  esset  Lydins 
ad  quern  ingenia  sanabilia  explorarentur." — Butler. 

t  The  internal  evidence  of  religion  seems  chiefly  to  havo 
been  intended  as  a  means  of  moral  probation.  Vide  John, 
vii.,  17. 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  185 

with  this  natural  sense  of  things,  so  they  may  be 
persuaded  and  made  to  see  that  there  is  evidence 
of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and  many 
appearing  completions  of  prophecy.  But  though 
this  general  proof  be  liable  to  objections,  and  run 
up  into  difficulties  which  can  not  be  answered  so  as 
to  satisfy  curiosity,  yet  we  can  see  that  the  proof 
is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed  by  these 
objections.  It  is  true,  this  requires  knoivledgc,  time, 
and  attention,  and  therefore  can  not  be  the  business 
of  every  man ;  but  it  ought  to  be  considered  by 
such  as  have  picked  up  objections  from  others,  and 
take  for  granted  upon  their  authority  that  they  are 
of  weight  against  revelation,  or  by  often  retailing 
them,  fancy  they  see  that  they  are  of  weight.  In 
this,  as  in  all  other  matters,  doubtfulness,  ignorance, 
or  error  must  attend  the  neglect  of  the  necessary 
means  of  information. 

IV.  Analogy  objected  against  the  fitness  of  the 
evidence  of  Revelation.  "  If  a  prince  or  common 
master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  servant,  he 
would  take  care  that  they  should  always  bear  the 
certain  marks  of  him  from  whom  they  came,  and 
that  their  sense  should  always  be  plain  ;  so  that 
there  should  be  no  possible  doubt,  concerning  their 
authority  or  meaning." 

ANSWER.  The  proper  answer  to  all  this  kind  of 
objections  is,  that  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is 
even  certain  we  can  not  argue  thus  with  respect  to 


186  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  [PART  II. 

Him  who  is  the  Governor  of  the  World,  and  par- 
ticularly that  he  does  not  afford  us  such  information, 
with  respect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  interests. 
However,  there  is  a  full  answer  to  this  objection, 
from  the  very  nature  of  religion — for  they  are  not 
parallel  cases.  The  prince  regards  only  the  ex- 
ternal event — the  thing's  being  done  ;  religion  re- 
gards the  inward  motive — and  exercise  by  action. 
If  the  prince  regarded  the  same,  if  he  wished  to 
prove  the  understanding  or  loyalty  of  a  servant,  he 
would  not  always  give  his  orders  in  such  a  plain 
manner.  It  may  be  added,  the  Divine  Will  re- 
specting morality  and  religion  may  be  considered 
either  absolute  or  conditional ;  it  can  not  be  abso- 
lute in  any  other  way  than  that  we  should  act  vir- 
tuously in  such  given  circumstances,  and  not  by 
His  changing  of  our  circumstances ;  so  that  it  is 
still  in  our  power  to  do  or  contradict  His  will.  But 
the  whole  constitution  of  nature  affords  certain 
instances  of  its  being  conditional,  that  if  we  act  so 
or  so,  we  shall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otherwise,  pun- 
ished. 

Several  of  these  observations  may  well  seem 
strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good  men ; 
but  if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are  made, 
think  so — persons  who  object  as  above,  and  throw 
off  all  regard  to  religion  under  pretence  of  want 
of  evidence,  they  are  desired  to  consider  whether 
their  thinking  so  be  owing  to  any  thing  unintelli- 


CHAP.  VI.]  IN  REVELATION.  187 

gible  in  these  observations,  or  to  their  not  having 
sucli  a  sense  of  religion,  as  even  tlieir  state  of  skep- 
ticism does  in  all  reason  require  ?  It  ought  to  be 
forced  upon  the  reflection  of  these  persons,  that  our 
nature  and  condition  require  us,  in  the  daily  course 
of  life,  to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower  than  prob- 
able, and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when  the  proba- 
bility is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be  credible 
that  possibly  we  may  succeed  in  them. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VI. 

1.  Upon  what  supposition   is    the   weak  objection 
founded  that  »*  because  revelation  is  left  upon  doubtful 
evidence  it  can  not  be  true?"     Give  a  general  answer 
to  it. 

2.  Explain  in  like  manner  the  foundation  of  the  2d 
objection   that  **  Revelation  can  not  be  true  from  its 
want  of  universality  ;"  and  answer  it  generally. 

3.  Give  a.  particular  application  of  the  subject  to  the 
evidence  of  revealed  religion  in  different  ages,  and  the 
degrees  of  religious  light  enjoyed  by  various  parts  of 
mankind. 

4.  What  considerations  may  tend  to  reconcile  us  to 
the  apparently  unequal  dispensations  of  the  Creator  in 
regard  to  religion  ? 

5.  Admitting  revelation  to  be  uncertain  in  its  evi- 
dence, there  are  three  practical  reflections  which  will 
tend  to  remove  all  causes  of  complaint.     Name  them. 

6.  How  does  Butler  prove  that  there  is  not  a  great 
difference  between  what  might  in  reason  be  the  rule 
of  life  to  those  who  really  doubt,  and  those  who  are 
fully  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion  ? 

7.  How  does  Butler  prove  that  doubting  necessarily 
implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that  for  which  we 
doubt? 

8.  Show  that  the  same  account  may  be  given  of 
doubts  in  the  evidence  of  religion  as  of  temptation  and 
difficulties  in  practice. 

9.  Give  a  summary  of  the  argument  in  which  it  is 
explained,  that  uncertainty  in  religious  truths  may  part- 
ly arise  from  our  own  neglect. 

10.  Answer  the  apparent  analogy,  by  which  an  ob- 
jection is  raised  against  the  fitness  of  revelation  being 
left  upon  doubtful  evidence. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF    THE    PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE    FOR    CHRISTIANITY. 

The  presumptions  against  Revelation,  and  objections  against 
the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  particular  things 
relating  to  it  being  removed,  there  remains  to  be  consid- 
ered what  positive  evidence  we  have  for  its  truth ;  this  is 
considered  under  two  heads. 

I.  The  direct  and  fundamental  evidence  for  Christianity  from 
Miracles  and  Prophecy,  and  various  objections  answered. 

II.  The    direct  and  circumstantial  evidence   considered  as 
making  up  one  argument. 

WE  proceed  to  consider  what  is  the  positive  evi- 
dence for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  We  shall, 
therefore,  First,  make  some  observations  relating 
to  miracles,  and  the  appearing  completions  of  proph- 
ecy, (which  are  its  fundamental  proofs),  and  con- 
sider what  analogy  suggests  in  answer  to  the  objec- 
tions brought  against  this  evidence;  and,  Secondly, 
We  shall  endeavor  to  give  some  account  of  a  gen- 
eral argument,  consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  col- 
lateral evidence  (for  the  latter  ought  never  to  be 
urged  apart  from  the  former),  considered  as  making 
up  one  argument ;  this  being  the  kind  of  proof 


190  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

upon  which  we  determine  most  questions  of  diffi- 
culty concerning  common  facts,  alleged  to  have 
happened,  or  seeming  likely  to  happen,  especially 
questions  relating  to  conduct.  The  conviction 
arising  from  this  kind  of  proof,  may  be  compared 
to  what  they  call  the  effect  in  architecture  or  other 
works  of  art — a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things 
so  and  so  disposed  and  taken  into  one  view. 

1.  1.   The  Historical  Evidence  of  Miracles. 

The  Old  Testament  affords  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  Pro- 
phets, as  of  the  common  affairs  of  the  Jewish  na- 
tion. And  the  Gospels  and  Acts  afford  the  same 
historical  evidence  of  the  miracles  and  of  the  com- 
mon facts — because  they  are  alike  related  in  plain, 
unadorned  narratives.  Had  the  authors  of  these 
books  appeared  to  aim  at  an  entertaining  mariner 
of  writing,  the  case  would  be  different;  then  it 
might  be  said  that  the  miracles  were  introduced, 
like  poetic  descriptions  and  prodigies,  to  animate 
a  dull  relation — to  amuse  the  reader  and  engage 
his  attention. 

2.  Some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  account 
of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove  the   truth  of 
Christianity,  are  quoted  as  authentic  and  genuine 
from  the  age  in  which  they  are  said  to  be  written, 
down  to  the  present. 

3.  The  miraculous  history,  in  general,  is  confirm- 
ed— by  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  arid  Christ- 


CHAP.  VII.]   .EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  191 

ian  religions;  events  cotemporary  with  the  mira- 
cles related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both,  or 
subsequent  to  them.  These  miracles  are  a  satis- 
factory account  of  those  events,  of  which  no  other 
satisfactory  account  can  be  given,  nor  any  account 
at  all  but  what  is  merely  imaginary  and  invented. 
Mere  guess,  supposition,  and  possibility,  when  op- 
posed to  historical  evidence,  prove  nothing,  but 
that  historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative.  There 
must  be  something  positive  alleged  against  the 
proof  of  the  genuineness  and  authenticity  of  Scrip- 
ture, before  it  can  be  invalidated;  either  that  this 
evidence  may  be  confronted  by  historical  evidence 
on  the  other  side,  or  the  general  incredibility  of  the 
things  related,  or  inconsistency  in  the  general  turn 
of  history;  none  of  which  can  be  proved. 

4.  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of 
epistolary  writing,  and  moreover,  from  several  of 
them  being  written,  not  to  particular  individuals, 
but  to  Churches,  carry  in  them  evidences  of  their 
being  genuine,  beyond  what  can  be  in  a  mere  his- 
torical narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.  One 
Epistle  especially,  which  is  chiefly  referred  to  here 
(the  1st  to  the  Corinthians),  has  a  distinct  and  par- 
ticular evidence,  from  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  in  an  epistle  of  his 
own  to  that  Church.  Indeed,  the  testimony  of  St. 

Paul  is  to  be  considered  as  detached  from  that  of 

/•'• 

the  rest  of  the  Apostles,  for  the  author  declares, 


19-2  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

in  his  Epistles,  that  he  received  the  G-ospel  in  gen- 
eral, and  the  institution  of  the  Communion  in  par- 
ticular, not  from  the  rest  of  the  Apostles,  or  jointly 
together  with  them,  but  alone  and  from  Christ  him- 
self; and  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued 
with  the  power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was 
publicly  known  to  those  very  people,  in  the  man- 
ner any  one  would  speak  to  another  of  a  thing 
which  was  as  familiar,  and  as  much  known  in  com- 
mon to  them  both,  as  any  thing  in  the  world.* 
This  evidence,  joined  with  what  these  Epistles 
have  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment, does  not  leave  a  particular  pretence  for  de- 
nying their  genuineness :  for,  as  to  general  doubts 
concerning  it,  any  single  fact,  of  such  kind  and  an- 
tiquity, may  have  them,  from  the  very  nature  of 
human  affairs  and  human  testimony. 

5.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that 
Christianity  offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demand- 
ed to  be  received,  upon  the  allegation  of  miracles, 
publicly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it,  in  such 
an  age,  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great 
numbers  in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed 
belief  of  the  reality  of  these  miracles.  Now  all 
this  is  peculiar  to  the  Jewish  and  Christian  dispen- 
sations. Mohammedism  was  not  introduced  on  the 

*  Vide  Rom.,  xv.,  19  ;  1  Cor.,  xii.,  8,  9,  10—28,  &c.,  and 
liii.,  1,  2,  8,  and  the  whole  of  xiv. ;  2  Cor.,  xii.,  12,  13 ;  Gal., 
iii.,  25. 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  193 

ground  of  miracles,  i.  e.,  public  ones,  for  as  revela- 
tion itself  is  miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  must  nec- 
essarily imply  some  pretence  to  miracles.*  Partic- 
ular institutions  in  Paganism  or  Popery,  confirmed 
by  miracles  after  they  were  established,  or  even 
supposed  to  be  introduced  and  believed  on  the 
ground  of  miracles,  are  not  parallel  instances,  for 
single  things  of  this  kind  are  easily  accounted  for, 
after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in  their 
hands — when  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  venera- 
tion with  the  multitude,  and  political  interests  are 
blended  with  religious  claims  and  religious  distinc- 
tions. But  even  if  this  be  not  admitted  to  be  pe- 
culiar to  Christianity,  the  fact  is  admitted  that  it  was 
professed  to  be  believed  on  the  evidence  of  mira- 
cles. Now,  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
such  numbers  of  men,  in  the  most  distant  parts  of 
the  world  should  forsake  the  religion  of  their  coun- 
try, and  embrace  another  which  could  not  but  ex- 
pose them  to  much  self-denial,  and,  indeed,  must 
have  been  a  giving  up  of  the  world  in  a  great  de- 
gree, unless  they  were  really  convinced  of  the  truth 
of  these  miracles,  as  they  professed,  when  they  be- 
came Christians,  and  this  their  testimony  is  the 

*  This  was  all  that  Mohammed  pretended  to.  "  The  Ko- 
ran itself  is  a  miracle."  So  far  was  he  from  claiming  to  him- 
selt  the  working  of  public  miracles,  that  he  declared  he  did 
not  work  them,  since  those  wrought  by  others,  the  Prophets, 
Apostles,  and  Jesus  Christ,  failed  to  bring  conviction  with 
them! — Vide  Sale's  Koran,  passim. 

R 


194  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

same  kind  of  evidence  for  those  miracles  as  if  they 
had  written  it,  and  their  writings  had  come  down 
to  us.  And  it  is  real  evidence,  because  it  is  of 
facts  of  which  they  had  capacity  and  full  opportu- 
nity to  inform  themselves.  It  is  also  distinct  from 
the  direct  historical  evidence,  though  of  the  same 
kind ;  for  the  general  belief  of  any  fact  at  the  time 
in  which  it  is  said  to  have  happened,  is  distinct 
from  the  express  testimony  of  the  historian.  We 
admit  the  credulity  of  mankind  ;  but  we  should 
not  forget  their  suspicions,  and  backwardness  even 
to  believe,  and  greater  still  to  practice,  what  makes 
against  their  interest.  So  that  the  conversion  of 
many  to  Christianity,  when  education,  prejudice  and 
authority  were  against  it,  is  an  undoubted  pre- 
sumption of  its  Divine  origin.  It  lies  with  unbe- 
lievers to  show  why  such  evidence  as  all  this 
amounts  to,  is  not  to  be  credited.*  Accordingly, 
there  is 

OBJECTED.  1st.  "  Numberless  enthusiastic  peo- 
ple, in  different  ages  and  countries  expose  them- 

*  If  it  be  objected  that  it  is  rather  slender  ground  upon 
which  to  stand,  merely  that  we  cannot  prove  the  contrary,  or 
the  falsehood  of  the  thing,  we  may  answer,  that  it  is  not  in- 
tended to  be  ground  to  rest  on ;  it  is  intended  to  set  us  in 
motion;  and  the  evidence  will  grow  in  proportion  to  the 
earnestness  and  sincerity  to  ascertain  the  point.  Now,  is  there 
not  a  moral  fitness  in  this,  that  evidence  should  be  progress- 
ive, and  that  in  proportion  to  the  singleness  of  eye  and  tho 
diligence  with  which  it  is  sought  and  investigated  1 —  Wolfe's 
Remains. 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  195 

selves  to  the  same  difficulties  which  the  primitive 
Christians  did,  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives 
for  the  most  idle  follies  imaginable." 

ANSWER.  Though  testimony  is  no  proof  of  en- 
thusiastic opinions,  or  of  any  opinions  at  all,  yet  (as 
is  allowed  in  all  other  cases)  it  is  a  proof  of  facts. 
The  Apostles*  sufferings  proved  their  belief  of  the 
facts ;  and  their  belief  proved  the  facts,  for  they 
were  such  as  came  under  the  observation  of  their 
senses. 

2d  OBJECTION.  "  But  enthusiasm  greatly  weakens, 
if  it  does  not  totally  and  absolutely  destroy,  the  ev- 
idence of  testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relat- 
ing to  religion. 

ANSWER.  If  great  numbers  of  men,  not  appear- 
ing in  any  peculiar  degree  weak  or  negligent,  af- 
firm that  they  saw  and  heard  such  things  plainly 
with  their  eyes  and  ears,  and  are  admitted  to  be 
in  earnest,  such  testimony  is  evidence  of  the  strong- 
est kind  we  can  have  for  any  matter  of  fact.  Such 
an  account  of  their  testimony  must  be  admitted,  in 
place  of  that  far-fetched,  indirect,  and  wonderful 
one  of  enthusiasm,  until  some  incredibility  can  be 
shown  in  the  things  thus  attested,  or  contrary  testi- 
mony produced.  The  very  mention  of  enthusiasm 
goes  upon  this  previous  supposition,  which  must  be 
proved  before  such  a  charge  need  be  answered  ; 
but  as  the  contrary  has  been  proved,  an  answer  to 
it  is  much  less  required.  However,  as  religion  is 


196  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

supposed  to  be  peculiarly  liable  to  enthusiasm,  we 
will  consider  what  analogy  suggests.  Nameless 
and  numberless  prejudices,  romance,  affectation, 
humor,  a  desire  to  engage  attention  or  to  surprise, 
party  spirit,  custom,  little  competition,  unaccount- 
able likings  and  dislikings,  are  to  be  considered  as 
influences  of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm,  because 
they  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected  upon  by 
the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by  them. 
These  influence  men  strongly  in  common  matters, 
yet  human  testimony  in  these  matters  is  naturally 
and  justly  believed  notwithstanding. 

3d  OBJECTION.  "  But  the  primitive  Christians 
might  still,  in  part,  be  deceived  themselves,  and,  in 
part,  designedly  impose  upon  others,  which  is 
rendered  very  credible  from  that  mixture  of  real 
enthusiasm  and  real  knavery  to  be  met  with  in  the 
same  characters/' 

ANSWER.  It  is  a  fact  that,  though  endued  with 
reason  to  distinguish  truth  from  falsehood,  and  also 
with  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say,  men  are  all 
liable  to  be  deceived  by  prejudice ;  and  there  are 
persons  who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any  foundation  at  all, 
but  yet  would  propagate  it  after  it  is  once  invented, 
with  heightened  circumstances.  And  others,  though 
they  would  not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which  is  a  low- 
er degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without  con- 
tradiction. This  is  analogical  to  the  ground  of  the 


CHAP.  VII  ]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  197 

objection ;  yet,  notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testi- 
mony remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  assent,  and 
this  assent  a  natural  principle  of  action. 

4th  OBJECTION.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  mankind 
have,  in  different  ages,  been  strangely  deluded  with 
pretences  to  miracles  and  wonders." 

ANSWER.  They  have  been,  by  no  means,  of- 
tener,  nor  are  they  more  liable  to  be,  deceived  by 
these  pretences  than  by  others.* 

5th  OBJECTION.  But  there  is  a  very  considerable 
degree  of  historical  evidence  for  miracles  acknowl- 
edged to  be  fabulous." 

ANSWER.  Is  there  the  like  evidence  ]  By  no 
means.t  But,  even  admitting  that  there  were,  the 
consequence  would  not  be  that  the  evidence  of  the 
latter  is  not  to  be  admitted  ;  for  what  would  such 
a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evi- 
dence confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any  way 
overbalanced,  destroys  the  credibility  of  other  evi- 
dence neither  confuted  nor  overbalanced  ]  If  two 
men,  of  equally  good  reputation,  had  given  evi- 

*  Counterfeit  coin  supposes  that  there  is  such  a  thing  in  the 
world  as  good  money,  and  no  one  would  pretend  outwardly 
to  be  virtuous,  unless  some  were  really  so.  In  the  same  man- 
ner, false  miracles  suppose  the  existence  of  real  ones ;  and 
the  cheats  that  have  been  imposed  upon  the  world,  far  from 
furnishing  us  with  reasons  to  reject  all  miracles  in  general, 
are,  on  the  contrary,  a  strong  proof  that  some,  of  which  they 
are  imitations,  have  been  genuine. — Douglas  on  Miracles. 

t  Vide  Paley's  Evidences,  Part  2,  where  this  point  is  satis- 
factorily proved. 


198  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II 

clence  in  different  cases  no  way  connected,  and  one 
of  them  had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  would  this 
confute  the  testimony  of  the  other  ? 

In  addition  to  all  these  answers,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, it  can  never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  di- 
rect historical  evidence,  indolently  to  say,  that  there 
are  so  many  principles  from  whence  men  are  liable 
to  be  deceived  themselves,  and  disposed  to  deceive 
others,  especially  in  matters  of  religion,  that  one 
knows  not  what  to  believe.  It,  indeed,  weakens  the 
evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases,  and  it  will  ap- 
pear to  do  so  in  different  degrees  according  to 
men's  experience  or  notions  of  hypocrisy  or  enthu- 
siasm ;  but  nothing  can  destroy  the  evidence  of  testi- 
mony in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or  probability  that 
persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to 
which  they  give  testimony,  or  that  they  are  actu- 
ally under  some  indirect  influence  in  giving  it,  in 
such  particular  case.  Till  this  be  made  out,  the 
natural  laws  of  human  actions  require  that  testi- 
mony be  admitted.  Now,  the  first  and  most  ob- 
vious presumption  is,  that  they  could  not  be  de- 
ceived themselves,  nor  would  deceive  others  ;  for 
the  importance  of  Christianity  must  have  engaged 
the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to  have  ren- 
dered them  less  liable  to  be  deceived  from  care- 
lessness, than  they  would  in  common  matters;  and 
the  strong  obligations  to  veracity  which  their  reli- 
gion laid  them  under  made  them  less  liable  to  do- 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  199 

ceive  others.  The  external  evidence  for  Christi- 
anity, unbelievers,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of  the 
matter,  must  admit;  that  is,  as  persons  in  many 
cases  own  they  see  strong  evidence  from  testimony 
for  the  truth  of  things  which  yet  they  can  not  be 
convinced  are  true — supposing  that  there  is  con- 
trary testimony,  or  that  the  things  are  incredible. 
But  there  is  no  testimony  contrary  to  that  which 
we  have  been  considering ;  and  it  has  been  fully 
proved  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  Christianity 
in  general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

I.  2d.  The  evidence  of  Christianity  from  Proph- 
ecy. The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one 
part  of  a  prophecy,  whether  it  arise  from  the  nature 
of  prophecy  or  from  want  of  learning  or  of  oppor- 
tunities of  inquiry,  or  from  the  deficiencies  in  civil 
history,  and  the  different  accounts  of  historians, 
does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the  proof  of 
foresight  arising  from  the  clear  fulfillment  of  those 
parts  which  are  understood.  For  the  case  is  evi- 
dently the  same  as  if  those  parts  which  are  not  un- 
derstood were  lost,  or  not  written  at  all,  or  written 
in  an  unknown  tongue.  Suppose  a  writing  partly 
in  cipher  and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length,  and 
that  in  the  part  understood  there  appeared  mention 
of  several  knowrn  facts  ;  it  would  never  come  into 
any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that,  if  he  under- 
stood the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find  that  those 
facts  were  not  in  reality  known  by  the  writer. 


200  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

The  fulfillment  of  the  facts  known  is  extensive 
enough  to  prove  foresight  more  than  human. 

1st  OBJECTION.  "Considering  each  prophecy 
distinctly,  it  does  not  at  all  appear  that  the  prophe- 
cies were  intended  of  those  particular  events  to 
which  they  are  applied  by  Christians ;  and,  there- 
fore, if  they  mean  any  thing,  they  are  intended 
of  other  events  unknown  to  us,  and  not  of  these  at 
all." 

ANSWER.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  appli- 
cable to  such  and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof  that 
it  referred  to  them.  This  appears  from  analogy  ; 
for  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing  which  bear  a 
great  resemblance  to  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the 
matter  before  us — the  mythological,  and  satirical 
where  the  satire  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  concealed. 
In  the  former  kind,  a  man  might  be  assured  that 
he  understood  what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable 
or  parable,  related  without  any  application  or 
moral,  merely  from  seeing  it  to  be  easily  capable 
of  such  application,  and  that  such  a  moral  might 
naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And,  in  a  satirical 
writing,  he  might  be  fully  assured  that  such  per- 
sons and  events  were  intended,  merely  from  its 
being  applicable  to  them  ;  and  his  satisfaction  that 
he  understood  the  intended  meaning  of  these  writ- 
ings would  be  greater  or  less,  in  proportion  as  he 
saw  the  general  turn  of  them  and  the  number  of 
particular  things  to  be  capable  of  such  application. 


CHAP.  VIL]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  201 

In  the  same  way,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is 
applicable  to  the  present  state  of  the  Church,  arid 
to  the  political  situations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the 
world,  some  thousand  years  after  these  prophecies 
were  delivered ;  and  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy, 
delivered  before  the  coming  of  Christ,  is  applica- 
ble to  Him,  these  things  are  in  themselves  a  proof 
that  the  prophetic  history  was  intended  of  Him, 
and  of  those  events,  in  proportion  as  the  general 
turn  of  it,  and  the  number  and  variety  of  particular 
prophecies  are  capable  of  such  application.  And 
although  the  appearing  fulfillment  of  prophecy  is 
to  be  allowed  to  determine  its  meaning,  it  may  be 
added  that  prophecies  have  been  determined  be- 
forehand, as  they  have  been  fulfilled.  The  prophe- 
cies of  a  Messiah  were  applied  to  Him,  by  the 
Jews,  before  the  coming  of  Christ ;  and  those  con- 
cerning the  state  of  the  Church  in  the  last  ages, 
were  applied  to  it  by  the  primitive  Christians,  as 
the  event  seems  to  verify. 

Farther,  even  if  it  could  be  shown,  to  a  high  de- 
gree of  probability,  that  the  Prophets  thought  of 
events  different  from  those  which  Christians  allege 
to  be  the  completion  of  their  predictions  ;  or  that 
their  prophecies  are  capable  of  being  applied  to 
other  events  than  what  Christians  apply  them  to ; 
yet  to  say  that  the  Scriptures,  and  the  things  con- 
tained in  them,  can  have  no  other  or  farther  mean- 
ing than  those  persons  thought  or  had,  who  first 


202  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART  II. 

recited  or  wrote  them,  is  evidently  saying  that  those 
persons  were  the  original,  proper,  and  sole  authors 
of  these  books,  and  not  the  amanuenses  of  the  Holy 
Ghost;  which  is  absurd,  while  the  authority  of 
these  books  is  under  consideration — it  is  begging 
the  question.  If  we  knew  the  whole  meaning  of 
the  compiler  of  a  book,  taken  from  memoirs,  for 
instance,  we  would  not  suppose  that  we  knew,  from 
this,  the  whole  meaning  of  the  author  of  the  me- 
moirs. So  that  the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of 
prophecy  has  been  fulfilled,  in  any  real  sense  of  the 
words  :  for  such  completion  is  equally  a  proof  of 
foresight,  more  than  human,  whether  the  Prophets 
are  or  are  not  supposed  to  have  understood  it  in  a 
different  sense.  For,  though  it  is  clear  that  tho 
Prophets  did  not  understand  the  full  meaning  of 
their  predictions,  it  is  another  question  how  far  they 
thought  they  did,  and  in  what  sense  they  understood 
them.  So  that  it  is  useless  to  show  that  prophecy 
is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age  in  which  it  was 
written,  or  of  ages  before  it.  To  have  proved  this, 
before  the  completion,  might,  indeed,  have  answered 
some  purpose ;  for  it  might  have  prevented  the  ex- 
pectation of  any  such  farther  completion.  For  ex- 
ample, if  Porphyry  could  have  shown  that  some 
principal  parts  of  the  book  of  Daniel,  for  instance 
the  7th  verse  of  the  7th  chapter,  which  the  Christ- 
ians interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was  applicable 
to  events  which  happened  before,  or  about,  the  age 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  203 

of  Antiochus  Epiphanes,*  this  might  have  prevented 
them  from  expecting  any  farther  completion  of  it. 
But  even  if  he  could  prove  his  assertion — which  by 
no  means  appears — these  remarks  show  it  to  be  of 
no  consequence :  and  they  are  remarks  which  must 
be  acknowledged,  by  those  of  a  fair  mind,  to  be 
just,  and  the  evidence  referred  to  in  them  real. 
But  it  is  much  more  easy,  and  more  falls  in  with 
the  negligence,  presumption,  and  willfulness  of  the 
generality,  to  determine  at  once,  with  a  decisive  air 
— there  is  nothing  in  them. 

II.  We  shall  now  endeavor  to  give  some  account 
of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christ- 
ianity; consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  circum- 
stantial evidence,  considered  as  making  up  one  ar- 
gument, for  three  reasons — 1st,  this  is  the  kind  of 
evidence  upon  which  most  questions  of  difficulty, 
in  common  practice,  are  determined — evidence 
arising  from  various  coincidences,  which  support 
and  confirm  each  other;  2d,  this  seems  to  be  of 
the  greatest  importance,  and  not  duly  attended  to 

*  It  appears  that  Porphyry  did  nothing,  worth  mentioning, 
in  this  way.  For  Jerome,  on  the  passage,  says :  "  Duas  pos- 
teriores  bestias  in  uno  Macedonian  regno  ponit."  And  as  to 
the  ten  kings,  "  Decem  reges  enumerat,  qui  fuerunt  ssevissi- 
mi :  ipsosque  reges  non  unius  ponit  regni,  verbi  gratia,  Mace- 
(Ionise,  Syrire,  Asiae,  et  Egypti,  sed  de  diversis  regnis  unum 
efficit  regum  ordinem."  And  in  this  way  of  interpretation 
any  thing  may  be  made  of  any  thing. —  Vide  Newton  on  the 
Prophecies,  and  Bishop  Chandler's  Vindication  of  Christi- 
anity. 


204  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

by  every  one ;  3d,  the  matters  of  fact  here  enu- 
merated, being  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  the 
weight  of  the  whole,  collectively,  must  be  ackowl- 
edged  to  be  very  important. 

(1.)  Revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may 
be  considered  as  wholly  historical — for  prophecy  is 
nothing  but  anticipated  history — and  doctrines  and 
precepts  are  matters  of  fact.  The  general  design  of 
Scripture,  containing  this  revelation,  thus  consider- 
ed as  historical,  may  be  said  to  be,  to  give  us  an 
account  of  the  world  in  one  single  view  as  GOD'S 
WORLD  ;  by  which  it  appears  distinguished  from 
all  other  books.  It  begins  with  an  account  of 
God's  creation  of  the  world,  in  order  to  ascertain 
by  what  He  has  done,  the  object  of  our  worship, 
distinct  from  idols,  and  the  Being  of  whom  the 
whole  volume  treats.  St.  John,  perhaps  in  allusion 
to  this,  begins  his  gospel  with  an  account  of  Him 
by  whom  God  created  all  things.  It  contains  an 
abridgment  of  the  history  of  the  world,  in  the  view 
just  mentioned,  from  the  first  transgression,  during 
the  continuance  of  its  apostacy  from  God,  till  the 
times  of  the  restitution  of  all  things  ;*  giving  a  gen- 
eral account  of  the  governments  by  which  religion 
is,  has  been,  or  shall  be  affected.  On  this  it  may 
be  remarked,  that  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the 
evidence  for  revelation,  in  place  of  implying  a  posi- 

*  Acts,  iii.,  21.  Vide,  also  Rev.,  x.,  7;  Dan.,  ii.,  44,  vii., 
22;  Rev.,  xxii.,  5;  Dan.,  vii.,  27. 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  205 

tive  argument  tliat  it  is  NOT  true,  implies  a  positive 
argument  tliat  it  is  TRUE  :  for,  if  any  common  re- 
lation of  such  antiquity r,  such  extent,  and  variety 
could  be  proposed  to  the  examination  of  the  world, 
and  if  it  could  riot  be  confuted  in  any  age  of  knowl- 
edge and  liberty,  to  the  satisfaction  of  reasonable 
men,  this  would  be  thought  a  strong  presumptive 
proof  of  its  truth  ;  strong  in  proportion  to  the  prob- 
ability that  if  it  were  false,  it  might  have  been 
shown  to  be  so.  Now  Christianity  is  not  said,  by 
any,  to  have  been  thus  confuted.  Farther,  the  Old 
Testament,  together  with  the  moral  system  of  the 
world,  contains  a  chronological  account  of  the  be- 
ginning of  it;  and,  .from  thence,  an  unbroken  gen- 
ealogy of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common 
history  begins.  It  contains  an  account  of  God's 
making  a  covenant  with  a  particular  nation — His 
government  of  them — His  threatenings  "  that  he 
would  scatter  them  among  all  people,  from  one 
end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other" — and  His  promise 
"  that  he  would  bring  again  the  captivity  of  His 
people  Israel,  and  plant  them  upon  their  land — and 
they  should  be  no  more  pulled  up  out  of  the  land."* 
It  foretells  that  God  would  raise  them  up  a  partic- 
ular person — the  Messiah — in  whom  all  His  prom- 
ises should  be  finally  fulfilled ;  and  consequently 
(as  profane,  as  well  as  sacred,  history  informs  us), 

*   Vide  Deut.,  xxx.,  2,  3;  Is.,  xlv.,  17,  lx.,  21;  Jer.,  xxx., 
11,  xlvi.,  28 ;  Amos,  ix.,  15  ;  Jer.  xxxi.,  36. 

s 


206  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

there  was  a  general  expectation  of  his  appearing 
at  such  a  particular  time,  before  any  one  appeared 
claiming  to  be  that  person.  It  foretells  also,  that 
he  should  be  rejected  by  those  to  whom  he  was  so 
long  promised,*  and  that  he  should  be  the  Saviour 
of  the  Gentiles. t  The  Scripture  farther  informs  us, 
that  at  the  time  the  Messiah  was  expected,  a  per- 
son arose  in  this  nation  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah, 
to  whom  all  the  prophecies  referred.  He  continued 
some  years  working  miracles,  and  endued  his  dis- 
ciples with  a  power  of  doing  the  same,  to  be  a 
proof  of  the  truth  of  that  religion  which  He  commis- 
sioned them  to  publish;  that  they,  accordingly,  made 
numerous  converts,  and  established  His  religion  in 
the  world ;  to  the  end  of  which  the  Scripture  pro- 
fesses to  give  a  prophetic  account  of  the  state  of 
this  religion  among  mankind. 

(2.)  Suppose  now  a  person,  quite  ignorant  of  his- 
tory, to  remark  these  things  in  Scripture,  without 
knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  fiction  ;  then 
to  be  informed  of  the  following  confessed  facts : 
that  the  profession  and  establishment  of  natural  re- 
ligion is  greatly  owing  to  this  book,  and  the  sup- 

*  Vide  Is.,  viii.,  14,  15,  xlix.,  5,  xliii.;  Mai.,  i.,  10,  11, 
rind  iii. 

t  Is.,  xlix.,  6,  ii.,  xi.,  Ivi.,  7  ;  Mai.,  i.,  11.  To  which  must 
be  added  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several  in  thf 
New  Testament,  and  very  many  in  the  Old,  which  describe 
what  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  revealed  plan  of  Provi- 
dence. 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  207 

posed  revelation  which  it  contains,*  even  in  those 
countries  which  do  not  acknowledge  the  proper 
authority  of  Scripture  ;  yet  that  it  is  acknowledged 
by  many  nations — that  religion  is  highly  import- 
ant (all  this,  considered  together,  would  make 
the  appearing  and  receiving  of  this  book  seem  the 
most  important  event  in  the  history  of  mankind,  and 
would  claim  for  it,  as  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  a 
serious  examination) ;  that  the  first  parts  of  Scrip- 
ture are  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earliest  antiq- 
uity ;  that  its  chronology,  and  common  history,  are 
entirely  credible,  being  confirmed  by  the  natural 
and  civil  history  of  the  world,  collected  from  com- 
mon historians,  from  the  state  of  the  earth,  and 
from  the  late  inventions  of  arts  and  sciences  ;  that 
there  appears  nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age, 
not  conformablet  to  the  manners  of  that  age  ;  that 
there  are  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  REAL 

*  But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the 
establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to 
Scripture-revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  reli- 
gion from  reason,  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid? s  Ele- 
ments is  destroyed  by  a  man's  knowing,  or  thinking,  that  he 
should  never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  propositions 
contained  in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come  into  his 
thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. —  Butler. 

t  There  are  several  objections  to  passages  of  Scripture,  oc- 
casioned by  not  considering  them  in  reference  to  the  man- 
ners of  the  times.  Thus  it  appears  that  the  things  objected 
to,  like  many  others  that  are  censured  in  Christianity,  and  iu 
Scripture,  are,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  actual  proofs  of 
their  truth  and  authenticity. 


203  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II 

characters  ;  that  the  miracles  are  interwoven  with 
the  common  history — which,  therefore,  gives  some 
credibility  to  them — that  the  Jews,  of  whom  it 
chiefly  treats,  are  acknowledged  to  have  been  an 
ancient  nation,  and  divided  from  all  others ;  that 
they  preserved  natural  religion  among  them,  which 
can  not  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world — (which  again 
adds  a  credibility  to  the  miracles,  for  they  alone  can 
satisfactorily  account  for  this  event) ;  that  as  there 
was  a  national  expectation  among  them,*  raised 
from  the  prophecies  of  a  Messiah  to  appear  at  such 
a  time,  so  one  at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be 
that  Messiah  ;  that  he  was  rejected  by  this  nation 
(as  seemed  to  be  foretold),  but  received  by  the 
Gentiles,  yet  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy, 
but  of  miracles  ;  that  the  religion  he  taught  sup- 
ported itself  under  the  greatest  difficulties,  gained 
ground,  and  at  length  became  the  religion  of  the 
world;  that,  in  the  mean  time,  the  Jewish  polity 
was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed 

*  Vide  Bishop  Chandler's  Vindication  of  Christianity,  where 
it  is  fully  proved  that  this  expectation  was  general  among 
the  Jews  and  Samaritans.  The  effects  of  it  may  be  judged 
from  its  extension  among  the  Gentiles.  To  say  nothing  of 
the  Arabians  and  of  the  appearing  of  the  star  to  the  Magi — 
Suetonius  informs  us  (Vespasian,  cap.  iv.,  8),  "  Percrebuerat 
oriente  toto  vetus  et  constans  opinio,  esse  in  fatis,  ut  eo  tern- 
pore  JudaeA  profecti  rerum  potirentur."  And  Tacitus,  in  his 
history  (lib.  v.,  cap.  9),  testifies,  that  "  Pluribus  persuasio 
inerat,  antiquis  sacerdotum  literis  contineri,  eo  ipso  tempore 
fore,  valesceret  oriens,  proefectique  Judaed  rerum  potirentur." 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  209 

over  the  face  of  the  earth ;  that,  notwithstanding 
this,  they  have  remained  a  distinct  numerous  people 
for  so  many  centuries,  even  to  this  day  ;  which, 
not  only  appears  to  be  the  express  completion  of 
several  prophecies  concerning  them,  but  also  ren- 
ders it,  as  one  may  say,  a  visible  and  easy  possi- 
bility that  the  promises  made  to  them,  as  a  nation, 
may  yet  be  fulfilled  ;  that  there  are  obvious  ap- 
pearances of  the  state  of  the  world  in  other  respects, 
besides  what  relates  to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Chris- 
tian Church  having  so  long  answered,  and  still  an- 
swering to  the  prophetic  history.  Let  him  view 
these  acknowledged  facts  in  connection  with  what 
has  been  before  collected  from  Scripture,  and  the 
weight  must  appear  very  considerable  to  any  rea- 
sonable mind. 

OBJECTIONS  PRECLUDED  :  All  these  things,  and 
the  several  particulars  contained  under  them,  re- 
quire to  be  distinctly  and  most  thoroughly  exam- 
ined. This  has  not  been  attempted  here.  How- 
ever, the  things  advanced,  must  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers  ;  for  though  they  may  say  that  the 
historical  evidence  of  miracles,  wrought  in  attesta- 
tion of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince 
them  that  such  miracles  were  really  wrought,  they 
can  not  deny  that  there  is  such  historical  evidence, 
it  being  a  known  matter  of  fact  that  there  is.  They 
object  to  the  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in 
the  Jews  remaining  a  distinct  people  in  their  dis- 


210  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     [PART.  II. 

persion,  accounting  for  this  fact  by  their  religion 
forbidding  them  intermarriages  with  those  of  any 
other,  and  presciibing  them  a  great  many  peculiar- 
ities in  their  food,  which  prevent  them  being  incor- 
porated with  any  other  people.  But  an  event,  con- 
sidered apart  from  all  coincidence,  may  not  appear 
miraculous,  yet  the  coincidence  with  prophecy  may 
be  so,  though  the  event  itself  be  supposed  not. 
Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's  being 
born  at  Bethlehem,  with  a  long  series  of  prophecy 
and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous, 
though  the  event  itself — his  birth  at  that  place,  ap- 
pears to  have  been  brought  about  in  a  natural 
way,  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain. 
Men  may  say,  the  conformity  betwen  the  prophe- 
cies and  events  is  by  accident ;  but  there  are  many 
instances  in  which  such  conformity  itself  can  not 
be  denied.  They  may  say,  with  regard  to  such 
kind  of  collateral  things  as  those  above  mentioned, 
that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without  meaning, 
will  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful  peo- 
ple. Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus,  but  no  one  who 
is  serious  can  possibly  think  these  things  to  be 
nothing,  if  he  considers  the  importance  of  collateral 
things,  and  even  of  lesser  circumstances,  in  the  ev- 
idence of  probability,  as  distinguished  in  nature 
from  the  evidence  of  demonstration.  This  general 
view  of  evidence  may  induce  serious  persons  to  set 
down  every  thing,  which  they  think  may  be  of  any 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  211 

real  weight  at  all  in  proof  of  it,  and  particularly 
the  many  seeming  completions  of  prophecy.  Nor 
should  I  dissuade  any  one  from  setting  down  what 
lie  thought  made  for  the  contrary  side  ;  but  let  him 
remember  that  a  mistake  on  one  side  may  be,  in 
its  consequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a 
mistake  on  the  other ;  but  is  not  this  prejudice  '? 
If  suffered  to  influence  the  judgment,*  it  is  so  in- 
deed, and,  like  other  prejudices,  it  operates  con- 
trary ways  in  different  men  ;  for  some  are  inclined 
to  believe  what  they  hope,  and  others  what  they 
fear  ;  and  it  is  manifest  unreasonableness  to  apply 
to  men's  passions  in  order  to  gain  their  assent.  But, 
in  deliberations  concerning  conduct,  there  is  noth- 
ing which  reason  more  requires  to  be  taken  into 
the  account  than  the  importance  of  it.  But  the 
truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of  common  facts, 
is  to  be  judged  by  all  the  evidence  taken  together. 
And,  unless  the  whole  series  of  things  which  may 
be  alleged  in  this  argument,  and  every  particular 

*  Thus,  though  it  is  indeed  absurd  to  talk  of  the  greater 
merit  of  assent  upon  little  or  no  evidence  than  upon  demon- 
stration, yet  the  strict  discharge  of  our  duty  with  less  sensible 
evidence,  does  imply  in  it  a  better  character  than  the  same 
diligence  in  the  discharge  of  it  upon  more  sensible  evidence. 
This  fully  accounts  for,  and  explains,  that  assertion  of  our 
Saviour — "  Blessed  are  they  that  have  not  seen  and  yet  have 
believed" — have  become  Christians,  and  obeyed  the  Gospel, 
upon  less  sensible  evidence  than  that  which  Thomas,  to 
whom  he  is  speaking,  insisted  upon. — Butler's  Sermon  on  the 
Ignorance  of  Man. 


212  EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      [PART  II. 

thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  supposed  to  have 
been  by  accident  (for  here  the  stress  of  the  argu- 
ment for  Christianity  lies),  then  is  the  truth  of  it 
proved  ;  in  like  manner  as,  if  in  any  common  case, 
numerous  events  acknowleged  were  to  be  alleged 
in  proof  of  any  other  event  disputed,  the  truth  of 
this  event  would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one  of 
the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly  imply 
it,  but  though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the 
whole  of  the  acknowledged  events  taken  together 
could  not,  in  reason,  be  supposed  to  have  happen- 
ed, unless  the  disputed  ones  were  true.* 


*  The  evidences  of  religion  being  so  exceedingly  dissimi- 
lar are  highly  characteristic  of  its  truth.  If  man's  contriv- 
ance, or  if  the  favor  of  accidents,  could  have  given  to  Christ- 
ianity any  of  its  apparent  testimonies — either  its  miracles  or 
its  prophecy,  its  morals  or  its  propagation,  or,  if  I  may  so 
speak,  its  Founder — there  could  be  no  room  to  believe,  nor 
even  to  imagine,  that  all  these  appearances  of  great  credibil- 
ity could  be  united  together  by  any  such  causes.  If  a  suc- 
cessful craft  could  have  contrived  its  public  miracles,  or  so 
much  as  the  pretence  of  them,  it  required  another  reach  of 
craft  and  new  resources  to  provide  and  adapt  its  prophecies 
to  the  same  object.  Further,  it  demanded  not  only  a  differ- 
ent art,  but  a  totally  opposite  character,  to  conceive  and  pro- 
mulgate its  admirable  morals.  Again,  the  achievement  of  its 
propagation  in  defiance  of  the  powers  and  terrors  of  the 
world — but  the  hypothesis  sinks  under  its  incredibility.  For, 
each  of  these  suppositions  of  contrivance  being  arbitrary,  as 
it  certainly  is,  and  unsupported,  the  climax  of  them  is  an  ex- 
travagance ;  and  if  the  imbecility  of  art  is  foiled  in  the  hy- 
pothesis, the  combinations  of  accident  are  too  vain  to  b^ 
thought  of. — Davison  on  Prophecy. 


CHAP.  VII.]     EVIDENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  213 

It  is  obvious  how  much  advantage  the  nature 
of  this  evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack 
Christianity,  especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is 
easy  to  show,  in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  that 
such  and  such  things  are  liable  to  objection — that 
this  and  another  thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itself — 
but  impossible  to  show,  in  like  manner,  the  united 
force  of  the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VII. 

1.  In  what  does  Butler  proceed  to  consider  the  pos- 
itive evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity  ? 

2.  Give  summarily  the  five  heads  under  which  But- 
ler treats  of  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles. 

3.  Why  must  peculiar  importance  be  attached    to 
the  testimony  afforded  by  the  writings  of  St.  Paul  ? 

4.  State  the  argument  which  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  '« the  conversion  of  many  to  Christianity,  when 
education,  prejudice,  and  authority  were  against  it,  is 
an  undoubted  presumption  of  its  Divine  origin." 

5.  Answer  the  objection,  that  "  Enthusiasm  greatly 
weakens,  if  not  destroys,  the  credibility  of  evidence 
given  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to  religion." 

6.  How  may  we  answer  the  assertion  that  «« there 
is  a  considerable  degree  of  historical  evidence  for  mir- 
acles acknowledged  to  be  fabulous  ?" 

7.  What  general  answer  may  be  given  to  all  the 
foregoing  objections  against  evidences  of  religion,  taken 
from  the  liability  of  men  to  be  deceived  ? 

8.  In  stating  the  evidence  of  Christianity  derived 
from  prophecies,  how  does  Butler  excuse  the  defects 
imputed  to  them,  from  the  alleged  obscurity  of  certain 
parts  in  them  ? 

9.  Answer  the   objection,   that  "  Considering  each 
prophecy  distinctly,  it  does  not  at  all  appear  that  the 
prophecies  were  intended  for  those  particular  events 
to  which  they  are  applied  by  Christians." 

10.  Explain  why  we  may  reasonably  assert,  that 
"  It  is  useless  (for  a  person  arguing  against  the  truth 
of  prophecy)  to   show  that  prophecy  is  applicable  to 
events  of  the  age  in  which  it  was  written."     Also  give 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VII.  215 

Butler's    remarks  in   conclusion   of  this  part  of  the 
chapter. 

11.  When  considering  both  the  direct  and  circum- 
stantial evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  as  mak- 
ing up  one  argument,  in   what  light  may   Scriptural 
revelation  be  looked  upon  ?     What  is  its  general  de- 
sign ?     And  how  does  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  ev- 
idence bear  upon  the  question  of  its  genuineness? 

12.  Give    a    summary  of  the  acknowledged  facts, 
which,  in  connection  with  what  is  collected   from  the 
Old  Testament  respecting  its  ancient  chronology,  the 
history  of  Israel,  prophecies  of  Christ;  or  from  the 
New,   respecting  the  Gospel  History  or  prophecies, 
ought  to  have  great  weight  with  a  reasonable  and  im- 
partial inquirer. 

13.  Mention  some  of  the  specious  reasonings   by 
which  unbelievers  endeavor  to  evade  the  force  of  the 
above  arguments  ;  and  answer  them. 

14.  Prove  the  reasonableness  of  the  following  warn- 
ing, given  to  a  man   noting  down  every  thing  which 
seems  to  be  a  proof  against  religion,  ««  Let  him  re- 
member that  a  mistake   on  one  side   may  be,  in  its 
consequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a  mistake 
on  the  other." 

15.  Taking  it  as  an  admitted  principle,  that  the  truth 
of  our  religion,  as  of  other  common  facts,  is  to   be 
judged  by  all  the  evidence  taken  together,  show  where 
the  stress  of  the  argument  for  Christianity  lies. 

16.  Describe  the    argument   given   by  Davison,  to 
show  that  the  evidences  of  religion  being  so  exceed- 
ingly dissimilar,  are  highly  characteristic. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OF  THE  OBJECTIONS  WHICH  MAY  BE  MADE  AGAINST 
ARGUING  FROM  THE  ANALOGY  OF  NATURE  TO  RE- 
LIGION. 

I.  The  Objections  that  may  be  urged  against  arguing  from 
Analogy  to  Religion  may  be  answered,  in  general,  by  say- 
ing that  they  are  owing  to  half  views — to  indeterminate 
language,  and  the  deficiencies  and  abuse  of  words;   but 
each  objection  can  be  separately  precluded. 

II.  This  Treatise  proceeds  upon  the  principles  of  others,  and, 
therefore,  is  not  as  full  a  confirmation  of  Religion  as  it 
might  otherwise  be. 

I.  1st.  OBJECTED.  "  IT  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve 
difficulties  in  revelation  by  saying,  that  there  are 
the  same  in  natural  religion,  when  what  is  wanting 
is  to  clear  both  of  them  of  these  their  common,  as 
well  as  others  their  respective,  difficulties." 

ANSWER.  The  having  all  difficulties  cleared,  may 
be  the  same  as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  Divine 
Nature,  and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence.  As  to 
its  being  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from  natural  to  re- 
vealed religion,  it  has  always  been  allowed,  and  it 
is  often  necessary  to  argue  in  such  a  way  of  prob- 
able deduction  from  what  is  acknowledged  to  what 
is  disputed ;  and,  indeed,  the  epithet  poor  is  as 


CHAP.  VIII.]     OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     217 

properly  applicable  to  the  whole  of  human  life.  Is 
it  not  a  poor  thing,  for  instance,  that  even  the  most 
eminent  physician  should  have  so  little  knowledge 
in  the  cure  of  diseases  as  often  to  act  upon  conjec- 
ture, where  the  life  of  a  man  is  concerned  ]  Yet 
it  is  not  a  poor  thing  in  comparison  of  having  no 
skill  at  all.  Farther,  it  is  of  great  consequence  to 
show  that  objections  urged  against  revelation  are 
as  much  leveled  against  natural  religion ;  for  thus 
we  prove  that  the  objectors  are  arguing  against 
moral  Providence,  while  they  seem,  whether  in- 
tentionally or  not,  to  argue  against  revelation  ;  for 
nothing  more  has  been  taken  for  granted  in  the 
second  part  of  this  treatise  than  there  was  in  the 
first,  viz.,  the  existence  of  an  Author  of  nature ;  so 
that  Christianity  is  vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy 
to  natural  religion,  but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to 
the  constitution  of  nature. 

2d.  OBJECTED.  "It  is  a  strange  way  of  convin- 
cing men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to  show 
them  that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  their  world- 
ly pursuits." 

ANSWER.  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  con- 
sists in  such  a  determinate  course  of  life,  as  there 
is  reason  to  think  is  commanded  by  the  Author  of 
nature,  and  will,  upon  the  whole,  be  our  happiness 
under  His  government.  Now,  if  men  can  be  con- 
vinced that  they  have  the  like  reason  to  believe 
this  as  to  believe  that  care  of  their  temporal  affairs 
T 


218  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     [PART  II. 

will  be  their  advantage — this,  with  the  infinitely 
superior  interest  which  religion  proposes,  will  be 
an  argument  for  the  practice  of  it.  But  the  chief 
and  proper  force  of  the  argument,  referred  to  in 
the  objection,  lies  in  another  place ;  for  it  is  said, 
that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  such  inex- 
tricable difficulties  as  to  render  it  doubtful ;  and 
this  is  made  a  positive  argument  against  its  truth, 
since,  if  it  were  true,  it  is  said  to  be  incredible  that 
it  should  be  left  to  doubtful  evidence.  Now,  the 
observation,  that,  from  the  natural  constitution  of 
things,  we  must,  in  our  temporal  concerns,  almost 
continually,  and  in  matters  of  great  consequence, 
act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree  to  the 
evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this  argument, 
because  it  is  a  general  instance  made  up  of  nu- 
merous particular  ones  of  somewhat  in  the  conduct 
of  the  Author  of  nature  toward  us  similar  to  what 
is  said  to  be  incredible. 

3d  OBJECTION.  "  It  is  a  strange  way  of  vindi- 
cating the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  and  of  removing  objections  against  both,  to 
which  the  system  of  religion  lies  open,  to  show 
that  the  like  objections  lie  against  natural  Provi- 
dence. This  is  a  way  of  answering  objections 
against  religion  without  even  pretending  to  make 
out  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the  particular  things 
in  it  objected  against,  are  reasonable ;  especially 
when  it  is  admitted  that  analogy  is  no  answer  to 


CHAP.  VIII.]     OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.    219 

such  objections,  i.  e.,  those  against  wisdom,  justice, 
and  goodness." 

ANSWER.  The  design  of  this  treatise  is,  not  to 
vindicate  the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the 
obligations  of  men — not  to  justify  his  Providence, 
but  to  show  us  our  duty.  For,  1st,  It  is  not  ne- 
cessary to  justify  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
against  objections,  any  further  than  to  show,  that 
the  things  objected  to  may  be  consistent  with,  and 
even  instances  of  justice  and  goodness,  as  has  been 
already  shown  (Chap.  4,  Part  II.).  2d.  The  objec- 
tions are  not  endeavored  to  be  removed,  by  show- 
ing that  the  like  objections,  allowed  to  be  conclusive, 
lie  against  natural  Providence;  but  these  objec- 
tions being  shown  to  be  inconclusive,  the  credibility 
of  the  things  objected  against,  considered  as  mat- 
ters of  fact,  is  shown  from  their  conformity  to  the 
constitution  of  nature.  3d.  This  would  be  of 
weight,  even  though  these  objections  were  not 
answered.  For,  there  being  the  proof  of  religion, 
above  set  down,  and  religion  implying  several  facts 
— for  instance,  the  fact  that  God  will  hereafter  re- 
ward and  punish  men  for  their  actions — the  obser- 
vation, that  His  present  government  is  by  rewards 
and  punishments,  shows  that  future  fact  not  to  be 
incredible.  4th.  Though  objections  against  the 
reasonableness  of  the  system  of  religion,  can  not  be 
answered  without  entering  into  the  consideration 
of  its  reasonableness ;  yet  objections  against  the 


220          OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     [PART  II. 

credibility  or  truth  of  the  system  may;  because 
the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  matter  of  fact, 
and  the  probable  truth  of  facts  may  be  shown  with- 
out considering  their  reasonableness.  Nor  is  it 
necessary  to  prove  the  reasonableness  of  every 
precept  and  dispensation ;  though,  in  some  cases, 
it  is  highly  useful  to  do  so.  But  the  general  obli- 
gations of  religion  are  made  out  by  proving  the 
reasonableness  of  its  practice.  5th.  Though  anal- 
ogy be  not  an  immediate  answer  to  such  objec- 
tions, yet  it  is  an  immediate  answer  to  what  is  in- 
tended by  them,  which  is — to  show  that  the  things 
objected  against  are  incredible. 

4th.  OBJECTED.  "  When  analogical  reasoning  is 
carried  to  the  utmost  length,  it  will  yet  leave  the 
mind  in  a  very  unsatisfied  state." 

ANSWER.  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  foregoing 
treatise  is  far  from  satisfactory ;  but  so  would  any 
natural  institution  of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a 
system,  together  with  its  evidence.  Indeed,  the 
unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  evidence  on  which  we 
are  obliged  to  act,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  is 
scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do  not  throw 
away  life,  or  disregard  the  interests  of  it,  upon  ac- 
count of  this  doubtfulness.  The  evidence  of  reli- 
gion, then,  being  admitted  real,  those  who  object 
against  it,  as  not  satisfactory,  i.  e.y  as  not  being 
what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condi- 
tion of  our  being ;  for  satisfaction,  in  this  sense, 


CHAP.  VIIL]     OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.    221 

does  not  belong  to  such  a  creature  as  man.  They 
also  forget  the  very  notion  of  religion  ;  for  religion 
presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it,  a 
certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty,  just  as 
much  as  speaking  to  a  man  presupposes  that  he 
understands  the  language  in  which  you  speak,  or 
the  warning  a  man  of  danger  presupposes  in  him 
self-concern.  And,  therefore,  the  question  is,  not 
whether  the  evidence  of  religion  be  satisfactory  as 
to  the  purposes  of  curiosity,  but  whether  it  be,  in 
reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline  that  virtue 
which  it  presupposes. 

5th.  OBJECTED.  "  It  must  be  unaccountable  ig- 
norance of  mankind,  to  imagine  that  men  will  be 
prevailed  upon  to  forego  their  present  interests  and 
pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon  doubtful 
evidence/' 

ANSWER.  Religion  is  intended  for  a  trial  and  ex- 
ercise of  the  morality  of  every  person's  character 
who  is  a  subject  of  it ;  and  thus  considered,  it  has 
its  ends  upon  all  persons  to  whom  it  has  been  pro- 
posed, with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to  influ- 
ence their  practice ;  for  it  puts  them  in  a  state  of 
probation,  let  them  behave  as  they  will  in  it.  And 
the  purpose  of  this  treatise  is  to  show  how,  in 
reason,  men  ought  to  behave — not  how,  in  fact, 
they  will  behave.  But  the  objection  itself  allows 
the  things  insisted  upon  in  this  treatise  to  be  of 
some  weight ;  hence  it  is  probable  that  the  treatise 

T* 


222          OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     [PART  II. 

will  have  some  influence ;  and  this  is  the  same  rea- 
son in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  befort; 
men,  as  there  would  be  if  it  were  likely  to  have 
a  greater  influence. 

II.  Thus  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections 
arise  in  a  great  measure  from  half  views,  and  un- 
determinate  language,  but  farther,  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served, concerning  them,  that  this  treatise  has  pro- 
ceeded upon  the  principles  of  others  (i.  e.,  notwith- 
standing these  principles — even  admitting  them  to 
be  true).  Thus  we  have  argued  upon,  or  notwith- 
standing, the  principles  of  Fatalists,  which  we  do 
not  believe ;  and  there  have  been  omitted  two 
principles  of  the  utmost  importance,  namely,  the 
abstract  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness* — 
which  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  and  in  en- 
deavoring to  avoid  them,  the  form  of  expression 
sometimes  made  use  of  will  appear  strange,  to  such 
as  do  not  observe  the  reason  of  it.  Now  these  two 
abstract  principles  being  omitted,  religion  can  only 
be  considered  as  a  question  of  fact,  and  in  this  view 

*  Bishop  Butler  throughout  the  present  work  has  only  con- 
sidered the  moral  difference,  by  which  virtue  and  vice,  as 
such,  are  approved  and  disapproved.  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke, 
has  demonstrated  (vide  his  sermons  at  Boyle's  Lectures), 
that  there  are  essential  differences  in  the  qualities  of  human 
actions  established  in  nature,  and  this  natural  difference  of 
things,  prior  to  and  independent  of  all  will,  creates  a  natural 
FITNESS  in  the  agent  to  act  agreeably  to  it :  it  is  obvious  that 
the  introduction  of  this  principle  would  materially  confirm 
Bishop  Butler's  arguments. 


CHAP.  VIII.]     OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.    223 

it  is  here  considered,  since  Christianity,  and  its 
proof,  are  historical;  and  since  also,  natural  reli- 
gion is  a  matter  of  fact — as  its  general  system  is 
contained  in  the  fact,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Gov- 
ernor of  the  World.  This  may  be  considered  apart 
from  these  abstract  principles;  for  instance,  that 
the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles,  may  be  considered  apart  from  their  appear- 
ing so  to  our  minds ;  the  former  is  an  abstract 
truth — the  latter  is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  So  like- 
wise, that  there  is  in  the  nature  of  things  an  ori- 
ginal standard  of  right  and  wrong,  in  actions,  in- 
dependent upon  all  will ;  but  which  unalterably 
determines  the  will  of  God,  to  exercise  the  moral 
government  of  finally  righteous  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments— contains  an  abstract  truth  as  well  as  mat- 
ter of  fact.  But  suppose  that  the  government  of 
righteous  rewards  took  place  here — it  would  not 
be  an  abstract  truth,  but  only  a  matter  of  fact ; 
and  the  same  questions  as  are  now  raised,  might 
still  be  raised  about  liberty  and  moral  fitness ;  so 
that  this  proof  would  remain,  however  the  ques- 
tions might  be  decided.  And  thus,  God  having 
given  mankind  a  moral  faculty,  the  object  of  which 
is  actions,  which  naturally  approves  some  actions 
as  of  good  desert,  and  condemns  others  as  of  ill 
desert.  This  final  righteous  judgment  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  an  abstract  truth,  but  as  mere  a  fact 
as  if  it  took  place  here.  This  future  fact  has  not. 


224          OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     [PART  II. 

indeed,  been  proved  with  the  force  with  which  it 
might  be  proved,  by  taking  in  the  considerations 
of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ;  but  by  omitting  these, 
we  have  avoided  the  abstract  questions  concerning 
them,  which  have  been  perplexed  with  difficulties 
and  abstruse  reasonings ;  and  we  have  confined 
ourselves  to  matter  of  fact,  which  must  have  been 
admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient  skep- 
tics,, who  would  not  have  admitted  abstract  truth, 
but  pretended  to  doubt  whether  there  was  any 
such  thing  as  truth,  or  whether  we  could  depend 
upon  faculties  for  the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  case. 
Hence,  therefore,  the  force  of  this  treatise  may 
be  distinctly  observed.  To  such  as  are  convinced 
of  religion  upon  the  proof  of  the  two  last-mentioned 
principles,  it  will  be  an  additional  proof  and  con- 
firmation of  it ;  to  such  as  are  not  satisfied  with 
abstract  reasonings,  it  will  be  an  original  proof  of 
it.  Those  who  believe  will  here  find  the  scheme 
of  Christianity  cleared  of  objections,  and  its  evi- 
dence peculiarly  strengthened.  Those  who  do  not 
believe,  will  be  shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts 
to  prove  Christianity  false,  and  they  will  also  be 
shown  its  plain  undoubted  credibility  at  the  least. 
Ridicule  may  be  applied  to  show  the  argument 
from  analogy  in  a  disadvantageous  light,  but  it  is 
unquestionably  a  real  one ;  for,  religion  implying 
in  it  numerous  facts,  analogy  being  a  confirmation 
of  all  facts  to  which  it  can  be  applied ;  as  it  is  the 


CHAP.  VIII.]     OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     225 

only  proof  of  most,  so  it  can  not  but  be  admitted  by 
every  one  to  be  of  considerable  weight  on  the  side 
of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed. 

CONCLUSION.*  Deduct,  now,  what  is  to  be  de- 
ducted from  the  positive  evidence  of  religion,  upon 
account  of  any  weight  which  may  be  thought  to 
remain  in  the  objections  against  it  upon  the  most 
skeptical  principles,  and  the  practical  consequences 
will  be — 1st.  That  immorality  is  greatly  aggrava- 
ted in  persons  who  have  been  made  acquainted 
with  Christianity  :  because  the  moral  system  of  na- 
ture which  Christianity  lays  before  us,  approves 
itself  almost  intuitively  to  a  reasonable  mind,  upon 
seeing  it  proposed.  2d.  That  there  is  a  middle, 
between  a  full  satisfaction  of  the  truth  of  Christian- 
ity, and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary  ;  which  mid- 
dle state  of  mind  consists  in  a  serious,  doubting 
apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true  :  and  this  serious 
apprehension  that  Christianity  may  be  true,  lays 
persons  under  the  strictest  obligations  of  a  serious 
regard  to  it  throughout  the  whole  of  their  life.  3d. 
It  will  appear  that  blasphemy  and  profaneness, 
with  regard  to  Christianity,  are  without  excuse; 
for  there  is  no  temptation  to  it,  but  from  the  wan- 
tonness of  vanity  or  mirth.  If  this  be  a  just  ac- 
count of  things,  and  yet  men  can  continue  to  vilify  or 

*  The  summaries  prefixed  to  each  chapter  should  now  be 
read  in  continuation,  as  the  force  of  the  treatise  consists  in  the 
whole  analogy  considered  together. 


226          OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  ANALOGY.     [PART  11. 

disregard  Christianity — which  is  to  talk  and  act  as 
if  they  had  a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood — there 
is  no  reason  to  think  they  would  alter  their  behav- 
ior to  any  purpose,  though  there  were  a  demon- 
stration of  its  truth. 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VIII. 

1.  How  may  the  objections  urged  against  arguing 
from  analogy  to  religion  be  generally  answered  ? 

2.  Give  a  special  reply  to  each  of  the  following  ob- 
jections :  1st.  What  is  wanted  is,  not  to  solve  difficul- 
ties in  revelation  by  saying  that  there  are  the  same  in 
natural  religion,  but  to  clear  both  of  them  of  their 
common  as  well  as  their  respective  difficulties. 

3.  2d  Objection.  It  is  a  strange  way  of  convincing 
men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to  show  them  they 
have  as  little  reason  for  their  worldly  pursuits. 

4.  3d   Objection.  We  can  not  vindicate  the  justice 
and  goodness  of  the  Author  of  nature,  and  remove  ob- 
jections against  both,  to  which  the  system  of  nature  is 
open,  by  showing  that  the  like  objections  lie  against 
natural  Providence. 

5.  4th  Objection.  Analogical  reasoning,  carried  to 
the  utmost  extent,  does  not  fully  satisfy  the  mind. 

6.  5th  Objection.  We  can  not  imagine  that  men  will 
forego  their  present  interests  and  pleasures  from  re- 
gard to  religion  upon  doubtful  evidence. 

7.  Give  an  exposition  of  the  argument,  by  which 
Butler  distinguishes  between  abstract  truths  and  mat- 
ters of  fact  in  religion.     What  important  conclusion 
does  he  draw  from  thence  ? 


QUESTIONS— CHAPTER  VIII.  228 

8.  To  what  purpose  may  the  force  of  this  whole 
treatise  be  effectually  applied  ? 

9.  Deducting  every  thing  that  can,  upon  skeptical 
principles,  be  required  to  be  deducted  from  the  posi- 
tive evidence  of  religion,  what  practical  consequences 
can  be  drawn  from  that  which  remains  unassailable  by 
sophistry  and  cavil  ? 


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Jttfecellang 

Of  Popular  Sterling:  Literature. 
Now  in  course  of  publication,  price  fifty  cents  a  volume 

'  I.,  II.  Prof.  Whe well's  Elements  of  Morality  and  Polity 

III.  Dendy's  Philosophy  of  Mystery. 

IV.  Holmes's  Life  and  Letters  of  Mozart. 

V.  Dick's  Practical  Astronomer. 

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XIX.  Schiller's  History  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 


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's  JFamtlg 

Each  work  sold  separately,  price  by  the  set  of  173  vol 
umes,  $77  05. 

Nos.  1-3.  Milman's  History  of  the  Jews. 
4,  5.  Lockhart's  Life  of  Napoleon. 

6.  Southey's  Life  of  Nelson. 

7.  Life  of  Alexander  the  Great. 

8.  74.  Natural  History  of  Insects. 

9.  Gait's  Life  of  Byron. 

10.  Bush's  Life  of  Mohammed. 

11.  Scott's  Demonology  and  Witchcraft. 

12.  13.  Gleig's  History  of  the  Bible. 

14.  Discovery  in  the  Polar  Seas. 

15.  Croly's  Life  of  George  IV. 

16.  Discovery  in  Africa. 

17-19.  Cunningham's  Lives  of  Painters. 

20.  James's  Chivalry  and  the  Crusades. 

21,  22.  Life  of  Mary  Queen  of  Scots. 

23.  Russell's  Egypt. 

24.  Fletcher's  History  of  Poland. 

25.  Festivals,  Games,  and  Amusements.     By  Horace  Smith 

26.  Life  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton. 

27.  Russell's  History  of  Palestine. 

28.  Life  of  the  Empress  Josephine. 

29.  Court  and  Camp  of  BtJhaparte. 

30.  Lives  and  Voyages  of  Drake,  Cavendish,  and  Dampier 

31.  Pitcairn's  Island  and  the  Mutiny  of  the  Ship  Bounty. 

32.  72,  84.  Turner's  Sacred  History  of  the  World. 

33.  34.  Jameson's  Female  Sovereigns. 
35,  36.  Landers'  Travels  in  Africa. 

37.  Abercrombie  on  the  Intellectual  Powers. 
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41,  42.  Life  of  Frederic  the  Great. 
43,  44.  Sketches  of  Venice. 
45,  46.  Lives  of  the  Indians. 
47-49.  Murray's  British  India. 
50.  Brewster's  Natural  Magic. 
51,52.  Taylor's  History  of  Ireland. 

53.  Discovery  in  North  America. 

54.  Humboldt's  Travels. 

55.  56.  Euler's  Natural  Philosophy. 

57.  Mudie's  Popular  Guide  to  the  Observation  of  Nature. 

58.  Abercrombie's  Moral  Feelings. 

-  59.  Dick  on  Improvement  of  Society. 

60.  James's  History  of  Charlemagne. 

61.  Russell's  Nubia  and  Abyssinia. 

62.  63.  Russell's  Oliver  Cromwell. 

64.  Montgomery's  Lectures  on  Poetry. 

65.  Barrow's  Life  of  Peter  the  Great. 

66.  67.  Lives  of  Painters  and  Sculptors.    Vols.  IV.  and  V. 
68,  69.  Crichton's  History  of  Arabia. 

70.  Fraser's  History  of  Persia. 

71.  Combe  on  Physiology. 

72.  Sacred  History  of  the  World.    Vol.  II. 


PUBLISHED   BY   HARPER  &  BROTHERS 
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73.  Russell's  Barbary  States. 

74.  Natural  History  of  Insects.     Vol.  II. 
75,76.  PauJding's  Life  of  Washington. 

77.  Ticknor's  Philosophy  of  Living. 

78.  Physical  Condition  of  the  Earth. 

79.  Greene's  History  of  Italy. 

80.  81.  China  and  the  Chinese.     By  Davis. 
82    Circumnavigation  of  the  Globe. 

83.  Dick's  Celestial  Scenery. 

84.  Sacred  History  of  the  World.     Vol.  III. 

85.  Griscom's  Animal  Mechanism. 

86-91.  Ty tier's  Universal  History:   continued  by  Dr.  Narcs 

92,  93.  Life  of  Franklin,  &c. 

94,  95.  Pursuit  of  Knowledge  under  Difficulties. 

96,  97.  Paley's  Natural  Theology. 

98.  Natural  History  of  Birds. 

99.  Dick's  Sidereal  Heavens. 

100.  Upham  on  Imperfect  and  Disordered  Mental  Action. 

101.  102.  Murray's  British  America. 

103.  Lossing  on  the  Fine  Arts. 

104.  Natural  History  of  Quadrupeds. 

105.  Life  and  Travels  of  Mungo  Park. 

106.  Two  Years  before  the  Mast. 

107.  108.  Parry's  Three  Voyages  for  the  Discovery  of  a  Northwest  Pas 
sage. 

109,  110.  Life  of  Dr.  Johnson,  with  Selections  from  his  Writings 

111.  Bryant's  American  Poets. 

112,  113.  Halleck's  British  Poets. 
114-118.  Keightley's  History  of  England. 
119,  120.  Hale's  United  States. 

121,  122.  Irving's  Life  of  Goldsmith,  with  Selections  from  his  Writings 
123,  124.  Distinguished  Men  of  Modern  Times. 

125.  Life  of  De  Witt  Clinton. 

126,  127.  Life  of  Commodore  Perry. 

128.  Life  and  Travels  of  Bruce. 

129.  Lives  of  John  Jay  and  Alexander  Hamilton. 

130.  Brewster's  Lives  of  Galileo,  Tycho  Brahe,  and  Kepler. 

131.  History  of  Iceland,  Greenland,  and  the  Faroe  Islands. 

132.  Manners  and  Customs  of  the  Japanese. 

133.  Dwight's  History  of  Connecticut. 

134.  135.  Ruins  of  Ancient  Cities. 
136,  137.  History  of  Denmark. 

138.  Camp  on  Democracy. 

139.  Lanman's  Michigan. 

140.  Fenelon's  Lives  of  the  Ancient  Philosophers. 

141.  142.  Count  Segur's  History  of  Napoleon's  Expedition  to  Russia 
143,  144.  History  of  Philosophy. 

145.  Bucke's  Beauties,  Harmonies,  and  Sublimities  of  Nature. 

146.  Lieber's  Essays  on  Property. 

147.  White's  Natural  History  of  Selborne. 

148.  WrangelPs  Expedition  to  Siberia. 

149.  150.  Popular  Technology. 
151-153.  Italy.     By  Spaulding. 

154,  155.  Lewis  and  Clarke's  Travels. 
156.  Smith's  History  of  Education. 


VALUABLE   NEW  AND  STANDARD  WORKS 
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157.  Mesopotamia  and  Assyria. 

158.  Russell's  History  of  Polynesia. 

159.  Perilous  Adventures. 

160.  Constitutional  Jurisprudence  of  the  United  States      By  Dr.  Duei. 
161-163.  Belknap's  American  Biography. 

164.  Natural  History  of  the  Elephant. 

165.  Potter's  Hand-book  for  Readers, 

166.  Woman  in  America. 

167.  168.  Border  Wars  of  the  Revolution.     By  W.  L.  Stone. 
169    Vegetable  Substances  used  for  Food. 

170.  Michelet's  Elements  of  Modern  History  :  edited  by  Rev.  Dr.  Potle. 

171.  Bacon's  Essays,  and  Locke  on  the  Understanding. 

172.  Voyages  round  the  World. 

173.  Travels  of  Marco  Polo. 


JFanuly  Classical 

Containing  36  vols.  18mo.     Price  per  set,  $15  86. 

I,  2.  Xenophon.     Translated  by  Spelman  and  Cooper 
3,  4.  Demosthenes.     Translated  by  Leland. 

5.  Sallust.     Translated  by  Rose. 

6,  7.  Csesar.     Translated  by  Duncan. 
8-10.  Cicero.     Translated  by  Duncan. 

II,  12.  Virgil.     Translated  by  Wrangham,  Sotheby,  and  Dryden. 

13.  jEschylus.     Translated  by  Potter. 

14.  Sophocles.     Translated  by  Francklin. 
15-17.  Euripides.     Translated  by  Potter. 

18,  19.  Horace  and  Phaedrus.     Translated  by  Francis,  Smart,  &c. 

20,  21.  Ovid.     Translated  by  Dryden  and  others. 

22,  23.  Thucydides.     Translated  by  Smith. 

24-28.  Livy.     Translated  by  Baker. 

29-31.  Herodotus.    Translated  by  Beloe. 

32-34.  Homer.     Translated  by  Pope. 

35.  Juvenal.    Translated  by  Badham  :  and  Persius,  by  Drummond. 

36.  Pindar.     Translated  by  Wheelwright :  and  Anacreon,  by  Bourne. 


antr  Oftris'  Sifcrarg. 

Containing  32  vols.  18mo.     Sold  separately  or  in  sets 
Price  $10  75  per  set. 

1.  Lives  of  the  Apostles  and  Early  Martyrs. 

2,3.  The  Swiss  Family  Robinson ;  or,  Adventures  of  a  Father  and  Moth- 
er and  four  Sons  on  a  Desert  Island. 
4,13,18.  Sunday  Evenings.    Comprising  Scripture  Stories.     Engr's. 

5.  The  Son  of  a  Genius.     By  Mrs.  Hofland. 

6.  Uncle   Philip's  Natural  History ;  or,  Conversations  about  Tools  and 
Trades  among  the  Inferior  Animals. 

7.  8.  Indian  Traits  ;  or,  Manners,  Customs,  and  Character  of  the  North 
American  Indians.    By  Thatcher. 


PUBLISHED   BY   HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 
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9-11.  Tales  from  American  History.    By  the  Author  of  "American 

Popular  Lessons." 
12.  The  Young  Crusoe  ;  or,  the  Shipwrecked  Boy.     By  Mrs.  Hofland. 

14.  Perils  of  the  Sea.  being  authentic  Narratives  of  remarkable  and  af- 
fecting- Disasters  upon  the  Deep. 

15.  Sketches  of  the  Lives  of  Distinguished  Females.    By  an  American 
Lady. 

16.  Caroline  Westerley ;  or,  the  Young-  Traveler  from  Ohio.    By  Mrs 
A.H.  L.  Phelps. 

17.  The  Clergyman's  Orphan;  The  Infidel  Reclaimed;  and  Jane  Clark, 
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19.  The  Ornaments  Discovered.     By  Mrs.  Hugh. 

20.  Uncle  Philip's  Evidences  of  Christianity. 

21.  Uncle  Philip's  Conversations  about  the  History  of  Virginia. 

22.  The  American  Forest ;  or,  Uncle  Philip's  Conversations  about  the 
Trees  of  America. 

23.  24.  Uncle  Philip's  Conversations  with  the  Children  about  the  History 
of  New  York. 

25.  Tales  of  the  American  Revolution.     By  B.  B.  Thatcher. 

26,  27.  Uncle  Philip's  Account  of  the  Whale  Fishery  and  the  Polar  Seas. 

28.  Uncle  Philip's  Conversations  about  the  History  of  the  Lost  Colony  ol 
Greenland. 

29,  30.  Uncle  Philip's  History  of  Massachusetts. 
31,  32.  Uncle  Philip's  History  of  New  Hampshire. 


School  Dfetrtct 

Of  Valuable  Standard  Literature. 

Each  volume  sold  separately,  at  37£  cents. 

First  Series — $20  with  the  Case,  or  $19  ivithout  the  Case 

1,  2.  Paulding's  Life  of  Washington. 

3.  Poor  Rich  Man  and  Rich  Poor  Man. 

4,  5.  The  Swiss  Family  Robinson. 
6,  7.  Natural  History  of  Insects. 

8.  The  Son  of  a  Genius.    By  Mrs.  Hofland 
9-11.  Tales  from  American  History. 

12.  Tales  from  the  American  Revolution. 

13,  14.  Lockhart's  Life  of  Napoleon. 

15.  Combe's  Physiology,  &c. 

16,  17.  Thatcher's  Indian  Traits,  &c. 

18.  Discovery  and  Adventure  in  Africa. 

19.  Conversations  about  Trees. 

20.  Guide  to  the  Observation  of  Nature. 

21.  Perils  of  the  Sea. 

22.  Abercrombie  on  the  Intellectual  Powers. 

23.  Montgomery's  Lectures  on  Poetry. 

24.  Dick's  Celestial  Scenery. 

25.  Russell's  History  of  Palestine. 

26.  James's  History  of  Chivalry. 

27.  firewater's  Life  of  Newton. 


VALUABLE   N  EW  AND  STANDARD  WORKS 
School  District  Library  continued. 

28,  Live  and  Let  Live.     By  Miss  Sedgwick. 

29,  30.  Davis's  China  and  Chinese. 

31.  Circumnavigation  of  the  Globe. 

32.  Life  of  Alexander  the  Great. 

33.  34.  Euler  on  Natural  Philosophy. 
35!  Barrow's  Life  of  Peter  the  Great. 

30,  37.  Russell's  Life  of  Cromwell. 

38.  Dick  on  the  Improvement  of  Society 

39.  Physical  Condition  of  the  Earth. 

40.  Abercrombie  on  the  Moral  Feeling 

41.  42.  Jameson's  Female  Sovereigns. 

43.  Uncle  Philip's  History  of  Virginia 

44.  The  Ornaments  Discovered. 

45.  Uncle  Philip's  Natural  History. 

46.  47.  Uncle  Philip's  Whale  Fishery. 

48.  Lives  and  Voyages  of  Drake,  Cavendish,  amd  Dampier 

49,  50.  Dunlap's  History  of  New  York. 

Second  Series — $20  with  the  Case,  or  $19  without  the  Case. 

51,  52.  Life  and  Works  of  Franklin. 

53,  54.  Buel's  Farmer's  Instructor. 

55,  56.  Pursuit  of  Knowledge  under  Difficulties. 

57.  Griscom's  Animal  Mechanism. 

58.  Natural  History  of  the  Elephant. 

59.  Vegetable  Substances  used  for  Food. 
60-65.  Tytler's  Universal  History. 

66.  Moseley's  Illustrations  of  Mechanics. 

67.  The  Polar  Seas  and  Regions. 

68.  69.  Paley's  Natural  Theology. 
70-79.  Sparics's  American  Biography. 

80.  Humboldt's  Travels. 

81.  Goldsmith's  History  of  Greece. 

82.  Natural  History  of  Birds. 

U3.  Renwick's  Familiar  Illustrations  of  Natural  Pkilesophy 
84,  85.  Selections  from  the  Spectator. 

86.  Lee's  Elements  of  Geology. 

87.  Goldsmith's  Rome.     Abridged. 

88.  Armstrong  on  Agriculture. 

89.  Natural  History  of  Quadrupeds. 

90.  Chaptal's  Agricultural  Chemistry. 

91.  Dwigrht's  Lives  of  the  Signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Indtpendence 
92-95.  Plutarch's  Lives. 

Third  Series— $20  with  the  Case,  or  $19  without  the  C&sc. 

96,  97.  Hale's  History  of  the  United  States. 
v)8.  Brewster's  Letters  on  Natural  Magic. 

99.  Renwick's  Applications  of  Mechanics. 

100,  101.  Parry's  Voyages  of  Discovery. 
102-106.  Keightley's  History  of  England. 
107,  108.  Mackenzie's  Life  of  Perry. 
109,  110.  Irving's  Life  of  Goldsmith. 
Ill,  112.  Murray's  British  America. 


A  NEW  Classified  and  Descriptive  Catalogue  of  HARPER 
&  BROTHERS'  Publications  has  just  been  issued,  compri- 
sing a  very  extensive  range  of  Literature,  in  its  several 
departments  of  History,  Biography,  Philosophy,  Travel, 
Science  and  Art,  the  Classics,  Fiction,  &c. ;  also,  many 
splendidly  Embellished  Productions.  The  selection  of 
works  includes  not  only  a  large  proportion  of  the  most  es- 
teemed Literary  Productions  of  our  times,  but  also,  in  the 
majority  of  instances,  the  best  existing  authorities  on 
given  subjects.  This  new  Catalogue  has  been  construct- 
ed with  a  view  to  the  especial  use  of  persons  forming  or 
enriching  their  Literary  Collections,  as  well  as  to  aid  Prin- 
cipals of  District  Schools  and  Seminaries  of  Learning,  who 
may  not  possess  any  reliable  means  of  forming  a  true  es- 
timate of  any  production  ;  to  all  such  it  commends  itself 
by  its  explanatory  and  critical  notices.  The  valuable  col- 
lection described  in  this  Catalogue,  consisting  of  about 
two  thousand  volumes,  combines  the  two-fold  advantages 
of  great  economy  in  price  writh  neatness — often  elegance 
of  typographical  execution,  in  many  instances  the  rates  of 
publication  being  scarcely  one  fifth  of  those  of  similar  is- 
sues in  Europe. 

%*  Copies  of  this  Catalogue  may  be  obtained,  free  of 
expense,  by  application  to  the  Publishers  personally,  or 
by  letter,  post-paid. 

To  prevent  disappointment,  it  is  requested  that,  when- 
ever books  ordered  through  any  bookseller  or  local  agent 
can  not  be  obtained,  applications  with  remittance  be  ad- 
dressed direct  to  the  Publishers,  which  will  be  promptly 
attended  to. 


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